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Abstract 
This thesis studies the economic implications of a transition from a neutral to a 
non-neutral network. A mathematical model with an end to end ecosystem is 
developed, which includes a backbone internet service provider that provides 
connectivity for the content providers. The model also includes internet users that pay 
an access internet service provider for connectivity to interact with the content 
providers, advertisers that pay the content providers, and access internet service 
providers that charge the internet users for their connectivity. In the non-neutral 
regime, the content providers can pay the access internet service provider to access 
specialized services, a priority lane. The model is solved in a non-cooperative two stage 
game, and where the backbone and access internet service providers maximize their 
individual profits. Our analysis shows that the non-neutral unregulated regime always 
improves social welfare, investment and innovation levels, and lowers the congestion 
levels. We also show that the backbone internet service provider is always better off in 
the non-neutral regime, and therefore reduce the benefit of the other players. The 
result for the other players is generally positive in favor of a non-neutral regime, but 
much more ambiguous, especially for the access internet service providers. We also 
show that moderate regulation can increase social welfare. However, even moderate 
regulation might severely impair individual players, and too much regulation may also 
impair the non-neutral regime so that the overall social welfare is worse than in the 
neutral regime. 
 
Sammendrag: Oppgaven studerer de økonomiske konsekvensene ved en overgang fra et 
nøytralt til et ikke-nøytralt nettverk. Vi utvikler en matematisk modell med et ende-til-ende 
økosystem, som inkluderer en bakgrunnsleverandør som gir innholdsleverandører tilgang til 
Internett. Modellen inkluderer også internettbrukere som betaler internettleverandører for 
tilgang til Internett og dermed innholdsleverandørene, annonsører som betaler 
innholdsleverandørene, og internettleverandører som får betalt av internettbrukerne. I det ikke-
nøytrale regimet kan innholdsleverandørene betale internettleverandørene for å få tilgang til 
spesialiserte tjenester, en prioritetstilkobling. Modellen løser et ikke-samarbeids to-stegs spill, 
hvor bakgrunnsleverandøren og internettleverandørene maksimerer sine respektive overskudd. 
Analysen viser at det ikke-nøytrale og uregulerte regimet alltid forbedrer det sosialøkonomiske 
overskuddet, investerings- og innovasjonsnivåene, og gir lavere kødannelser i nettverket. Vi viser 
også at bakgrunnsleverandøren alltid profiterer på det ikke-nøytrale regimet, og derfor reduserer 
de potensielle fordelene av regimet for de andre aktørene. Overgangen er likevel generelt sett 
positiv for de andre aktørene, men resultatet er mye mer tvetydig. Dette gjelder særlig for 
internettleverandørene. Vi viser også at moderat regulering av nettverket kan øke det 
sosialøkonomiske overskuddet. Men, selv moderat regulering kan gå kraftig utover individuelle 
aktører, og for mye regulering kan også redusere det sosialøkonomiske overskuddet i et ikke-
nøytralt regime slik at overskuddet blir mindre enn i det nøytrale regimet. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet is rapidly evolving, with services demanding ever higher levels of 
network capacities. This has led to the exploration of alternative ways the access 
internet service providers can monetize on their position as gatekeepers, in order to 
finance the high levels of investments. In general what is being explored is the 
transition from a neutral network to a non-neutral network where the internet service 
providers can differentiate and prioritize content, and much research has been done to 
analyze the effects of such a transition [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]. 
Among these, [1] and [2] are closest to our work. In this context, and throughout the 
thesis, a neutral network is a network where the internet service providers are not 
allowed to differentiate content in the network or favor one content provider over 
another, and the access internet service providers can only charge the internet users 
once and not the content providers for sending information over the broad band lines 
to end users. The internet service providers are also not allowed to block internet 
traffic based on its source, ownership or destination. A non-neutral network is a 
network where the internet service providers are allowed to differentiate content in the 
network, and as such prioritize content from one content provider over another. The 
prioritized lane is called specialized services, and the best effort lane is called internet 
access services. The internet service providers may also charge both the internet users 
and the content providers for sending information over the broad band lines to end 
users. However, the internet service providers are not allowed to block internet traffic. 
The articles, [1] - [13], are part in what is referred to as the net neutrality debate. 
Net neutrality is widely and intensely debated among law and policy makers, as well 
as the key actors in the ecosystem that are affected by a possible transition to a non-
neutral network. The policy makers are afraid that a non-neutral network will 
threaten the open internet, and impair the traffic that is not being paid for by the 
content providers. The neutral regime proponents, mostly the content providers, are 
afraid that a departure from a neutral regime will stifle innovation. The proponents of 
a non-neutral network, mostly the internet service providers, claim that a non-neutral 
regime will stimulate innovation by expanding the network infrastructure, help to cope 
with the increase in internet traffic and that it will secure necessary revenues to 
maintain and improve networks without charging extra fees on the end-users. 
Much important research has been developed in the later years, and especially the 
late research by Krämer et al. [1], Bourreau et al. [2], Njorge et al. [3] and Economides 
and Hermalin [4] provide interesting results and thorough insights to many of the 
possible effects of this transition. Krämer et al. provides a model with heterogeneous 
content providers, investments from both internet service providers and content 
providers and multi-homing content providers. Bourreau et al. have further developed 
a model based on a similar setting to include heterogeneous internet users and 
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competing access internet service providers, providing more crisp and realistic results. 
They also do a comprehensive analysis on the effect of endogenous regime choice, 
sabotage and different size of the content providers. While Krämer is more ambiguous 
towards the non-neutral regime, and shows that the access internet service providers 
always benefits from a transition, Bourreau et al. are more positive, and show that 
because of the competition between the access internet service providers they are not 
certain at all to benefit from a non-neutral regime. Njorge et al. use a different setting 
from Bourreau et al., however, with the same overall features. They obtain a crisp set 
of results through a six stage game, and the results mostly agrees with what was found 
by Bourreau et al. Economides and Hermalin does include heterogeneous content 
providers and internet users, and investments by the content providers and access 
internet service providers. However, they do not consider competing access internet 
service providers and multi-homing content providers. Their results are generally not 
in favor of a non-neutral regime. 
The previous research is largely based on a closed ecosystem, where the content 
providers have to connect to the same internet service providers as the internet users, 
or the content provider’s connectivity is not included. In reality, the content providers 
have to connect to the internet, which is modelled in this thesis through a backbone 
internet service provider. The content providers are dependent on sufficient quality of 
service from the backbone internet service provider. We assume, because of the much 
lower costs of backbone network expansion, that the backbone internet service 
provider delivers sufficient quality of service. We have extended on the work done by 
Krämer et al. and Bourreau et al. to include the backbone internet service provider, 
and also include the other features of Bourreau et al., which includes competing 
internet service providers, investments by the internet service providers and the 
content providers as measured by innovation, multi-homing content providers and 
heterogeneous content providers and internet users. The new features in our model are 
the following 
 A backbone internet service provider that provides connectivity to the  
content providers, and endogenously sets the connectivity price to 
maximize its own profits 
 The opportunity to simulate a weaker market power of the backbone 
internet service provider 
 A regulation scheme on the internet access lane, that forces the access 
internet service providers to invest in more capacity to obtain sufficient 
quality of service on their internet access lanes 
In addition to confirming propositions of Bourreau et al. in an ecosystem that 
includes a backbone internet service provider, we also provide new propositions based 
on the analysis and assumptions of our model 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 3 
 If the M/M/1 queue assumptions hold, splitting a network into two 
separate networks can increase the average congestion levels by a factor 
of two  
 A backbone internet service provider always prefers a non-neutral regime, 
provided he has sufficient quality of service to deliver sufficient quality of 
service to the specialized service lanes in the non-neutral regime 
 The backbone ISP reduce the benefit of the non-neutral regime for the 
other actors 
 Too much regulation of the internet access services’ quality of service may 
reduce the overall social welfare 
We perform a numerical experiment where we compare the two regimes, and 
analyze which regime is favorable over the other in overall social welfare and for the 
individual actors. Some highlights of our findings are 
 The attractiveness of advertising relative to the traffic needed to generate 
revenues is arguably the most important factor when considering the 
effects of a neutral versus a non-neutral network because with high and 
low ratio values the winners and losers of a non-neutral regime is opposite 
to one another 
 Regulating the internet access services lane can reduce the overall social 
welfare, and significantly reduce the benefit of the internet users when 
they are dependent on the content providers and high quality of service 
This thesis consists of eight parts. Part 1 provides an overview of important 
definitions and clarifications, an introduction to the net neutrality debate and a 
description of the problem. Part 2 follows up with a comprehensive survey of previous 
research on the net neutrality debate and two-sided markets. Part 3 describes the 
most relevant theory used in this thesis. Part 4 presents mathematical models from 
four of the latest and most comprehensive papers on the net neutrality debate, and 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the presented models. Part 5 is the core 
section of this thesis, and contains a presentation of the mathematical models 
developed and modified for this thesis, solutions to the analytical model, an analytic 
discussion of the results, and a scenario based numerical experiment with a thorough 
discussion that compares a neutral and a non-neutral network based on the scenarios 
in the numerical experiments. Part 6 evaluates the results, and provides a conclusion 
as well as recommendations for future research. Part 7 contains a full list of references 
and part 8 contains the appendix, which provides proofs, a thorough derivation of the 
analytical results and some complimentary numerical results that were used in the 
analytical discussion in part 5.6.4. 
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1.1 Definitions and Conceptual Clarifications 
The following section shows common expressions and their abbreviations that are 
frequently used in the net neutrality debate, together with an explanation. Where 
there is no abbreviation the full expression is used throughout the thesis. However, for 
most of the thesis the abbreviation will be used when possible. 
 
Expression Abbreviation Explanation 
Assured 
forwarding 
AF 
Assurance of delivery of packet as long as the 
traffic does not exceed some subscribed rate. [14] 
Bandwidth 
 
QoS parameter: Describes the capacity of a link or 
end-to-end path. Measured in bits per second. [14] 
Best Effort BE 
Packet forwarding is performed with the best 
effort, but without guaranteeing bandwidth, delay 
bounds etc. [14] 
Bits per 
second 
bps 
Bandwidth rate describing how much information 
can be transferred in the network per second. [14] 
Content 
distribution 
networks 
CDN 
Networks paid by the big CPs to improve the 
quality of experience in a BE Internet. They 
achieve this by building additional infrastructure 
that bypasses congested routes on the public 
Internet and by caching frequency downloaded 
content closer to respective customer class 
networks. [13] 
Content 
provider 
CP 
Actor or player in the NN ecosystem that provides 
content to the IUs through a platform provided by 
the ISPs. [13] 
Delay 
 
QoS parameter: Average delays that packets 
experience over a specific connection. [14] 
Delay 
variation  
QoS parameter: Difference between the bounds of 
minimum and maximum delay. [14] 
Differentiated 
services 
DiffServ/DS 
Approach to provide QoS support in large scale 
networks while avoiding the scalability problems in 
the IntServ concept. Does this by reducing the 
flows to a small number of aggregated flows, and 
admission control and policing are no longer the 
responsibility of core routers. [14] 
Elastic 
Applications  
Application able to adapt to changing QoS 
parameters and does not fail in that case. Also 
called Best Effort Applications (e.g. e-mail). [14] 
End-to-end E2E In the context of this thesis end-to-end refers to the 
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principle of treating information from one end of 
the value chain to the other. Should not be 
confused with the end-to-end principle of networks. 
Inelastic 
applications  
Need strict QoS guarantees. Real-time applications 
by nature are mostly inelastic, but might have 
some abilities to adapt to certain QoS parameter 
changes (e.g. video conferring with changing 
bandwidth). [14] 
Integrated 
Services 
IntServ 
Architecture designed to overcome the inability of 
the Internet to provide guaranteed end-to-end QoS. 
It is based on the reservation of network and 
system resources on application parameters. Five 
parameters (token rate, bucket size, peak rate and 
minimum and maximum packet sizes) make up an 
IntServ Traffic Specification. [14] 
Interactive 
Applications  
Include human interaction. Typically a human 
interacts remotely with another end system and 
expects quick reaction to the performed action (e.g. 
online gaming). [14] 
Internet 
Protocol 
IP 
Principal communications protocol in the Internet 
Protocol suite for relaying datagrams across 
network boundaries. [15] 
Internet 
Protocol 
packets 
IP packets Data information to be sent in the network. [15] 
Internet 
Protocol 
services 
IP services 
Services provided by data sent through the 
network. [15] 
Internet 
Service 
Provider 
ISP 
Providing access to the Internet for IUs (end-
users), and may be viewed as a two-sided market 
platform under the NNN regime. 
Internet user IU 
Internet users, or end-users, are connected to the 
network by their local access provider (ISP). [13] 
Net 
neutrality 
NN 
Net neutrality means that broadband service 
providers charge consumers only once for internet 
access, do not favor one content provider over 
another, and do not charge content providers for 
sending information over broadband lines to end 
users. [13] 
Network 
Application  
Applications for use of network. [14] 
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Non-
interactive 
Applications 
 
Does not include human interaction (e.g. web 
browsing, file transfer, chat and multimedia 
streaming). [14] 
Non-net 
neutrality 
NNN 
In a NNN regime ISPs understands themselves as 
two-sided market operators, connecting CPs with 
the IUs, and can use their last-mile monopoly to 
charge the CPs extra fees for using their network. 
[13]   
Packet loss 
rate  
QoS parameter: Indicates the number of packets 
that do not reach the destination in relation to all 
sent packets. [14] 
Premium 
Service  
User negotiates with his ISP a maximum 
bandwidth for sending packets through the ISP 
network. Allocates absolute bandwidth for 
aggregated flows. Packet flow described by the 
packets source and destination. [15] 
Quality of 
Experience 
QoE 
The QoE of a service is influenced by three major 
dimensions: the CPs requirements with respect to 
QoS, the actual QoS that is delivered by the 
network and the IUs preferences and expectations 
about the service experience. [13] 
Quality of 
Service 
QoS 
A measure of the ability of network and computing 
systems to provide different levels of services to 
selected applications and associated network flows. 
[13] 
Queuing 
 
IP Packets in queue in the case of an overload 
situation [15] 
Service Level 
Agreement 
SLA Contract between an ISP and its customers. 
Strict net 
neutrality  
Net neutrality prohibits Internet service providers 
from speeding up, slowing down or blocking 
Internet traffic based on its source, ownership or 
destination. [13] 
Termination 
fee  
When CPs are charged extra, just to be able to 
transmit their data to the access ISPs customers, 
but without any additional benefits in return. [13] 
Table 1: Definitions and conceptual clarifications 
  
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 7 
1.2 Introduction to the Net Neutrality Debate 
The internet is rapidly developing into an essential platform to reach information, 
entertainment and communication, and the role of network infrastructure owners has 
shifted to an essential gatekeeper position in the information society. This has leaded 
both politicians and the public to be concerned about how ISPs are going to monetize 
access and usage of the networks in the future [13]. Much research has been done to 
analyze the consequences of different regimes the ISPs monetize on their position as 
gatekeepers [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]. These articles are part of 
what is referred to as the net neutrality debate. The debate is currently active in both 
the EU and the USA [16]. 
The phrase net neutrality was first coined by Columbia Law Professor Tim Wu in 
2003 [7]. The term is used to signify the concept that the Internet is merely a carrier 
of online content that does not distinguish one website from another. The central idea 
inherent in this concept is that a «maximally useful public information network aspires 
to treat all content, sites and platforms equally» [7]. There are several definitions of 
net neutrality. Two definitions of net neutrality can be read below: 
“Net neutrality usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers 
only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do 
not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end 
users.” [13] 
“NN usually means that broad-band service providers charge consumers only once 
for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge 
content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users.” [7] 
There is also a strict definition of net neutrality: 
“Net neutrality prohibits Internet service providers from speeding up, slowing 
down or blocking Internet traffic based on its source, ownership or destination” [13] 
The first two definitions refer to that ISPs cannot differentiate among IUs or CPs, 
and that CPs should be free to send their content to IUs without being charged by the 
ISPs. The strict net neutrality has much of the same message. However, it also 
includes blocking of content, which is forced upon the ISPs in some foreign countries. 
Also the strict definition prohibits ISPs from charging access fees on CPs to reach 
their end-users. 
The techniques necessary to differentiate and manage internet traffic are already 
implemented in the networks. However, what started the debate was that ISPs have 
implicitly and overtly signaled that they intend to use these techniques to generate 
extra revenues. The debate was particularly stimulated in 2005 when the CEO of ATT 
at the time, Ed Whitacre, stated: “Now what content providers would like to do is use 
my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital 
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and we have to have a return on it”. Similar statements have been released by major 
European network operators since then [13]. 
To understand the 
reasoning behind the ISPs 
statements, one has to look 
at the ISPs as platforms in 
a two-sided market, which 
they might be considered 
economically [18] [19] [20]. 
The ISPs provide access to 
the Internet for IUs, who 
through their connection 
with the ISP can interact 
with several CPs. We could 
say that there are two types 
of CPs, inelastic and elastic 
applications. Where elastic 
applications can adapt to 
changing QoS, e.g. e-mail, 
inelastic applications need strict QoS guarantees to deliver sufficient QoE [13] [14]. 
These inelastic applications usually consume a disproportionate amount of internet 
traffic. E.g. Netflix amount for nearly 30% of Internet traffic at peak hours [21] (new 
estimates provide an even higher number [17]). Netflix provides video on demand 
through online streaming. Their huge demand for traffic is of course not only 
generated by their services per se, but also by their vast amount of IUs. Thus, an ISP 
has to provide sufficient access to good enough QoS to the IUs in order for all their 
users to be satisfied with both the service of the ISP and the experience from using 
Netflix. If not, they might lose subscribers themselves, or at least many of their 
customers will not be satisfied. However, with the one-sided pricing most ISPs use 
today, they cannot charge Netflix explicitly to bear the investment costs that is 
required to provide a sufficient QoS so that the IUs can enjoy their services. This leads 
us to the three main arguments of the proponents of NNN:  
First, the prioritization of bandwidth stimulates innovation because the ISPs can 
use the money paid for preferential treatment of Internet traffic to pay for the building 
of network infrastructure that would increase broadband access to more consumers. 
[16] 
Second, video sharing websites, such as YouTube (www.youtube.com), Vimeo 
(www.vimeo.com), and Vevo (www.vevo.com), take up a lot of bandwidth. According 
to Cisco, global Internet video traffic was 57 percent of all consumer traffic in 2012. 
The global Internet video traffic will be 69 percent of all consumer Internet traffic in 
2017. This statistic does not include video exchanged through peer-to-peer (P2P) file 
 
Figure 1: Graph by the Wall Street Journal illustrating 
the large share of data flow to internet users from 
Netflix and YouTube [17]. 
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sharing. Cisco states that the sum of all forms of video traffic, including P2P, will be 
in the range of 80 to 90 percent of global consumer traffic by 2017. In order to deal 
with the increased bandwidth requirements, ISPs will need to charge more high-
bandwidth websites. [16] 
Third, network neutrality decreases the revenues earned by the ISPs. The 
decreased revenues of the ISPs increase the level of the employment and decrease 
GDP. Moreover, the decreased revenues of ISPs prevent them from deploying and 
maintaining networks, and improving them over time. In order to recoup the decrease 
revenues, the ISPs may charge their customers increased fees. [16] 
In short, the main arguments of the NNN proponents are that NNN will stimulate 
innovation by building our the network infrastructure, it is necessary to cope with the 
increase in internet traffic and that it secures necessary revenues to maintain and 
improving networks without charging extra fees on the end-users. 
However, there are those who fears that the NNN regime would have negative 
effects. There are mainly six arguments used by the NN proponents: 
First, network neutrality protects the right of freedom of speech. The reason is 
that network neutrality restricts ISPs from blocking or prioritizing content on the 
Internet. Countries that have not implemented the principle of network neutrality in 
their legislation often control or suppress the publishing or accessing of information on 
the Internet. For example, in China, the government uses a system that does not allow 
the residents of China to access certain online content. As a result, if an Internet user 
searches in Google or other search engines for the word “Tibetan independence,” 
“democracy movements,” or other blacklisted words, he or she will be redirected to a 
blank page stating “page cannot be displayed.” [16] 
Second, ISPs have no right to control data transmitted between end-users. 
According to this argument, the networks’ only function is to move data, not choose 
which data to move. In this context, Vinton Cerf, a co-inventor of the internet 
protocol (IP), stated that “the Internet was designed with no gatekeepers over new 
content or services.” [16] 
Third, network neutrality does not allow ISPs to restrict content and/or services 
provided by their competitors. As known, restrictions of competition may lead to 
increased prices of services and/or goods. For example, in 2009, Deutsche Telekom 
announced plans to prohibit the use of Skype over iPhones. Such a prohibition will 
harm the interests of consumers who can otherwise save money on calls by using 
Skype. [16] 
Fourth, the involvement of ISPs in determining what content or services reach 
consumers will stifle innovators. For instance, if Google can pay ISPs to deliver 
YouTube videos faster than other sources of Internet video, any startups offering 
better services than YouTube will have tremendous difficulties enter the online video 
market. [16] 
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Fifth, network neutrality preserves the existing Internet standards. The reason is 
that, at present, the Internet runs on technical standards created by variety of 
organizations, such as the internet engineering task force (IETF). By using the 
existing Internet standards, computers, services, and software created by different 
companies can be integrated together. Without network neutrality, the Internet will be 
regulated by ISPs under standards chosen by them. [16] 
Sixth, network neutrality maintains the end-to-end principle. It “allows nodes of 
the network to send packets to all other nodes of the network, without requiring 
intermediate network elements to maintain status information about the transmission”. 
The principle allows people using the Internet to innovate free of any central control. 
[16] 
In short, the main arguments of the NN proponents are that it protects the 
freedom of speech, is in accordance with “no gatekeepers” principle, protects the 
interest of consumers with no blocking of content, it preserves the existing internet 
standards and it maintains the end-to-end principle so that people can use the Internet 
freely to innovate. 
All three arguments posed by the NNN proponents can be tested quantitatively in 
a mathematical model. The third, fourth and fifth argument of the NN proponents can 
also be analyzed in a mathematical model. The other arguments of the NN proponents 
are either technical or principal and will therefore not be analyzed in this thesis. 
Regulators have so far responded differently towards 
NN. In the USA, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has adopted a set of rules that should “preserve the 
Internet’s openness and broadband providers’ ability to 
manage and expand their networks”. The four core 
principles are: transparency, no blocking of content, no 
unreasonable discrimination, and reasonable network 
management. In Europe, no such rules have been adopted 
so far. The European Commission is committed to 
“preserving the open and neutral character of the Internet”, 
it believes that the existing rules on transparency, consumer 
switching and quality of service are sufficient to ensure competitive outcomes [22]. 
However, the EU has recently stated that the Internet could be spilt in two, internet 
access services (IAS) and specialized services (SS). Internet access services should be 
open without traffic management. On the other hand specialized services allows the 
operators to manage the networks how they want. The splitting point between these 
two networks has not yet been decided, and neither has the flexibility in managing the 
two networks been decided yet. This is to be decided by the European commission this 
year [23]. 
 
 
Figure 2: FCC (top) 
and the European 
(EU) Commission  
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1.3 Presentation of the Problem Statement 
The regulators and policy makers have not yet set the final conditions for a 
potential NNN regime, where a specialized service lane can be offered to the content 
providers that are willing to pay for it. The other content providers are left in the 
internet access lane, which is similar to today’s best effort. In order to increase the 
knowledge of the effects of adopting the NNN regime has on key ecosystem actors, and 
guide the policy makers in their work on possible regulations, the following problem 
statement was chosen: 
 
“What effects does leaving the NN regime in favor of the NNN regime involve for 
key ecosystem actors in an E2E multi actor environment, which scenarios lead to a 
beneficial outcome for the key actors and overall social welfare, and how does 
regulating the QoS of the IAS lane in the NNN regime affect the key actors and social 
welfare?” 
1.4 Justification of the Chosen Problem Statement 
The problem description given to me by Telenor was the following: “Describe 
different quantitative methods for analyzing economics effects in E2E multi actor 
environment for a network operator (ISP), including two-sided pricing models. 
Furthermore design different scenarios in both network neutrality and non-neutrality 
settings. Finally analyze economic impact and recommend policy implications for key 
ecosystem actors using preferred methods.” The problem statement of this thesis aims 
to provide an answer to this problem description, as well as give deeper insights on the 
effects of regulation. 
The EU has largely agreed to allow a separation of the internet into specialized 
services, and internet access services. However, how this should be implemented, and 
how flexible it should be, is still to be considered. The problem statement is to provide 
better insights into the questions the EU commission, FCC and other policy makers 
have to evaluate before deciding on final guidelines for a possible non-neutral Internet. 
Also, the problem statement allows for a broad analysis of the implications of a non-
neutral internet, which has not yet been fully analyzed in an end to end perspective, 
which is included in this thesis. 
The problem statement could have included a broad analysis on regulation, and 
look deeper into how regulators could best regulate the network in order to best utilize 
the benefits and avoid the possible pitfalls of a non-neutral Internet. This is a topic 
that could also be interesting to investigate further. However, the regulators largest 
concern is how the QoS of IAS is affected by the non-neutral regime, and therefore 
this is also chosen as the problem statement in this thesis. A broad analysis of 
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different regulation schemes would also complicate the mathematical model and 
solutions, which might reduce the quality of the general analysis. 
By key actors we consider the main actors in the network ecosystem, the content 
providers, the backbone ISP, the access ISPs, the internet users and the regulators. 
The formulation could include a direct analysis of specific actors, like Telenor or 
Netflix. However, since the insights provided by this thesis aims to aid in a general 
assessment of adopting the NNN regime, no individual actors are considered. A 
business analysis that aims to help companies maneuver in the NNN regime to 
maximize their own profits would benefit from such a formulation and analysis. Single 
companies should not affect the regulators that have to evaluate the full picture, 
which is the focus of this thesis. 
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2 Survey of Previous Research 
2.1 Literature on Net Neutrality 
The following section contains a survey of previous research on the net neutrality 
debate. Two articles, [24] and [25], describe the framework of internet 
interconnections, and how regulators have to take the complexity of the Internet 
Interconnections into consideration when looking at different regulation policies. 
Twelve articles, [1] - [12], directly analyze the effects of regulation regimes for the NN 
debate, will be presented both in tabular form and in a short summary. Some of the 
findings from these articles will be used explicitly in own sections. As such, they will 
be presented thoroughly according to the context in which they are being used. An 
article providing empirical studies [22] is presented, and represents a different 
approach from the other research papers and the work in this thesis. Lastly, Krämer et 
al. [13] have written a progress report, and we summarize their most important 
findings. 
2.1.1 Tabular Overview of Previous Research on the NN Debate 
This section contains two tables; one that summarizes the framework in which the 
previous research has analyzed the NN debate, the other table shows the findings in 
these articles. Both tables were made in MS Excel using Pivot tables. 
The columns of the first table include 
 Authors states who wrote the article 
 Year states when the article was published 
 Definition NN is how net neutrality is defined in the article. Some articles 
consider managing access is defining NN, while other articles define NN as the 
ability not to prioritize content by offering differentiated classes. 
 Network regime is how, in the NNN case, the ISP structures the network. It could 
be by offering tiering services, where there are lanes of different quality, or 
simply by allowing access to the higher quality lanes or even the network 
through a termination fee. 
 ISP Comp. is whether the model captures competition among ISPs. This is 
important as previous research shows competition for end users are toughened 
in the NNN regime [2] 
 Invest ISPs state whether the article consider investments in infrastructure and 
better quality by the ISPs or not. This is important to analyze long-term effects of 
regulation policies. 
 Invest CP states whether the article considers investments or innovations done 
by CPs, and is again important to analyze long-term effects of regulation. 
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 Multih. CPs is whether end-users connect to several CPs simultaneously. 
 Het. CPs is whether is whether the CPs are modelled as heterogeneous or not 
 Het. IUs is whether is whether the IUs are modelled as heterogeneous or not 
 Explicit cong. is whether congestion is modelled explicitly as a result of demand 
for packages and investment levels 
 E2E is whether E2E effects are considered in the model or not 
Authors Year 
Definition 
NN 
Network 
regime 
ISP 
Comp. 
Invest 
ISPs 
Invest 
CPs 
Multih. 
CPs 
Het. 
CPs 
Het. 
IUs 
Explicit 
cong. 
E2E 
Altman et al. 2011 Acc fee Ter. fee No Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
Bourreau et al. 2012 Priority Tiering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Cañon 2009 Acc fee Ter. fee No Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Cheng et al. 2011 Priority Tiering No Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
Choi and Kim 2010 Priority Tiering No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Choi et al. 2011 Priority Tiering Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Economides et al. 2012 Priority Tiering No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Economides et al. 2012 Acc fee Tiering Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Hermalin et al. 2007 Priority Tiering No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Krämer et al. 2012 Priority Tiering No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Musacchio et al. 2009 Acc fee Tiering Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Njorge et al. 2012 
Acc 
fee/Prio 
Tiering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
This thesis 2014 Priority Tiering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 2: Features of the mathematical models presented in the previous research, 
compared to the features of the model in this thesis. This thesis is the only paper with 
yes in all of the columns. 
As can be seen from the overview, only two articles, with the exception of this 
thesis, use a relatively complete framework, namely Njorge et al. (2012) and Bourreau 
et al. (2012), which are also some of the newest articles. However, these articles do not 
consider the effects of an E2E network ecosystem. Njorge et al. does consider 
connectivity by a CDN, but that is from one of the same ISPs that provide 
connectivity for the end users, which is rarely the case in international E2E network 
configurations. This thesis presents the first research what takes this into 
consideration, in a complete framework. The second table shows a summary of the 
results found in the different papers. The table reflects a general interpretation of the 
articles results and argumentation, and does not necessarily represent any personal 
views the authors may have. 
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The columns of the second table include 
 NNN states whether the article in general is positive towards NNN or not. This is 
usually tied to the overall social welfare. It is important to notice that whether 
the article is generally in favor of or against NNN is usually dependent on the 
values of the parameters, and that there usually are values that make either 
regime profitable. 
 SW states whether social welfare benefits from NNN or not. Social welfare is in 
most cases measured as the profit of the ISPs, the CPs and the consumer surplus 
combined. 
 CP states whether the CP is better off with NNN or not 
 Backbone ISP states whether the backbone ISP is better off with NNN or not 
 Access ISP states whether the access ISPs is better off with NNN or not 
 IU stated whether the IUs (end-users) are better off with NNN or not 
 Where depending is used, the result is dependent on parameter values, and no 
clear answer can be given based on the general argumentation in the article. 
 N/A states that non conclusion could be made from the analysis in the article 
  
Authors Year NNN SW CP 
Backbone 
ISP 
Access 
ISP 
IU 
Altman et al. 2011 Depending N/A Depending N/A Yes N/A 
Bourreau et al. 2012 Yes Yes Depending N/A Yes Depending 
Cañon 2009 No Depending Depending N/A Depending Yes 
Cheng et al. 2011 Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes 
Choi and Kim 2010 Depending Depending Depending N/A Depending Depending 
Choi et al. 2011 N/A Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Economides et al. 2012 No Depending No N/A Yes Depending 
Economides et al. 2012 Depending Depending Depending N/A Depending Depending 
Hermalin et al. 2007 Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Krämer et al. 2012 Depending Depending No N/A Yes Yes 
Musacchio et al. 2009 Depending Depending Depending N/A Depending Depending 
Njorge et al. 2012 Yes Yes Depending N/A Depending Yes 
This thesis 2014 Yes Yes Depending Yes Depending Depending 
Table 3: Summary of results on profits, consumer surplus and social welfare from the 
transition to a non-neutral from a neutral regime in the previous research, compared 
to the results provided by this thesis. 
The table reveals a trend that most articles are actually positive towards NNN, 
especially later research with more comprehensive modelling. However, most articles 
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also point out challenges like “tragedy of the commons” with the ISPs overcharging 
CPs when the maximize their own profits, ISPs sabotaging BE lanes, hard entry for 
new CPs or that small CPs might be pushed out of the market. Thus, for regulators, 
even though NNN should prove beneficial for the society, the articles reveal a need to 
regulate or monitor some of the business to protect fair competition. 
2.1.2 Summaries on Articles Covering the NN Debate 
The following section contains short summaries of the articles, their most 
important findings and suggestions for future research. The summaries are not meant 
to give a thorough understanding of the results, and any material used explicitly in 
this thesis will therefore be described independently of this section. 
Complexity of Internet Interconnections: Technology, Incentives and Implications for 
Policy (Faratin, Clark, Gilmore, Bauer, Berger and Lehr) [24] 
The article describes the structure and complexity of Internet interconnections. 
The article describes the different participants in a network system: Autonomous 
Systems, Prefix, Cone of Prefixes and Default Route. The article also defines tiers for 
the different ASes, depending on how they interact with each other. There are two 
ways to interact, transit (A is a customer of X) or peering (exchange of traffic). 
Peering is what enables ISPs to be in contact with the whole of internet without doing 
a transit with all networks. However, for peering to work, certain conditions must be 
met which is regulated by traffic volume, traffic ratio, consistent announcements, 
marketing considerations or other requirements. The article goes on to describe 
possible issues and solutions to conflicts, as well as different types of interconnection 
agreements. The article then describe “Settlement-Free Peering Bargaining”, in which 
different network providers have different willingness to peer (WTP) based on their 
traffic structure. The article follows up with strategies on when not to peer, and how 
to create incentives to peer. In general you should avoid to indirectly or directly 
peering with current or potential customers, and create incentives by lowering 
performance of the networks that does not want to peer but indirectly are dependent 
of your network. The article also provides strategies to remain in a current peering 
policy. Lastly the article provides bilateral negotiations, market failure and entry of 
content delivery networks. The market failure refers to the fact that there are 
willingness to pay for better than best effort connectivity, but with no providers able 
to give such an offer. This enables entry incentives for third party content distribution 
overlay networks. The article concludes that because of the complexity of the Internet 
interconnection, regulations have to be very complex in order to reflect reality. The 
article suggests that regulators should rather focus on the sources of bargaining power 
and identify anti-competitive opportunism, rather than to impose ex-ante restrictions 
on the range of bilateral contacts. The article encourage both the industry and the 
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academia to bring “best practice” or “common practice” in interconnection into the 
light, as this might help reduce bargaining costs, but in a more flexible way than 
might be achieved vie regulatory constraints. Lastly the article points out that today’s 
“best effort” Internet probably have hindered the emergence of some applications 
because of lacking QoS, and that some sort of differentiated QoS will be necessary in 
the future to accommodate the requirements of different types of traffic. 
The Growing Complexity of Internet Interconnection (Faratin, Clark, Bauer, Lehr, 
Gilmore and Berger, 2008) [25] 
The article is an abbreviated version of [24]. However, some elaboration of 
different alternative interconnections is presented. The early internet grew on the 
assumption that the ISPs were homogeneous in size, and thus in costs. This makes it 
beneficial for the large Tier 1 ISPs to peer. However, following the recent development 
of the Internet with bandwidth heave content providers, the Autonomous Systems’ 
(AS) are now more heterogeneous. They can be divided into “eyeball” heavy networks, 
which provide connectivity to users, and “content” heavy networks that provide 
connectivity to the content providers. The “eyeball” networks connects to many users 
that send relatively little traffic to the “content” networks, that on the other hand send 
loads of traffic back to the “eyeball” networks. This makes for unfair peering, as the 
“eyeball” networks have to carry much cost that they do not get compensated for 
directly. The “eyeball” networks thus sometimes refuse to peer with “content” network; 
this could be because of several reasons: Switching costs are now high for consumers, 
so the “eyeball” networks may perceive that they have increased bargaining power. The 
“eyeball” networks believe that the natural direction of value flow is towards them. 
Especially since the content providers are so dependent on advertising to users to 
generate revenues. The last-mile networks of the broadband “eyeball” networks are 
more capital intensive, which makes for a cost recovery challenge. 
Some alternative peering and transit is therefore discussed, paid peering and 
partial transit. Paid peering is also called “settlement based peering”, and is similar to 
“settlement free peering” except that the traffic is no longer exchanged without 
payment. This is the best solution for heterogeneous ASes that want to peer. Partial 
transit is where a provider sells access to and/or from a subset of the Internet prefixes 
to another network. E.g. a network that only buy the ability to send traffic but not 
receive can work as a content network but not like an eyeball network. 
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Network Neutrality and Congestion Sensitive Content Providers: Implication for 
Content Variety, Broadband Investment, and Regulation (Krämer and Wiewiorra, 
2012) [1] 
The article answers and analyses many of the arguments in the net neutrality 
debate, welfare enhancement, capacity expansion, BE unable to provide necessary 
QoS. The article finds results that do not agree with previous research on capacity 
expansion. The reason is that the article also considers the effect of new CP entrants, 
and competition between ISPs, that force them to invest in higher capacities. The 
analysis also considers the effect of bad QoS, and thus capture the disutility that 
might be the effect from congestion with traditional BE networks. The article also 
analyses different strategic options for policy makers, like minimum quality standards 
or strategic degradation. The first may be effective but inefficient concerning 
investments, while the latter may decrease the overall welfare as fewer CPs enter the 
network. All in all, except for the capacity expansion, the article agree with much 
earlier research in that in general the CPs are worse off while the overall welfare in 
general is higher. However for very congestion sensitive CPs QoS tiring might put 
them better off because QoS tiring can allocate congestion to congestion insensitive 
CPs. The article concludes that QoS tiering is the preferred regime for ISPs, and that 
prohibiting this can eventually be harmful to content variety, broadband investment, 
and welfare. 
Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms (Bourreau, Kourandi and Valleti, 
2013) [2] 
The article studies the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investment 
in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content. The 
article finds that under discrimination investments in broadband capacity and content 
innovation are both higher than under net neutrality, and that the total welfare 
increases. Also, the end users benefit from less congestion. However, the discriminatory 
regime is not always beneficial to the ISPs as it can intensify competition for 
subscribers. Though welfare-enhancing, the discriminatory regime has some 
undesirable effects, as the discriminatory regime hurts the small CPs more than the 
large ones. The article also considers sabotage by the ISPs on the CPs, and shows that 
it can only emerge, with adverse effects, under discrimination. Under discrimination 
each ISP benefits from degrading the quality of the non-priority lane in order to 
extract higher profits from the priority lane. This effect should be considered by policy 
makers, and if possible be regulated while allowing the welfare-improving 
discriminatory regime. This could be done my monitoring the traffic quality. 
Investment in two-sided markets and the net neutrality debate (Njorge, Ozdaglar, 
Stier-Moses and Weintraub, 2012) [3] 
The article develops a game theoretic model, where the participants make 
decisions in a specified order, to investigate the net neutrality debate. The article 
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summarizes the research done on the NN debate, and explicitly shows the limitations 
of the other articles that this article covers. The paper claims to be the first to analyze 
the NN debate in a model that simultaneously considers competition between ISPs, 
ISP investment decisions, CPs and consumers heterogeneity and CPs endogenous 
participation decisions as a proxy for content innovation. The model has a high quality 
platform, and a low quality platform that offer their services. The model is solved 
theoretically and exhaustively through numerical simulation. In general ISPs 
investments are larger in the non-neutral regime, because the ISPs can extract surplus 
from the CPs. The results in the article suggests that net neutrality regulation could 
possibly be an inapt policy to increase value in the Internet, because it could limit the 
investment incentives of network providers, which results in decreased CPs and 
consumer utility directly through low QoS and indirectly through bottleneck effects. 
The results are in general, and the article also provides tables to illustrate which 
actors prefer what under different circumstances. E.g. the low quality platform always 
prefers non-neutrality. However the high quality platform prefer (in the numerical 
solution) non-neutrality when the CPs are very heterogeneous, and neutrality when 
they are not (theoretically the high quality platform always prefer neutrality). This is 
because with heterogeneous CPs the platforms can use their monopoly power more 
effectively charging higher prices to CPs that enroll and appropriating the higher 
revenues that CPs earn in this regime. The results also suggest that a non-neutrality 
policy could potentially reduce the CPs participation and innovation. The article 
suggests that future research could implement transaction costs in the non-neutral 
regime, to let the CPs quality be determined endogenously and finally to model 
congestion more explicitly. 
The economics of network neutrality (Economides and Hermalin, 2012) [4] 
The article analyzes the private and social implications of two-sided pricing by 
ISPSs when the network is congested and more traffic implies greater delays. The 
article analyses under the assumption that the ISP can price discriminate only the CP 
side. The article argues that even though network neutrality might not generally be 
welfare maximizing, it might be welfare maximizing within second degree price 
discrimination, where the content providers are induced to play their part in the set. 
In particular, if the elasticity of content demand with respect to transmission time 
does not increase with households’ time sensitivity for the content, then network 
neutrality is welfare maximizing within the set of feasible schema. The article features 
a complex and abstract mathematical model, which provides some direct insights. E.g. 
that it is impossible to increase total welfare by excluding content, and that it could 
be welfare maximizing to hold back inelastic content in favor of elastic content, 
because the IUs will adapt to the situation.  Overall the article argues in favor on NN. 
If that elasticity is invariant with households’ time sensitivity for the content, then 
network neutrality is welfare superior to all schema. (This is of course not realistic). 
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The mathematical model in the article has a number of simplifying assumptions. 
However, the simplifications are relaxed individually to prove that the major standings 
are reliable also under relaxation and thus a more realistic scenario. Other issues to be 
explored are an analysis of what happens when the ISP is engaging in price 
discrimination on both sides of the market.  
Network Non-neutrality Debate: An Economic Analysis (Altman, Legout and Xu, 2004) 
[5] 
The article considers an environment with one ISP and one CP and analyzes a 
two-sided pricing model with two separate analyses, where the first considers revenue 
generation of CPs through subscriptions, and the latter through advertising. The 
analysis has three important features, the relative price sensitivity, the CP’s revenue 
model and the QoS provided by the ISP. The analysis shows that under certain 
conditions it is beneficiary for the ISP to charge a side-payment. With the subscription 
model, the relative price sensitivity determines whether the ISP should charge the side 
payment from the CP or not. With the advertisement model, the charge of the side 
payment depends on the ability of the CP’s investment to attract demand. Under 
some circumstances it is also beneficial for both when the side payment is charged by 
the ISP, due to better QoS delivered to end users, which increase demand. 
Regulation Effects on Investment Decisions in Two-Sided Market Industries: The Net 
Neutrality Debate (Carlos Cañon, 2009) [6] 
The paper discusses the impact of regulation on a platform’s pricing scheme, on 
investment decisions, on network users’ decision to join the network and on welfare. 
The article studies three scenarios, a profit maximizing platform, a profit maximizing 
platform that cannot charge content providers and a profit maximizing platform that 
cannot charge end users. Concerning investments the article concludes that a profit 
maximizing platform with no regulations will invest less. However, if regulators care 
about the mass of network users that join in, the results are a bit more two-sided: The 
profit maximizing platform will exclude more content providers and end-users than the 
profit maximizing platform forced to either charge content providers or end users a 
zero access fee. On the other hand, if network effects are such that content providers 
trade surplus exceeds enough end-users trade surplus, the profit maximizing platform 
will exclude more content providers but less end users than when forced to charge 
either group zero for access. The welfare is maximized if the profit maximizing 
platform is forced to charge the content providers a zero access fee. 
The Debate on Net Neutrality: A Policy Perspective (Cheng, Bandyopadhyay and Guo, 
2011) [7] 
The article discusses two major issues, who are the gainers and losers when 
abandoning NN, and if broad band providers will have a greater incentive to expand 
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their capacity without NN. The model is based on a simplistic model with one ISP and 
two CPs, Y and G have inverse proportional market share, and a uniformed 
distributed demand of end users for the ISP. The Social welfare and consumer surplus 
is also considered when the results are analyzed. Concerning the first issue, the ISP is 
ambiguously better off without NN. Social welfare either increases or remains 
unchanged depending on the parameter values. Likewise, consumer surplus either 
increase or remain unchanged. The CPs are usually worse off under NNN (non-net 
neutrality), except when the content provider fee has the same surplus as under NN. 
Regarding expanding capacity, it is shown that, except under one condition, the 
optimal capacity is higher under NN than with NNN. The scenario when capacity 
expansion is higher for NNN is equivalent to when the revenue rates, rG and rY, is such 
that rG is a certain ratio hither than rY. G is the content provider that attracts the 
best customers for its advertisers, and therefore can collect higher advertising fees. 
Net neutrality and investment incentives (Choi and Kim, 2010) [8] 
The article analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment 
incentives for ISPs and CPs, and their implications for social welfare. The article use a 
simple model based on queuing theory to capture the congestion in the network. The 
article shows that the ISPs incentives to invest in a multitiered network vs. a 
nondiscriminatory network under net neutrality regulation depends on a potential 
tradeoff between the two sides of the market: the network access fee from end users 
and the revenue from content providers through the potential trade of the first 
priority in delivery. The article also finds that the relationship between the net 
neutrality regulation and investment incentives is subtle in the case of CPs incentives 
to invest and social welfare. For future research the article emphasize the simplifying 
assumptions of the model regarding pricing strategies of several players, and it should 
be further analyzed. Research on two-sided markets show what the equilibrium 
depends crucially on the pricing scheme, which makes this an important extension. 
Another important extension would be competition between the content providers. 
Content providers can perform different types of investments, e.g. firm-specific 
investments or investments that have spillover effects. This is also suggested as an 
extension for future research. 
Net Neutrality and Internet Interconnection (Choi, Jeon and Kim, 2011) [9] 
The article analyzes competition between interconnected networks when content is 
heterogeneous in terms of its sensitivity to deliver quality. The article considers, in a 
two-sided market, under a neutral and non-neutral regime how packet delivery can 
take place. In the neutral regime, all packets are delivered with the same quality, and 
under the non-neutrality regime ISPs are allowed to offer multiple lanes with different 
delivery quality levels. Cooperation is needed to assure quality in an interconnected 
network, and the article provides a framework of two-sided markets in which ISPs 
compete with each other to serve as platforms that connect CPs and end consumers. 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 22 
The article shows that, under a non-neutral regime, ISPs agree on charges that enable 
them to behave as monopoly bottlenecks towards the CPs, and that the competition in 
the consumer side of the market is intensified. However, under a neutral regime, ISPs 
make losses from the CPs side of the market and the consumer plays the role as the 
competitive bottleneck. Also the competition to attract consumers is softened. The 
model in the article is static in nature, and there are no dynamic investment incentives 
facing ISPs and CPs. This could be included in future research. 
Network neutrality on the Internet: A two-sided market analysis (Economides and 
Tåg, 2012) [10] 
The article considers two sided pricing in a monopoly and duopoly scenario (ISPs), 
with several CPs and customers. The demand from CPs and users are both dependent 
on the expected demand of the other, because more users attract more CPs, and more 
CPs attracts more users. The model does not consider QoS, and discuss the net 
neutrality debate looking at prices and demand only. This is a major simplification. 
The article concludes that under different circumstances, the total surplus might be 
higher or lower, depending on parameter values, under non-net neutrality. The 
customers however are usually better off, together with the ISP. However the CPs will 
be worse off with a two sided pricing system. The article suggest further analysis on 
network neutrality implications on innovation, price discrimination and two part 
tariffs to consumers and content providers. The results in the article rely heavily on 
the fact that ISPs cannot extract the entire surplus from content providers and 
customers. 
The Economics of Product-Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network 
Neutrality Debate (Hermalin and Katz, 2006) [11] 
The article examines the effects of product-line restrictions, such as those called for 
by some proponents of net neutrality regulation. The regulation being analyzed in the 
article is towards product lines for the consumer, and two-sided pricing of the CPs and 
the end-users. The article finds that by restricting a monopoly supplier to a single 
product, the follow effects apply: consumers who would otherwise have consumed a 
low-quality variant are excluded from the market, consumers in the middle range of 
the market consume a higher and more efficient quality, and consumers at the top of 
the market consume a lower and less efficient quality. The total surplus might rise or 
fall. A duopoly model is also analyzed, and the article finds that a single-product 
restriction always reduces welfare. The welfare is reduced because of the loss of variety 
as a result from the regulation. 
A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with an Application 
to the Net-Neutrality Issue (Musacchio, Schwartz and Walrand, 2009) [12] 
The article address whether local ISPs should be allowed to charge content 
providers, who derive advertising revenue, for the right to access end-users. The article 
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compares two-sided pricing with one-sided pricing. When the ratio between parameters 
characterizing advertising rate and end-user price sensitivity is either high or low, two-
sided pricing is favorable. When the ratio is high, such that the content providers 
revenue from advertising is large and ISPs revenue from end users low, the ISPs 
incentives to invest are suboptimal unless they can extract some extra revenues from 
the content providers through two-sided pricing. However, when the ratio is very small 
the ISPs have to pay the content providers in order to get the CPs to invest 
adequately. This whether ISPs should charge CPs through two-sided pricing is a 
question on how the revenue is the value chain is divided between CPs and ISPs. 
When the ratio is in the intermediate range, both ISPs and CPs have adequate 
incentives to invest. An interesting aspect is the effect of when the number of ISPs is 
large. Each ISP only sees the benefit of increasing its own prices, but not the 
externalities the community suffers from the raised prices. Thus all ISPs will overprice 
the CPs, which is analogous to the tragedy of the commons. The model in the article 
is limited due to a fixed amount of network providers, no heterogeneity among the 
providers or net users, full commitment to the declared prices and the content 
provider’s price on advertisers is not a variable. Future studies could take these 
limitations into account, in order to capture a more realistic image of the industry 
structure. 
Net Neutrality, Foreclosure and the Fast Lane An empirical study of the UK (Laura 
Nurski, 2012) [22] 
The article analyzes the NN debate using empirical data, as the first and, to our 
knowledge, the only article to do so. The empirical analysis is based on data from the 
UK. The paper investigates the inceptives for an ISP to break net neutrality 
empirically. The empirical data is used in a two-stage consumer demand model of 
differentiated online content providers and downstream ISPs. The demand estimates 
are then used to explore two counterfactual simulations of breaking net neutrality, 
with focus on YouTube in particular. There is one analysis where a fast lane is offered 
and another where the ISP can foreclosure through quality degradation. The results in 
the article are preliminary. They reveal that a fast lane increases consumers’ surplus, 
industry revenues and advertising revenues. However, foreclosure reduce the 
foreclosing ISP’s revenues from selling broadband more than it can recuperate through 
advertising on online content, and is therefore an unlikely scenario. The article also 
shows a summary empirical data: market share among the players, competition in the 
local exchanges, statistics on households, share of households that consume different 
type of only content by speed, and product characteristics. The author is going to 
expand the preliminary model to allow for more realistic substitution patterns as well 
as estimate complementary or substitutability between content providers. Future 
empirical research should look at the long run effects of net neutrality regulation on 
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investment in the broadband network as well as on innovation among content 
providers. 
Net neutrality: A progress report (Krämer, Wiewiorra and Weinhardt, 2012) [13] 
The article is a summary of the work done on net neutrality. The article provides 
a definition of net neutrality, and a non-net neutrality framework to categorize the 
different NNN scenarios along two dimensions, pricing regime and network regime. 
The pricing regime refers to whether the pricing is one-sided or two-sided. The 
network regime refers to the way the network is managed, either through capacity 
only, managed network or quality of service. 
 
  Pricing regime 
  One-sided Two-sided 
  
  
N
et
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rk
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e 
Quality of 
Service 
User tiering 
(IUs choose priority class) 
Content and service 
provider tiering 
(CPs and/or IUs choose 
priority class) 
Managed 
network 
Status quo 
(Best effort network with 
traffic engineering and/or 
managed services) 
Termination fee 
(Additional fee for CPs to 
terminate traffic at access ISP) 
Capacity only 
Strict net neutrality 
(No discrimination based on 
source, destination or content) 
N/A 
Table 4: Setup of network and pricing regimes in one- and two-sided markets in the 
NN debate 
The conclusion is that today’s network is still not NN per definition. The article 
move on to discuss a strict NN model, the Termination fee model, the CP tiering 
model and the User tiering model by summing up the most important findings from 
the research done on the subject. The strict NN model could lead to congestion at 
peak hours, as ISPs would not be allowed to manage congestion. The counter play 
would be overprovisioning of network capacity, and overall the ISPs revenue would be 
reduced because business models that rely on managed services could not be provided 
anymore. Either the consumer price would increase, or the rate of investments in 
network infrastructure be reduced. In the Termination fee model, ISPs use the last 
mile monopoly to charge the CPs additional fees for terminating their traffic to the 
installed customer base. This would only be a financial burden for the CPs, without 
any immediate reward. The main concern of NN proponents concerning this model is 
that the additional termination fee causes CPs to cease or to be discouraged from ever 
offering their services. It is therefore argued that two-sided pricing reduces innovation 
of the internet. The research done on the area is divided on whether this would benefit 
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society or not. The CP tiering model is a response to the fact that many services 
would be much better off if they were allowed to pay for priority, e.g. Skype. The 
most relevant scenario in this model is that only the CP that opts for better quality 
pays and the other CPs receive best effort. The general tone of CP tiering is that this 
practice should be welfare enhancing, and especially if there exists competition 
between access ISPs. UI tiering is a one sided model where users can pay for better 
quality. Many of the arguments opted by the NN proponents do not hold with this 
model, because the CPs are not charged with any fees. However, even though some 
ISPs already do some IU tiering, they hesitate to do it on a big scale. This is probably 
due to a different psychological perspective on fairness from IUs vs. CPs, where IUs 
might negative get negative emotions to a proposed tiering pricing scheme. 
The article continues by drawing policy conclusion. The debate on net neutrality 
rests on two fundamental assumptions, the internet traffic will increase to such a high 
level that we get a severe congestion problem, and the ISPs claim that they cannot 
bear the costs for the necessary network infrastructure investments without tapping 
additional revenue streams. The survey in the article shows that deviations from the 
NN are generally welfare enhancing if the appropriate remedies are applied.  The 
article also suggests a flow chart that could guide policy makers through the potential 
threats that are associated with the different NNN scenarios. For each threat, a 
remedy is suggested that can potentially deal with it. The chart is simplified to a 
binary decision process, and in reality the conclusion might be finer grained. The 
article further discusses different regulation policies. Lastly the article consider 
neutrality in the internet ecosystem, and argue the debate may only be onset of a 
larger debate on neutrality in the Internet ecosystem, due to the fact that the Internet 
ecosystem is affected by competition up and down the internet value chain. There are 
also other participants that should be included in the debate, namely content and 
services, the devices that connect users to the network and the content delivery 
networks. 
As a conclusion the paper state that while there are some consensus on the NN 
debate (e.g. allowing reasonable network management), there is still considerable 
disagreement and topics that should be researched further: The effect of competition 
between ISPs on IUs, empirical papers to reject some of the assumptions driving the 
analytical models, and finally to extend the debate to other participants on the 
Internet. 
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2.2 Literature on Two-sided Markets 
The net neutrality debate in many ways centers around the understanding of two-
sided markets, because debate is about whether an ISP should operate as a platform in 
a two-sided market or not. Because of network externalities and a complicated 
ecosystem it is not straight forward to deduce the effects of a transition based on 
general research on two-sided markets. Still, the previous research provides important 
insights on modelling two-sided markets, strategies and general assumptions. The 
following section contains short summaries of relevant literature on two-sided markets. 
Three of the articles contain mathematical models, [18] - [20], two are strategic, [26] 
and [27], and the last descriptive, [28]. 
2.2.1 Summaries on Articles Covering Two-sided Markets 
Competition in two-sided markets (Mark Armstrong, 2006) [18] 
The article discus two-sided pricing with three different models: a monopoly 
platform, a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform and a 
model of competitive bottlenecks where one group joins all platforms. The article 
provides necessary and sufficient condition for a market sharing equilibrium to exist, 
and postulate formulas to calculate welfare maximizing and profit maximizing 
formulas. The article also discusses different pricing schemes, e.g. two-part tariffs or 
uniform prices. The models are put up with examples from real life, e.g. Supermarkets 
where the customers enter for free and the shops pay a sum to the supermarket (this is 
a competitive bottleneck). The models are analyzed and the effects of two sided 
pricing are discussed for the different scenarios. 
Two-Sided Markets: An Overview (Rochet and Tirole, 2004) [19] 
The article is very similar to the progress report by the same authors, [20], which 
was published two years later. Much of the results in that article is based on the 
research in this article, and the conclusions the same. However, this article is a bit 
more comprehensive in describing the different types of two sided markets, that can be 
interaction between two end users, but end-users can also connect to the platform 
through intermediaries or “service providers”. There can also be “on us” or “on net” 
interactions. If the buyers and sellers interact through the same platform, it is said to 
be “on us”. An example could be when the user and retail shop have a transaction 
through a credit card using the same bank. If for example a telephone operator may 
serve both the caller and the callee, and the backbone serve the website and the web 
user; the traffic is said to be “on net”. There may also be multiple non-interconnected 
platforms, for example when a seller wants to interact with as many buyers as possible 
through different platforms, or video game developers that create games for multiple 
platforms. They are then said to be “multi-homing”. The article also provides a 
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definition of two-sided markets, and a list of a platforms motivation to charging 
membership fees, in contrast to usage based fees only. The article provides the same 
mathematical model as in [20], and list several weaknesses to the model; that side i 
only cares about the number of users on the other side and no other factors such as 
quality, that the model excludes same side externalities, that the model does not 
consider users who might have ex ante private information about their future per-
transaction benefit and that the model involves simultaneous courting of buyers and 
sellers. The article lastly discusses how platforms can regulate the interactions between 
the users, to encourage positive externalities and discourage negative ones.  
Two-sided markets: a progress report (Rochet and Tirole, 2006) [20] 
The article is a comprehensive analysis of two sided markets, defining two side 
markets and necessary and sufficient conditions for a market to be two sided. The 
article also provides a general mathematical model to analyze two-sided markets. 
Factors that make a market two-sided include transaction costs among end-users, 
platform-imposed constraints on pricing between end-users and membership fixed costs 
or fees. A market is defined as two-sided if the volume is dependent of the price 
structure (that is if the total price of the two agents are constant) the market is said 
to be two sided. A necessary condition for a market to be two-sided is the break-down 
of the Coase theorem; if the outcome of negotiations between two informed agents 
with established tradable goods and no transaction costs are not Pareto efficient. In 
other words the optimal allocation of resources cannot be negotiated between the two 
agents when they maximize their own surplus, and the platform has to set prices in 
order to maximize the surplus as both sides benefit from externalities by the other 
side. The article also discusses an extended model that allows for payments between 
end users with both symmetric and asymmetric information. With symmetric 
information Coasian bargaining between end-users calls for a pass-through of variable 
costs by the platform to the end users. However, with asymmetric information the 
platform should subsidize the transactions between end users. Concerning pricing the 
article concludes that it is tied to the Lerner formula (price elasticity), however 
because of the two-sidedness the cost must be replaced with opportunity costs. 
Strategies for Two-Sided Markets (Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne, 2006) [26] 
The article discusses different strategies to win the battle in a two-sided market. 
The article considers different scenarios and examples from real life business. The 
article identifies three challenges in two sided markets: Pricing the platform, winner-
take-all dynamics and the threat of envelopment. Concerning pricing it is important to 
price and substitute the right side, dependent of their characteristics and costs of 
serving them and externality effects. The winner-take-all dynamics refer to situations 
when multi-homing is expensive for at least one side. For example DVD, which took 
the whole market as it is costly for both producers and consumers to support more 
than one platform. The threat of envelopment refers to the situation when one 
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platform develops so that it also supports another platform, and can use bundle 
synergies to outcompete the smaller platform. The article provides different strategies 
companies can apply depending on which situation they are in.  
The Economics of Two-Sided Markets (Mark Ryasman, 2009) [27] 
The article describes what a two-sided market is, and discuss the two-sided market 
through the newspaper and media industry, payment card industry and operating 
systems industry. The article discusses strategies in two sided markets, and divides the 
strategies into pricing and openness. Where pricing focus on finding the right price for 
the two agents interacting through the platform. Openness refers to the choice of being 
one- or multi-sided, or whether to be compatible or incompatible with competitors. 
Sometimes it can be advantageous to be one-sided to begin with, in order to attract 
the valuable side before charging the other side. Openness can also be exemplified with 
Apple that produces both its own hardware and software with no third party 
producers. Microsoft on the other hand allows anybody to manufacture computers for 
their operating system, lowering the bar to use their product. Based on the openness 
discussion the article concludes that it is better to discuss two sided “strategies” rather 
than two-sided “markets”, as whether the market is one-, two or multi-sided depends 
on the strategy of the companies operating in the environment. The article also discuss 
other strategies, such as innovation, and public policies such as antitrust and 
regulations. The article asks for more work to be done on how open one should be, and 
how many sides of the market to allow. 
Everything you wanted to know about Two-Sided Markets (Evans and Passell, 2003) 
[28] 
The article describes what two-sided markets is, and provide some examples of 
two-sided markets, e.g. dating services and credit cards. The article further describes 
the economics of two-sided markets, and how the number and quality of one side 
attracts the other, which the platform can reap high revenues from. The article further 
describes profit maximization, entry costs and balancing demand in two-sided markets. 
Lastly the article discusses regulation and how two-sided markets often attract 
competition authorities, and the challenges of establishing a working two-sided pricing 
model. Usually the companies have to invest a few years before a profit can be reaped. 
When the model works, one side of the market usually bears most of the costs. This 
creates a challenge for the authorities as they have to distinguish between actions that 
would undermine competition in one-sided markets, yet serve long-term interests of 
consumers in two-sided markets. Two-sided markets also generally encourage novel 
partnerships arrangements among competitors, to increase competition on one side of 
the market, and reduce the competition on the other. An example are banks 
collaborating with VISA and MasterCard, reducing competition on the retail side by 
collaborating with a mutual platform, however increasing the competition for 
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customers as there are more banks able to provide an offer. The article suggests that 
regulators have to question whether the restraint of competition is justified by 
efficiency, and if regulation in the context of interest group pressure work better than 
without regulation. 
 
Examples of two-sided markets: 
 
 
Figure 3: The operating system 
Microsoft Windows charges consumers 
and subsidizes developers with free 
developer tools [26] 
 
Figure 4: Credit cards are usually free 
to use for the customers, but the 
shops pay for the credit card’s 
services [27] 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Shopping malls usually 
allow customers to enter for free, and 
the retailers pay a sum to the 
shopping mall [26] 
Figure 6: Video game consoles 
subsidizes consumers and charges the 
developers [26] 
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3 Relevant Theory 
3.1 Economics and Game Theory 
3.1.1 Microeconomics 
The demand curve shows how much of a good consumers are willing to buy as the 
price per unit changes. The supply curve shows the quantity of a goods that producers 
are willing to sell at a given price. The supply curve and demand curve can be put 
together. Where the two curves intersect there is an equilibrium, which also is called 
market clearing price and quantity. The market mechanism is the tendency in a free 
market for the price to change until the market clears [29]. 
The supply function is dependent on the market situation. In an oligopoly with 
several suppliers, it might be stepwise, reaching a certain threshold enables more 
supplies to enter the market. Under perfect competition, where no participants are 
large enough to have market power to set the price, the supply is independent of price, 
and the price is equal the variable costs of the suppliers. In general, every participant 
in the market are “price takers”. The opposite is true with a monopoly, where there is 
only one supplier that has all the market power. The market power is dependent on 
the price elasticity of demand. The higher the price elasticity, the less is the market 
power. In the case of a monopoly, the supply is based on the variable costs of the 
single supplier that will offer the supply which maximizes the profit under the current 
demand [29]. 
The demand function can be estimated empirically [29] or analytically using utility 
functions. The consumer net surplus can be estimated as the expected utility of the 
purchase less the expected price to obtain that utility. As long as the net utility is ≥ 0, 
the customer will be interested in the purchase [30]. The customer’s expected net 
surplus can be expressed as follows: 
 
   (   )     ( )       
( 1 ) 
 
Where ESi is the expected net surplus for customer type i, EUi is the expected 
utility for customer type i as a function of x, where x is the evaluation of the offer by 
the customer. E[p] is the price the customer expects to pay for the service. Setting ESi 
= 0 and rearranging for x as a function of P yields a function of the fraction of the 
total market of customer type i that is indifferent to the offer. This fraction can be 
used to calculate the amount of total demand described by customer type i [30]. This 
way a market is divided into several parts where the users are considered to be 
homogeneous, which of course is a  simplification of reality, however the resolution can 
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be set dependent of the need of the analysis, and thus might work quite well for 
analytical purposes. 
To find the optimal price for a supplier one has to know the demand and cost 
function of the supplier. Once that is known, calculus can be used to find the optimal 
levels. One way of doing this is by expressing both revenue and cost as a function of 
price [29]: 
 
 ( )     ( )     ( ) ( 2 ) 
 
Here p is the price, D(p) is the demand as a function of price, and C is the 
marginal cost of production. C does not have to be constant, and thus the variable 
cost function does not have to be linear. Regardless, the process of finding the optimal 
price and quantity are the same. The next step is to take the derivative of P with 
respect to p: 
 
  ( )
  
  ( )    
  ( )
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 ( 3 ) 
 
By setting the derivative equal to zero and rearranging for p, one can find an 
expression for the optimal price to maximize profits. Another way of arranging the 
equation after setting the derivative equal to zero is: 
 
 ( )    
  ( )
  
   
  ( )
  
 ( 4 ) 
 
This equation says that profits are maximized when the marginal revenue (MR) on 
the left side equals the marginal cost (MC) on the right side [29]. 
3.1.2 Nash Equilibrium, and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibriums and 
Backward Induction 
A Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in a game theoretic analysis of a non-
cooperative game involving two or more players. Each player is assumed to know the 
equilibrium strategies of the other players. Formally, a Nash equilibrium can be stated 
as: 
A Nash equilibrium is an action profile a* with the property that no player i can 
do better by choosing an action different from a*i, given that every other player j 
adheres to a*j.” [31] [32] 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 32 
A subgame is a subset of any game that includes an initial node, which has to be 
independent from any information set, and all its successor nodes [33]. The figure 
below shows how a  subgame works in extensive form. 
 
 
Figure 7: Illustration of a game and its subgames, which are marked by red circles. As 
seen by the figure, a subgame can contain several subgames of its own [33]. 
To determine a subgame perfect equilibrium one can apply the method of 
backward induction. In backward induction one first considers the last actions of the 
game and determines which actions the final player should take in each possible 
circumstance to maximize his/hers own utility. One assumes that all players make the 
choice that maximizes their own utility. After the last move has been determined, the 
second move is determined, and so on. The process continues until the first mover is 
reached. When the optimum decision of the first mover is decided based on the 
optimal strategies of the later stages, the optimal strategies of the later stages 
automatically falls into place. The strategies that remain are the set of all subgame 
perfect equilibria for finite-horizon extensive games of perfect information. [31] 
3.1.3 Cournot and Bertrand Conditions of Competition 
With a demand function and knowledge of the variable costs from the provider, it 
is possible to calculate the optimal price to maximize profits. If there is only one 
provider, this will be the market clearing price. However, with several providers a 
game theoretic analysis based on the results of maximizing profits of the individual 
supplier is needed to find the market clearing price and corresponding Nash 
equilibrium. This can be done under a Cournot Model where the suppliers compete on 
quantity, or a Bertrand Model where the suppliers compete on price. Both models 
analyze the competition to find Nash equilibrium [29]. 
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3.1.4 Tragedy of the Commons 
When a resource is freely accessible, the users of the resource become locked in to 
a pattern of behavior where all seek to take more of it [34]. That the resources are 
freely accessible is important, as the agents do not feel the consequences they inflict on 
the whole population by their own actions. Thus the resource is used inefficiently. This 
is a common problem for network services under flat-rate pricing, as the customers are 
not forced to compensate for excess use of the bandwidth available to all users.  
3.2 Optimization 
3.2.1 Non-linear Optimization and Convex Analysis 
This theory is applied in section 0 to find the optimal solutions to the simplified 
mathematical model developed in this thesis, which are presented in section 5.4. 
Definition 9.5: A mathematical program is a convex problem if the objective 
function is a concave in a maximization program, or convex in a minimization 
program, and the feasible region defined by the constraints is a convex set [35]. 
Definition 9.2: 
The Hessian H is a matrix consisting of all partial second order derivatives to the 
function f(x) and can be expressed as [35]: 
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Definition 9.6 
The quadratic matrix H is positive definite (positive semi-definite) if dTHd > 0 for 
all vectors d ≠ 0 (dTHd ≥ 0, for all d) [35]. 
This definition makes us able to formulate the following theorem: 
Theorem 9.5: 
Suppose the function f(x) is twice differentiable defined on a convex set X. Then 
we have [35]: 
 f(x) is convex a function on X if the Hessian matrix H is positive semi-definite for all x 
ϵ X. 
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 f(x) is a strict convex function on X if the Hessian matrix H is positive definite for all x 
ϵ X. 
 f(x) is a concave function on X if the Hessian matrix H is negative semi-definite for all 
x ϵ X. 
 f(x) is a strict concave function on X if the Hessian matrix H is negative definite for all 
x ϵ X. 
An alternative approach to check if the matrix is positive or negative definite is to 
examine all minor determinants to H. If h1 is the first minor determinant, h2 the 
second minor determinant and hn = H is the last minor determinant, we can state the 
following theorem 
Theorem 9.7 
H is positive definite if and only if 
 
                                 
( 6 ) 
 
H is negative definite if and only if 
 
                          
( 7 ) 
3.2.2 M/M/1 Queuing Theory 
This theory is applied in section 5.2 and 5.3 to define the mathematical models, 
and in section 0 to solve the simplified mathematical model. 
The M/M/1 queuing system has been widely used by scholars in operations 
research to study congestion problems and priority pricing. The setup is well known to 
be a very good approximation for the arrival process in real systems, in which the 
number of customers is sufficiently large so that the impact of single customers on the 
performance of the system is very small, and all customers’ decisions to use the system 
are independent of other users’. [8] 
The first and second M in the M/M/1 setup means that the distribution of arrivals 
and the distribution if service are exponentially distributed, respectively. The “1” 
means that there is one service station, which represents the single network in our 
setup. If λ is the average arrivals per time unit, and μ is the average service per time 
unit, the following representation of an M/M/1 queue can be made [36] 
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Figure 8: schematic representation of the M/M/1 queue with capacity μ and average 
arrivals per time unit μ 
The state transition diagram shows the relation between each stage of the queue, 
where there is a probability of reaching the next stage of the queue depending on the 
average arrival rate and capacity or service time. 
 
Figure 9: Representation of the state transition diagram of an M/M/1 queue  
The system represents a birth-and-death process, which can be formulated as a 
Markowitz chain. By solving the system of equations, we can obtain the following 
solutions  
In a neutral network, where all packets are treated equally without and priority 
classes, each customer has the expected waiting time, w, of [8] 
 
  
 
   
 ( 8 ) 
 
If there is a differentiated network with two priority classes, where λ1 is the total 
amount of traffic sent with the first priority, the expected waiting time for consumers 
waiting for packets in the priority lane is [8] 
 
   
 
    
 ( 9 ) 
 
The customers who requests content without the first priority faces the expected 
waiting time, w2, of 
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 ( 10 ) 
 
Based on standard results of queuing theory, we can infer that the customer will 
face a higher waiting cost by requesting the non-prioritized content instead of the 
prioritized one, that is [8] 
 
                   
( 11 ) 
 
We define β as the share of the total traffic on the priority. Based on standard 
results of queuing theory we can obtain the following relation between the average 
congestion level, w, and the priority and non-priority lane w1 and w2, respectively [2] 
 
                  (   )   
( 12 ) 
3.3 Two-sided Markets 
In a two-sided market there are two groups of agents that interact through a 
platform. The agents could either single-home or multi-home. Were single-home means 
that the agent only interact with one platform, and multi-home means that the agents 
interacts with multiple platforms. This provides for three different setups, both sides 
single- or multi-home, or one side single-homes and the other is multi-homing. [18] 
More examples of different two-sided markets can be seen in the article by Rochet and 
Tirole (2004, 2006) [19] [20]. 
Examples of such markets, as described above, are the credit cards where the 
credit card companies connect shops with customers by enabling the customers to pay 
for goods in the shop, dating industry that connects men and women through a dating 
platform, gaming consoles that connects video game developers with players, operating 
systems connecting developers with end users, media industry that connects 
advertisers with viewers/readers and shopping malls that attracts customers for the 
shops inside the shopping mall [18] [19] [20] [26]. 
Two-sided markets are especially interesting when cross-group externalities are 
present, so the benefit enjoyed by a member of one group depends on how well the 
platform does in attracting custom from the other group [18]. The value of the 
platform to any given user largely depends on the number of users on the platform’s 
other side. Value grows as the platform matches demand from both sides. Because of 
these effects, successful platforms enjoy increasing returns to scale, and better margins. 
As a result, mature two-sided industries are usually dominated by a handful of large 
platforms [26]. 
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In general, there is a difference between the valuations of the two groups, where 
one of the groups is considered to be more valuable than the other. The value side, 
also called the “subsidy side” are users who, when attracted in volume, are highly 
valuated by the “money side” [26]. This means that the money-side is willing to pay to 
reach the value side. Thus the platform usually subsidies the value side in order to 
attract enough users so that the money side will pay handsomely to reach them [18] 
[26]. Examples are credit cards that are practically free to use for the customers, while 
the shops pay the credit card companies to use their services. The customers are the 
value side, and it is important for them to be able to use a credit card in order to 
make a transaction with the shops. Thus, the shops are willing to pay the credit card 
companies in order to use their services to be able to make transactions with 
customers. Sometimes, the value of the subsidy side might be so high that platforms 
are willing to pay to make the users interact with their platforms. E.g. ladies night at 
night-clubs, where girls get free drinks as they are considered more valuable than the 
men, whom ultimately have to pay for the fun. 
Mark Armstrong (2006) presents in an analysis on competition of two-sided 
markets a model of competitive bottlenecks, where one group single-home, and the 
other interacts with all platforms, that is multi-homes. This model is what closest 
represents the market in which the NN debate takes place under the NNN regime. CPs 
want to reach all the customers, who usually interact with a single ISP. Currently 
there is little differentiation of CPs through the ISPs, except for a few examples [16] 
[21]. Thus, since the CPs connect with all the ISPs with similar quality, there is little 
reason for the IUs to multi-home [18]. This assumption is important as it simplifies the 
solution process. In a world where niche ISPs provide superior quality for a certain 
type of CPs, and the CPs only connect through the niche ISPs, it is likely that some 
ISPs would multi-home if the services of those CPs are deemed important. 
3.3.1 Mathematical Model of Competitive Bottlenecks 
Mark Armstrong (2006) [18] has developed a mathematical model of competitive 
bottlenecks. The model is used a foundation I several research papers on the net 
neutrality debate, and is also the basis for the model provided in this thesis. In the 
model, group 1 is single-homing, while group 2 wishes to deal with each platform, 
which is a form of multi-homing. Implicit in the model is the idea that group 2 puts 
more weight on the network benefit of being in contact with the widest population of 
group-1 consumers that it does on the costs of dealing with more than one platform. 
Since group wishes to deal with all the platforms, there is no competition between 
platforms to attract group-2 customers. [18] This setting is similar to the setting in the 
net neutrality debate, where the IUs are single-homing and the CPs are multi-homing 
with respect to the access ISPs. 
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i 
j 
1 
2 
Platform i 
Platform j 
Group-1 single-homes 
Group 2 multi-homes (heterogeneous) 
n1
i 
n2
i 
u1
i 
û1
i 
 ̂ 
  
 ̂ 
  
Number of group-1 agents on platform i 
Number of group-2 agents on platform i 
Utility of platform i’s group-1 users 
Utility offered to group-1 agents by platform i 
Group-1 agents attracted by utility û1
i 
Optimal number of group-2 agents 
p1
i 
p2
i 
What platform i charges group-1 to join the platform 
Fixed fee for group 2 to join platform i 
Table 5: Indexes, parameters and variables of the mathematical model of competitive 
bottlenecks [18] 
The number of group-2 agents prepared to pay a fixed fee to join platform i is 
denoted 
 
  
    (  
    
 ) ( 13 ) 
 
The function øi is decreasing in p2
i and increasing in n1
i. A group-2 agent’s decision 
to join one platform does not depend on whether she chooses to join the rival 
platform. The revenue of platform i from group-2 when it has n1
i group-1 agents, sets 
group-2 price is defined as 
 
  (  
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 ))    
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A platform i’s group-1 utility u1
i is given by 
 
  
    (  
 )    
  ( 15 ) 
 
The function Ui might be decreasing, for instance when newspaper readers find 
advertisements to be a nuisance. If a group-1 agent’s utility is u1
i with platform i, 
suppose the platform will attract 
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Where Φi is increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second. If 
platform i’s total cost of serving the two sides is denoted Ci(n1
i,n2
i), its profit is 
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The number of group-2 agents on each platform in equilibrium is derived as a 
function of the equilibrium market shares for group-1. Platform i offers utility û1
i to its 
group-1 agents, and attracts a number  ̂ 
  of such agents (given the function Φi). Then 
the platform must be maximizing its profits given this group-1 utility û1
i. Consider 
varying p1
i and n2
i so that utility û1
i = Ui(n2
i) – p1
i is constant. Writing p1
i = Ui(n2
i) – 
û1
i in ( 17 ) means that profit is 
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Given  ̂ 
 , platform i will choose to serve a number  ̂ 
  of group-2 agents, where  ̂ 
  
maximizes 
 
  
   ( )    ( ̂ 
   )    ( ̂ 
   ) ( 19 ) 
 
The equilibrium price to group-2 is  ̂ 
 , where this satisfies 
 
 ̂ 
    ( ̂ 
   ̂ 
 ) ( 20 ) 
 
For a given  ̂ 
 , notice that ( 19 ) measures the total surplus of platform i and its 
group-1 agents as the number of group-2 agents is varied. Therefore, the number of 
group-2 agents is chosen to maximize the joint interests of the platform and its group-
1 agents, and the interests of group-2 are ignored. In general, this implies that there is 
a market failure, and there are a suboptimal number of group-2 agents on each 
platform for a given distribution of group-1 agents. [18] 
If Vi(n1
i, n2
i) is the gross group-2 surplus on platform I, and there are no 
externalities within the set of group-2 agents, this surplus function differentiates to 
give the inverse demand function, so that 
 
 
   
 
  (  
    
 )  
  (  
    
 )
  
 
 ( 21 ) 
 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 40 
The right hand expression is the price paid by group-2 agents. This formula is only 
valid when there are no intragroup externalities that could make a group-2 agent 
better off should there be fewer group-2 agents. The market failure can be seen by 
looking at the total surplus on platform i, which is maximized by choosing n2
i to 
maximize 
 
  
   ( )    ( ̂ 
   )    ( ̂ 
   ) ( 22 ) 
 
Since Vi() – Ri, group-2’s net aggregate surplus, is increasing in n2
i, the maximum 
of ( 22 ) is greater than the maximum of ( 19 ), and there are too few group-2 agents 
serviced in equilibrium. This is summarized in proposition 4 [18]: 
“In the competitive bottleneck model, in any equilibrium the number of group-2 
agents on a platform is chosen to maximize the joint surplus of the platform and its 
group-1agents, and the interests of group 2 are ignored. Unless there are externalities 
within the set of group-2 agents, there are too few group-2 agents on each platform 
given the distribution of group-1 agents on each platform. [18]” 
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4 Mathematical Models from Previous Research 
The following section contains descriptions of some of the latest mathematical 
models developed in the previous research on the NN debate. The first model by 
Krämer et al. includes a quite sophisticated model with explicit congestion. However, 
the model does not consider competing ISPs. This is included in the next model by 
Bourreau et al. The last two models use a different structure than Krämer et al. and 
Bourreau et al., and illustrate some of the different approaches when analyzing the NN 
debate. 
4.1 Congestion Sensitive Model by Krämer and Wiewiorra 
Krämer and Wiewiorra [1] developed a mathematical model to analyze the effects 
of a QoS tiering regime in which the ISP charges for prioritization on a non-
discriminatory basis. The model considers investments by the ISP and CPs, multi-
homing CPs and heterogeneous CPs and IUs. The model specifically addresses 
congestion sensitivity and effects of re-congestion after investments, inter-class 
externality and endogenous entry by CPs. 
 
F(θ): [0,1] 
 ̃ 
 
 ̅ 
Distribution of continuum of CPs 
CP that is indifferent between choosing the priority and BE class 
under NNN 
Congestion sensitivity characterizing indifference between staying 
active or not 
θ Individual congestion sensitivity of the CPs 
    
 ( ̃)
 ( ̅)
 Share of CPs choosing the priority class under a QoS tiering regime 
r 
 ̅ 
b > 0 
v > 0 
  > 0 
λ 
    ̅ ( ̅) 
Average revenue-per-click for CPs 
Share of internet customers in equilibrium 
Base utility for IUs to join the internet 
Marginal utility for IUs by adding an extra CP 
IUs marginal disutility because of congestion 
Average traffic from each customer 
Average rate at which IUs aggregate content requests arrive at the 
ISP’s network 
c(μ) The costs on capacity expansion 
w 
wQ  
p  
The CPs perceived average level of network congestion 
Average congestion level for IUs in NNN regime (=βwQ1 + (1-β)wQ2) 
Price of priority transmission class for CPs 
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a 
μ 
Internet access fee charged by the ISP 
Average rate at which service requests are handled (transmission 
quality) 
Table 6: Indexes, parameters and variables of the mathematical model by Krämer and 
Wiewiorra [1]  
If (1-θw) is the click through rate of a CP, the CPs profit under net neutrality is 
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(     )  ̅           
               
 ( 23 ) 
 
Under NN all CPs receive the same level of congestion wN. In the QoS tiering 
regime, however, CPs can opt for priority transmission class with wQ1 < wN at a price of 
p per click. On the other hand, the CPs that remain in the BE class receive a higher 
congestion level wQ2 > wN. 
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The utility of IUs are formally 
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The network congestion is measured through Internet consumers’ average waiting 
time following a content request. The model use an M/M/1 queuing model to fix ideas 
on the relationship between average waiting time, network traffic, and capacity. The 
average expected waiting time under NN is 
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It is assumed that μ > Λ. Under the NNN regime the congestion is expressed for 
the priority lane and BE lane accordingly 
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The ISP controls the two-sided Internet market, over which it has a terminating 
monopoly. Under an NN regime the ISPs profit is 
 
    ̅   ( ) ( 28 ) 
 
Under an NNN regime, the ISP can also chose the strategic variable p. The profit 
function becomes 
 
    ̅       ( ) ( 29 ) 
 
The previous investment decision in transmission capacity is considered to be sunk 
in all regimes, and is therefore not necessary to be considered in the short run 
maximization. 
4.2 Competing Internet Platforms by Bourreau et al. 
Bourreau et al. [2] have developed a mathematical model to compare the effects of 
competition between ISPs under a NNN and NN regime. While the ISPs mechanically 
benefit from NNN in a monopoly, it is less clear that switching to an NNN regime 
would benefit competing ISPs. The model also considers investments by ISPs and CPs, 
multi-homing CPs and heterogeneous CPs and IUs. The setting is quite similar to that 
of Krämer et al. However, this model also includes competing ISPs. The notation used 
in the article is presented in the following table. 
 
i ϵ {A, B} 
h ϵ [0, ∞) 
Index of the two horizontally-differentiated competing ISPs 
Continuum of CPs with mass 1 
λ 
 
a 
R 
v 
d 
t 
Constant number of visits per user, which is the same for all web-
sites 
Per click advertising revenue 
IUs utility of connecting to as ISP 
IUs preference for product variety supplied by the CPs 
Parameter for the IUs preference for the speed of the connection 
The standard Hotelling unit transporting cost 
wi 
xi 
 ̅  
 
 ̃  
 
Congestion on ISP i’s network 
Number of end-users subscribing to ISP i 
Marginal CP which is indifferent between connecting to ISP I and 
not connecting 
Marginal CP which is indifferent towards priority lane and non-
priority lane 
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pi 
μi 
Subscript for IUs to connect to ISP i’s network 
ISP i’s network capacity investments 
Table 7: Indexes, parameters and variables of the mathematical model by Bourreau et 
al. [2] 
With a click trough rate on ISP i for CP h of (1-hwi), the advertising revenue for 
CP h is 
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Under NN (N), the profit of CP h is 
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Under NN, all CPs are active at ISP I are treated equally and face the same 
average level of congestion wi
N. However, under the NNN (D), a CP may choose to 
pay a fixed fee to ISP i to benefit from a priority (P) lane where the congestion is 
lower. The profit for CP h under NNN is given by 
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( 32 ) 
 
In the NNN regime the CP that connects to ISP choose either to pay for access to 
the priority lane or to use the non-priority (BE) lane for free. 
The two ISPs are located at the extremities of a linear city of length one, with ISP 
A located at point 0 and ISP B located at point 1. The investment costs C(μi) is 
increasing and convex in μi (C’ > 0 and C’’ > 0). Under NN the profit function of ISP i 
is 
 
  
    
   
   (  
 ) ( 33 ) 
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In the NNN regime, the ISPs can also charge a fixed fee, fi, to the CPs that opt for 
the priority lane. The ISP profit function in the NNN regime is 
 
  
    
   
  ( ̅ 
   ̃ )    (  
 ) ( 34 ) 
 
Due to capacity constraints the IUs might suffer from congestion. Congestion is 
measured by the waiting time for IUs when they request content from CPs. The 
M/M/1 queue model is used to determinate the average level of congestion as a 
function of network capacity and traffic. Under the NN regime, the average level of 
congestion for ISP i is 
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( 35 ) 
 
Under the NNN regime, each ISP sorts CPs into two traffic lanes, the priority lane 
and the non-priority lane. The congestion for the priority lane (P) operated by ISP i is 
given by 
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The congestion for the non-priority lane (NP) is given by 
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The formula implies that congestion is always higher in the non-priority lane. If bi 
= 1 -  ̃    
  is the share of CPs that buy priority from ISP i, note that the average 
congestion under the NNN regime satisfies 
 
  
  
      
  (    )  
   
 
  
   ̅ 
    
  
( 38 ) 
 
So if the volume and capacity are the same under the NN and NNN regime, the 
average congestion will be the same (wi
N = wi
D). This is a well-known property of the 
M/M/1 queuing model. 
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There is a unit mass of IUs uniformly distributed along the unit interval. Each IU 
subscribes only to one ISP (single-homes). Under NN, a user located at xj on the unit 
interval and who subscribes to ISP A, obtains utility 
 
       ̅ 
  
 
  
    
      
( 39 ) 
 
A similar expression can be obtained for ISP B. It is assumed that R is sufficiently 
high so that the market is covered in equilibrium in both regimes. Under the NNN 
regime, the end user located at xj obtains utility 
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( 40 ) 
 
It is also assumed that the IUs value content sufficiently compared to the disutility 
they suffer from congestion. In particular, in a symmetric equilibrium, it must be that 
 
       ( 41 ) 
 
To see why, put ( 38 ) into ( 40 ) 
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For consumers to value the CPs, the bracket has to be positive. Therefore, 
      
   , which implies what is stated above as in an equilibrium solution xi
D = 
1/2. 
In the NN regime, the model is solved in a two stage game with the following set-
up 
1. The two ISPs choose their capacities μA
N and μB
N, and set the subscription 
fees to the end users pA
N and pB
N. 
2. The CPs choose which ISP(s) to connect to (if any), and the end users 
choose which ISP to subscribe to. 
The model is solved backwards to find the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium 
(SPE). 
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In the NNN regime, each ISP offers a priority lane and a non-priority lane to CPs. 
The CPs that opt for priority at ISP i pay a fixed fee fi, whereas the non-priority lane 
is offered for free. The two-stage game is modified accordingly: 
1. The two ISPs choose their capacities μA
D and μB
D, set their subscription fees to 
the end users, pA
D and pB
D, as well as the fees for their priority lanes fA and fB. 
2. The CPs choose which ISP(s) to connect to (if any) and whether to pay for 
priority, and the IUs choose which ISP to subscribe to. 
4.3 Investments and Competition model by Njorge et al. 
Njorge et al. [3] developed a mathematical model to analyze the NNN regime in a 
two-sided market that includes ISP competition, ISPs investments, CPs investments, 
Multihome CP (whether IUs connects to several CPs simultaneously) and 
heterogeneity among both CPs and IUs. The model is based on work by Shaked and 
Sutton (1982), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004), Roson 
(2005), Parker and Alstyne (2005) and Armstrong (2006). 
NN model 
The model considers two platforms (or ISPs), a continuum of users and CPs of 
unit mass. 
 
z ϵ[α,β] 
j ϵ[0,1] 
Indexes of the two platforms (ISPs) 
Index over CPs 
i Index of consumers (IUs) 
f ϵ [0,1] Mass of consumers 
ybasic 
Minimum threshold that ISPs are enforced to provide to all CPs by 
regulation 
γj 
 
a 
kα,kβ 
The quality of CP j. Uniformly distributed random variable, 
independent and identically distributed across the population of CPs 
Support variable of γj, [ ̅-a,  ̅+a] and 0 < a <  ̅ 
Value of extra services (e-mail, virus scans) provided by the ISPs, 
defined as random variables with the same distributions as those of γj 
θi 
R 
Consumer heterogeneity, uniformly distributed on the interval [0,f] 
Reservation utility of joining a platform 
yz ϵ R+ The QoS chosen by platform z. We assume yα ≥ yβ ≥ ybasic 
ø:[0,f]->{α,β} 
 ̂:[0,1]->{α,β} 
Connection decisions that map the space of consumers and CPs, 
respectively, to the set of platforms 
rα,rβ 
Aggregation of mappings representing the masses of CPs that join 
each platform 
qα,qβ Aggregation of mappings representing the masses of IUs that join 
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each platform 
pz 
wz 
vj 
Connection fee to consumers on platform z 
Fixed fee for a CP to connect to a platform z 
Utility of a CP, defined as its profit 
Table 8: Indexes, parameters and variables of the mathematical model by Njorge et al. 
[3]  
A consumer i on a platform ø(i) connecting to a CP j on platform  ̂( ) receives 
utility 
 
   (  ( )   ̂( )      ( )   ̂( ))        ( )   ̂( ) (
  
  ̂( )
   ( )) 
( 43 ) 
 
The formula multiplies the quality of the network transmission, given by the worst 
of the two platforms, by the value of the content plus additional services offered by 
the platform. To compute the value of the content, the quality of the CP j is divided 
by the mass of CPs that connect to the same platform to incorporate congestion 
effects. The congestion is not considered on the consumer side, which is a 
simplification. [3] 
Each consumer connects to a single platform, but has access to all content because 
of interconnection. In particular, a consumer i on platform ø(i) connects to all CPs 
subscribed to either platform since uij ≥ 0 for all j [3]. The overall utility perceived by 
IU consumer i that joins platform ø(i) is 
 
  (  ( )   (  )  ̅        )  ∫  [   (  ( )   ̂( )      ( )   ̂( ))]  
 
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
Here ø(-i) denotes the other platform, and the expectation is taken over the 
random parameters such as γj and kø(i). [3] 
Platform z charges consumers a connection fee of pz. Consumers have reservation 
utility of R and consumers’ preferences are heterogeneous, which is represented by the 
parameter θi. The utility of a consumer i connecting to platform ø(i) is given by 
 
  ( ( ))     {      (  ( )   (  )  ̅        )    ( )  } ( 45 ) 
 
Consumers join the platform that yields the highest utility, provided it is positive. 
[3] 
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If CPs connect to a platform z ϵ [α, β], they pay a fixed connection fee wz and 
make revenue by selling advertising and showing it to consumers. The utility vj of a 
CP j is defined to be its profit 
 
     (              )    ̂( ) ( 46 ) 
 
Where Vj is its gross revenue, given by 
 
  (              )  {
 (     )    (     )       ̂( )    
 (     )    (     )       ̂( )    
 ( 47 ) 
 
Here  (     ̂( )) is a function that represents as prices. It is increasing in both 
parameters: Ad prices are high when content quality is good because it is easier to 
attract advisers. In addition, consumers have a better experience with high-quality 
platforms and, therefore, they spend more time in these sites which increase the 
advertisers brand exposure. Note that is CP j join the higher quality platform, it is 
able to charge a higher ad price for connection arising from consumers on that 
platform. If a CP join the lower quality platform its ad prices are the same across the 
two platforms because when a customer and CP connect to different platforms, the 
QoS is given by the works of them. [3] 
The platforms pay for their quality investment, which modelled by an increasing 
and convex investment cost I(yz) to achieve a QoS of yz. This results in decreasing 
returns to investment. The investment function is differentiable, and I(0) = 0. The 
payoff πz experiences by platform z is given by 
 
              (  ) ( 48 ) 
 
Timing: 
1. Quality Investment Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose QoS yα and yβ 
2. CP Pricing Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose fees wα and wβ 
3. CP Connection Decisions: CPs decide which platform to join 
4. Consumer Pricing Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose prices pα and pβ 
5. Consumer Connection Decisions: Consumer decide which platform to join 
6. Consumer Consumption Decisions: Consumers decide which CPs to get service 
from 
The timing of the extensive game is predicated on the view that investments 
adjust more slowly than prices. The former is viewed as a medium to long-term 
decision whereas the latter is a shorter term decision. Thus investments are the first 
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stage of the game. The prices of CPs are set before IUs to reflect the longer horizon of 
contracts between CPs and ISPs, as opposed to those of IUs and ISPs. The game is 
solved by considering a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE), focusing on optimal 
actions/decisions along the equilibrium paths. The game can be solved with backward 
induction. [3] 
NNN model 
The model is equal to that in the neutral regime, the NN model, except for one 
important difference: a CP that joins and pay fees to a platform enjoys the enhanced 
quality level yz from that platform. However, if the CPs does not directly connect to 
that platform, it only enjoys the basic quality level ubasic (≤ yα) from that provider. In 
this sense, there are priority lanes in the non-neutral model. When ybasic is said to be 
zero, it effectively means that a CP has to pay the platform to reach the customers 
(else the IUs utility could be zero connecting to the CP). That way it is possible to 
analyze the NN regime through both a tiering and termination fee regime. [3] 
In the NNN-model, the utility of the different CP connection decisions are a bit 
different due to the implicit access fee and tiering 
 
  (              )
 {
 (     )          ̂( )    
 (     )          ̂( )    
 (     )    (     )             ̂( )       
 
( 49 ) 
 
( 49 ) being the three alternative buying options for the CPs. 
4.4 Congestion Sensitive Model by Economides and Hermalin 
[4] 
Economides and Hermalin (2012) developed a mathematical model to analyze the 
effects of NNN and NN that explicitly considers congestion, and does not take the 
amount of traffic (e.g. number of packets) sent by a given content provider as fixed. 
The amount of content purchased by IUs can vary, which means that expansion in 
bandwidth does not necessarily increase speed because larger bandwidth will attract 
more traffic. This effect is also observed in physical highways, when adding lanes does 
not always significantly reduce commute times. The model also consider differentiation 
in provision of quality (transmission speed), which is important for their result that, 
for a fixed amount of bandwidth, a case can be made that welfare is greater under 
neutrality than under multiple tiers. The model also considers investments by ISPs 
and CPs, and heterogeneous IUs and CPs. [4] 
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        )     
Continuum of content providers of measure one 
        ) Set of content providers 
j ϵ [1,J] Set of subbandwidths 
B 
 
Bj 
  [   )        
F(Θ) 
X(θ) 
Bandwidth of a pipe from CPs to IUs (capacity for B units of 
content / unit time)  
Sub-bandwidth (where ΣBj = B) 
Distribution of θ, where F’() exists and is positive for all     (   ) 
Proportion of application-provider types that are in set Θ 
Units of content send by content provider θ 
 ( ) 
 ( )  
∫  ( )  ( ) 
  
, The time necessary to send all of the content of 
the CPs in Θ, and a measure of congestion faced by CPs in Θ. 
τ(θ) 
α(τ(θ),θ) 
 
Deliver time for CP θ. If θ is in Θ, then τ(θ) = t(Θ). 
Adjustment factor on some indication of the value households place on 
content 
y 
c 
Numéraire good in households utility 
Marginal cost of content production and transmission 
x 
p 
q 
s 
π 
σ 
η 
Unit of content 
Price of content from CPs 
Advertising rate CPs 
Payment to ISP 
The “equilibrium gross profit factor” 
The “equilibrium consumer surplus factor” 
Hook-up fee for IUs connecting to ISP 
Table 9: Indexes, parameters and variables of the mathematical model by Economides 
and Hermalin [4]  
A household’s marginal utility from the xth unit of content from content provider θ 
is taken to be 
 
 (
 
 ( ( )  )
) ( 50 ) 
 
Where the adjustment factor, α(τ(θ),θ), reflects the congestion in transmission, 
τ(θ), some indication of the value the household assigns that content, and how much 
the household cares about delay or congestion  vis-à-vis that content. A household’s 
(IUs) overall utility is 
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        ∫ (∫  (
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)   
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The utility function assumes that all households are homogeneous in their 
preferences, and that they have additive separability across different content. The 
marginal utility m() is assumed to be twice differentiable and decreasing, and never 
too convex, specifically 
 
    ( )    ( )    ( 52 ) 
 
For all z ϵ+. It is further assumed that households prefer faster content delivery to 
slower content delivery, all else being equal, that is τ > τ’ implies α(τ,θ) < α(τ’,θ) for all 
θ. Also, households view content from higher-θ CPs to be more time sensitive than 
from lower-θ CPs, that is for all θ > θ’ and all τ > τ’, 
 
 (   )   (    )   (    )   (     ) ( 53 ) 
 
It is further assumed that consumption of the content providers’ good plus any 
hook-up fee paid the ISP never consumes a household’s entire income. This and the 
assumption of additively separable and quasi-linear utility mean that each household 
acquires the amount of the θth CPs product that equates marginal utility to marginal 
cost. A household’s demand is thus 
 
 (   )   ( ( )  )   ( )   ( ( )  ) ( ) ( 54 ) 
 
A CPs profit is 
 
(     ) (   )    ( 55 ) 
 
It is here assumed that the advertising rate and content cost are common across 
content providers. Assumption ( 52 ) implies that ω() is log concave. To rule out 
infinite consumption it is assumed that          ( )   . These assumptions are 
sufficient for a CPs pricing problem, 
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(     ) (   )    ( 56 ) 
 
to have a unique and finite solution. The fee paid to the ISP, s, and the content 
delivered, θ, is treated as constants and is thus not need to be evaluated in order to 
maximize ( 56 ), which could be solved by 
 
   
 
(     ) ( ) ( 57 ) 
 
The solution is, for further reference, defined as 
 
  (      ) (  ) ( 58 ) 
 
and π is referred to as the “equilibrium gross profit factor”. The household 
(consumer) surplus from trade with CP θ is 
 
∫  (   )  
 
  
  ( ( )  )∫  ( )  
 
  
  ( ( )  )  ( 59 ) 
 
The total welfare, the sum of CPs and household’s profits, is 
 
  ∫ (   ) ( ( )  )  ( )
 
 
 ( 60 ) 
 
Since the IUs are homogeneous, the ISP can capture the entire consumer surplus. 
Thus the hook-up fee posed on the IUs by the ISP is 
 
   ∫  ( ( )  )  ( )
 
 
 ( 61 ) 
 
If the ISP can discriminate continuously across content providers it will impose the 
scheme that maximizes expected virtual surplus subject to τ()’s being non-decreasing 
and the bandwidth constraint. The ISP seeks to maximize 
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The first term is to maximize the income from IUs, while the second term is the 
profit captured from the CPs. The model can also be modified to take investments in 
capacity by the ISP into account.  
4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Mathematical Models 
from Previous Research 
In this section a discussion of the four presented mathematical models will be 
provided. First, we will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the mathematical 
models, before our findings are summarized in Table 10. Lastly we will describe the 
strengths that are important to include in the analysis, and the weaknesses that are 
treated in this thesis and why they are important to include in the analysis. 
Krämer et al. and Bourreau et al. have many similarities in their model settings. 
Both models explicitly formulate congestion through the M/M/1 model, which is a 
well proven model to analyze the effects of network capacities and congestion [8]. They 
also have an explicit formulation of all the players which simplifies the process of 
analyzing results and making extensions. They also provide a holistic perspective on 
the CPs and IUs rather than analyzing individual players. This makes it possible to do 
a traceable overall assessment of the effect of the NN- and NNN regimes. Both models 
also have heterogeneous CPs and IUs. However, Krämer use a monopoly setting for 
the ISPs. The argument is that most ISPs operate under monopoly conditions in the 
US. However, this is not true in all regions, e.g. do most IUs have several ISPs to 
choose from in Norway. Thus, the conclusions based on the monopoly setting are not 
valid in many regions. Krämer et al.’s formulation of the IUs utility does not allow 
explicit formulation of the solutions. However, Bourreau et al. solved this by modelling 
good QoS as a utility, instead of congestion as a disutility, which makes it possible to 
do more sophisticated analytical analysis based on the explicit solutions. This is a 
major advantage over Krämer et al.’s model. Bourreau et al. does also consider 
competition among the ISPs. Both Krämer et al. and Bourreau et al. only have two 
stages in their set up. While this greatly simplifies the solving process, it is not 
completely realistic, as e.g. investments are usually made a long time prior to sale. 
Thus, it is often possible to adapt price levels based on the conditions at the time of 
sale. On the other hand, the decision to make investments is much more difficult as it 
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directly affects how the other decisions can be made, and has to be made based on 
reliable forecast or analyses. Njorge et al. has solved this in their sophisticated six 
stage model. However, their model is very complex and much more difficult to analyze 
than Krämer et al. and Bourreau et al.’s. All three models only consider CP revenues 
from advertising. This makes for a much easier analysis. However, many of the 
services that are likely to opt for a priority lane, e.g. Netflix, are subscription services. 
Subscription services can directly extract money from the IUs, and are thus positioned 
differently than advertising CPs to benefit from a NNN regime. Neither Krämer et al. 
nor Bourreau et al. formulate congestion sensitive IUs, rather they react to the average 
level of congestion. This is in favor of the NN regime, as the NNN regime more 
efficiently allocated congestion [1] [2]. This effect is captured directly by an increase in 
CPs revenues. However, the effect is not captured by the IUs, whom obviously would 
also be congestion sensitive by the same argument as the CPs are congestion sensitive. 
The reason why this is omitted is to simplify the solution process.  
Njorge et al. have developed a sophisticated model that provides very crisp results. 
However, congestion, which is a very important factor in the NN debate, is not 
included directly in their model. They do include a form of E2E by requiring the CPs 
to connect to either of the ISPs, and that the overall QoS is dependent on the worst 
link in the value chain. However, the Internet is international, which means that rarely 
the CPs connect to the same ISP, or CDN, as the IUs. Even in the same regions, there 
are many devoted CDNs that connect the CPs to the backbone of the Internet. Thus, 
the analysis becomes more of a closed ecosystem than the international ecosystem 
where multiple ISPs work together through transit and peering. Also, the CDNs 
investments costs are usually much lower than that of the access ISPs [24], which 
implies that the bottleneck of the network is usually at the eyeball and not at the 
backbone of the Internet. 
Economides and Hermalin does provide an analysis of CPs that offer both 
advertising and subscription services. The model does also include variable costs of the 
CPs, which is more realistic than only modelling revenues. However, their model has 
an implicit solution that complicates possible extensions. The model also considers a 
network where the capacity is separated, which can be proven to be less effective than 
a singular network with a high capacity. Analytically it is a nice feature, however, 
should provide sub-optimal results concerning network management. 
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 Krämer et al. Bourreau et al. Njorge et al. Economides et al. 
S
tr
en
g
th
s 
 Long and short 
term analysis 
 Heterogeneous 
CPs and IUs 
 Explicit 
congestion 
 Long and short 
term analysis 
 Heterogeneous 
CPs and IUs 
 Explicit solutions 
 Competing ISPs 
 Explicit 
congestion 
 Long and short 
term 
 Competing ISPs 
 Many stages 
 Different revenue 
for CPs based on 
quality of CDN 
 Variable CP costs 
 Both subscription 
and advertising 
revenues 
 Explicit capacity 
allocation 
 Explicit 
congestion 
W
ea
k
n
es
se
s 
 No ISP 
competition 
 No variable costs 
 Constant 
visits/IU/CP 
 Only advertising 
revenues 
 No transaction 
cost 
 Few stages 
 IUs not 
congestion 
sensitive 
 No E2E 
assessment 
 No variable 
costs 
 Constant 
visits/IU/CP 
 Only advertising 
revenues 
 No transaction 
cost 
 Few stages 
 IUs not 
congestion 
sensitive 
 No E2E 
assessment 
 No variable costs 
 ISPs also CDN, 
no real E2E 
assessment 
 Only advertising 
revenues 
 No explicit model 
of congestion 
 No transaction 
cost 
 IUs not 
congestion 
sensitive 
 No ISP 
competition 
 Homogeneous IUs  
 Abstract model 
 No transaction 
cost 
 IUs not 
congestion 
sensitive 
 Separated 
network 
 No E2E 
assessment 
Table 10: Summary of strengths and weaknesses of the mathematical models from 
previous research 
 
All models have heterogeneous CPs, which is very important to avoid the ISPs to 
extract all the surplus profits of the CPs in the NNN regime, and get a good 
assessment on the effect of CPs innovation levels. All but Economides and Hermalin 
also include heterogeneous IUs. Regulators and policy makers are very careful not to 
harm IUs. When the IUs are homogenous, the ISP can extract all available utility 
from the IUs, leaving no consumer surplus. Thus, no good analysis on the effect a 
transition to the NNN regime has on the IUs consumer surplus can be made. 
Heterogeneous IUs is therefore a very important feature to include in the model.  
All models include investments in capacity by the ISPs and investments in content 
by the CPs. These are all important features of analyzing the NN debate. First, 
because all wealth stems from the capacity in the network and the content the CPs 
send through it. Secondly, because the arguments posed by either side both focus on 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 57 
the effects of investments from both the ISPs and the CPs. Thus, to provide insights 
into the arguments posed by the two sides of the debate, it has to be directly included 
into the model. 
All models consider congestion, and all but Njorge et al. consider explicit 
congestion explicitly. This is important accurately analyze the effect of extra 
investments from lower congestion levels, but also from re-congestion as the CPs 
innovate and increase their volume of content.  
None of the mathematical models consider E2E. The Internet is global and CPs 
connects to access ISPs all over the world. They do connect to the Internet, but not 
necessarily through the same ISPs as the IUs. Rather, they connect through a CDN, 
which connects the CPs to the backbone of the Internet. This is included in our model 
through the backbone ISP, and is important because as the CPs pay the access ISPs 
for higher QoS and possibly offer more content to the IUs, the backbone ISP will also 
be affected. How the backbone ISP reacts in a NNN regime will again affect the 
outcome for the other actors. If this is not included some actors might believe they are 
winning from the NNN regime, while they actually are losing because the backbone is 
eating away their profits. 
None of the models include transaction costs. However, there will be transaction 
costs related to the adoption of an NNN regime. New SLAs have to be made, systems 
of monitoring to prevent moral hazard would have to be developed by the CPs and 
probably to the interest of IUs as well, and an administration would probably have to 
be set up to manage the new service. Due to the added complexity of this feature it is 
not included in this thesis. Congestion sensitive IUs are also not included by any of 
the models. However, this is not that important as the main effect would be a higher 
benefit of the NNN regime for the IUs [1] [2]. This analysis is therefore conservative 
regarding the IUs benefit of an NNN regime, and thus the analysis and results 
provided by this thesis is on the safe side for policy makers and regulators. 
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5 Mathematical Models, Numerical Experiments and 
Discussion 
In this section we will first, in section 5.1, describe the NN debate ecosystem, the 
actors involved, how they play, and how they are implemented in the general model. 
Then, in section 5.2, we develop a general mathematical model based on the NN 
debate ecosystem, and partly the previous research as presented in this thesis. In 
section 5.3 we develop a simplified mathematical model, which can be solved 
analytically. This model is based on the research by Kramer et al. and Bourreau et al. 
We extend on their work by including a backbone ISP and a regulating mechanism on 
the IAS lane. The solutions to the simplified mathematical model are presented in 
section 5.4. Section 5.5 provides a discussion of the solutions, as well as an analysis 
and discussion of the analytical solutions where the two regimes, NN and NNN, are 
compared. We further compare the two regimes in section 0 with several numerical 
experiments. Lastly, in section 5.7, we summarize the strengths and weaknesses of this 
model compared to the previous research. 
5.1 The Net Neutrality Debate Ecosystem 
 There are mainly six 
participants in the NN debate 
ecosystem, the advertisers, the 
CPs, the access and backbone 
ISPs, the IUs and the regulators 
[13] [16]. The advertisers pay the 
CPs to show adds, and they 
usually pay a proportional 
amount to the number of visitors, 
clicks per visitor and their click-
through rate. The CPs either 
make money from the advertisers, 
or by subscription fees. Either 
way, they are dependent on 
having users using their content. 
Some CPs obtain revenues from 
both advertisements and 
subscriptions, e.g. common for e-
newspapers like VG.no. However, 
this will not be considered in the 
model because indirectly it is analyzed by separating the business into two business 
units, advertising and subscribing business (like VG and VG+).  This analysis can 
 
Figure 10: The ecosystem of the NN 
debate 
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then be used to see the pure effects NN and NNN has on CP business that advertise 
and CP business from subscription fees. The CPs pay an ISP backbone connectivity 
provider to get access to the internet, and the access ISPs have to connect to the 
Internet through the backbone either with a transit or peering agreement [13] [25]. If 
there is no explicit agreement on assured services between the backbone and the ISPs, 
the connectivity between the CPs and the IUs can obviously not be assured, which is 
the case in a BE Internet. It is assumed that a settlement free peering between the 
access and backbone ISPs ensures sufficient QoS. However, for SS to be effective, the 
CPs have to purchase similar services from the backbone as that from the access ISPs. 
That is, the QoS of the backbone ISP have to be as high as or better than that of the 
access ISPs. This is actually a likely outcome as eyeball networks are more capital 
intensive than backbone networks [24]. The IUs pay the access ISPs to connect to the 
Internet and through that platform use the content of the CPs. In this respect, the 
ISPs (access) could under an NNN regime act as a platform in a two-sided market, 
and charge both the IUs and the CPs for connecting the two agents. Regulators (FCC, 
EU etc.) may put restrictions from which the ISPs have to operate in compliance with. 
Lastly it could be worth noticing that the CPs that connect advertisers with IUs could 
represent a platform in a two-sided market, connecting the advertisers with the IUs. 
However, analyzing this is beyond both the scope and focus of this thesis, and 
therefore the effect on advertisers will not be analyzed.   
 The advertisers main decision is how much to 
pay per click, which usually is set by the CPs. 
This decision will be treated exogenously, and the 
revenue per click is thus considered to be constant. 
The CPs have more strategic decisions. They can 
chose business model, whether they should get 
revenue from advertising or subscriptions. In a 
NNN regime they may also decide whether to pay 
for SS, which could be important for inelastic CPs. 
The CPs are heterogeneous in respect to the 
demand for connectivity and sensitivity towards 
congestion. The sensitivity for congestion is 
proportional to the amount of traffic the CPs 
generate. The CPs will have to multi home in 
order to reach all consumers with SS. However, the access ISPs cannot block the CPs 
from delivering content through IAS. In this respect, the ISPs have a monopoly for 
offering SS to reach their respective IUs. The CPs have to connect to the backbone of 
the Internet, regardless of NN or NNN, and the backbone ISP have to provide a high 
enough QoS in order for . 
Both access and backbone ISPs have to decide how much to invest in capacity and 
prices for providing connectivity to the IUs and CPs, respectively. This is normally a 
  
 
Figure 11: From top left: 
Example of IUs, access ISP 
(Telenor) and  CPs 
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fixed fee for the IUs connectivity, and thus not usage based. In an NNN regime, the 
access ISPs may also decide to offer Specialized Services (SS), with a higher QoS, that 
the CPs have to pay for. This could be a fixed fee, or a usage based fee and thus price 
discriminate based on the CPs aggregated traffic. The access ISPs also have to set the 
QoS of SS, which in turn may affect the QoS of IAS since the networks are not 
separated in closed networks. The networks could be separated. However, this would 
increase the overall average congestion: 
 
Proposition 1: If the M/M/1 queue assumptions are valid, splitting the networks into 
two independent networks will increase the overall average congestion by a factor of 
two. 
 The proof, ( 171 )-( 174 ), can be seen in the appendix. Therefore, the network 
should be open, and a protocol for priority of some packages should be applied rather 
than physically separating the information flows. This is also how it is implemented in 
this model. 
The IUs decide if they want connectivity, and if so from which ISP as they are 
single-homing. Then they decide which CPs they want to use. The IUs are sensitive to 
congestion, and would thus value a higher QoS to a lower QoS, as long as the price 
does not outweigh the benefit from higher QoS. This is also true for the ISPs and CPs, 
as congestion might result in lower revenues for both the ISPs and the CPs should the 
IUs not be interested in their service because of congestion. The IUs are heterogeneous 
with respect to demand for content through subscription CPs and preferences towards 
the ISPs. 
Lastly, the regulators may put restrictions on the IAS lane, and thus either force 
the ISPs to invest in more capacity, or restrict the QoS of SS. 
Decision and timing under NN Decisions and timing under NNN 
0. Exogenous parameters set 
1. ISPs make investments in 
capacity 
2. Backbone ISPs set the price for 
CPs 
3. CPs choose whether to 
participate or not 
4. ISP set the IUs price to access 
the Internet 
5. IUs choose which ISP to connect 
to 
6. IUs interact with the CPs 
0. Exogenous parameters set, 
including regulators restrictions 
1. ISPs make investments in 
capacity 
2. Backbone ISPs set the price for 
CPs 
3. Access ISPs set the priority fees 
and the QoS of SS 
4. CPs choose whether they should 
participate, and if so whether 
they want SS or IAS through 
either or both ISPs 
5. ISP set the IUs price to access 
the Internet 
6. IUs choose which ISP to connect 
to 
7. IUs interact with the CPs 
Table 11: The general decision procedure and timing of the NN debate ecosystem 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 61 
5.2 The General Mathematical Model 
The general mathematical model is developed based on previous research presented 
in this thesis. Especially the research by Njorge et al, Economides and Hermalin, 
Krämer and Wiewiorra, Bourreau et al., and Gaivoronski and the Telenor research 
team influence the formulation. However, some modifications are made in order to 
incorporate a more accurate ecosystem and description of the agents, and include the 
perspective of E2E. Specifically the model has split the CPs into advertising and 
subscribing CPs, a backbone ISP is included, which the CPs have to pay both for 
connectivity and SS, congestion sensitive IUs and heterogeneous IUs towards the 
subscription CPs, and different regulating mechanisms. The work by Marc Armstrong 
(2006) on two sided markets has laid the foundation for modelling the two sided 
market. This model will follow a game theoretic approach, with symmetric 
information. This makes it easier to solve, but it might be a less accurate 
representation of the real world. 
First the notation in the mathematical model will be presented. The mathematical 
formulation of the ecosystem will then presented together with reasoning behind the 
formulations. 
Notation 
jA ϵ [0,→) 
jS ϵ [0, →) 
Continuum of CPs that earn revenues from advertising 
Continuum of CPs that earn revenues from subscription fees 
i ϵ {a, b, c} 
x ϵ [0,1] 
Access ISP a and b, and backbone ISP c 
Unit mass of IUs, modelled as residents in a linear city between 0 
and 1 
L ϵ {N,D} 
Superscript to separate between a neutral (N) regime or a non-
neutral, differentiation, regime (D) 
SS 
IA 
Z ϵ {A,S} 
Specialized Services (usually as superscript) 
Internet Access Services (usually as superscript) 
Sub-index to separate between Advertising CPs (A) and 
Subscription CPs (S) 
r 
κjA 
λjZ 
hjZ 
cjZ 
N 
NPV of revenue per click from advertising per click for CPs 
Click traffic per IU for CP jA 
Package traffic per click per time unit per IU for CP jA or jS 
Sensitivity towards congestion for CP jA or jS 
Operating/marginal costs for CP jA or jS 
Number of subscription CPs competing with each other 
  (  ̅ 
    ̅ 
    
 ) Variable costs for the ISPs of providing connectivity 
  (  
 ) Investments costs of the ISPs from investing in capacity 
Y IUs numéraire utility of being provided connectivity 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 62 
mA 
t 
Ψ, Ψ1, Ψ2 
 
Marginal utility per content from advertising CPs for IUs 
Standard Hotelling unit cost of transportation 
Constant set by regulators to prevent impairment of the QoS on 
IAS 
M 
Big M, relaxation constant to change restriction type from 
regulators 
vjS 
     
Subscription fee for CP jS towards the IUs 
Fraction of demand from ISP i for CP jS  that purchase the CPs 
offer 
Λ 
μi
L 
w 
βi 
fi 
Total aggregated traffic per time unit 
Capacity as measured by packages (traffic) per time unit 
Measurement of congestion as average waiting time per packet 
Share of CPs in SS for ISP i 
Fee per traffic unit for connecting to SS on ISP a or b, or to the 
backbone ISP c  
   
  Utility for IU x from interacting with advertising CPs on ISP i 
   
  Utility for IU x from interacting with subscription CPs on ISP i 
pi
L Price for connectivity at ISP i for the IUs 
Table 12: Indexes, parameters and variables of the mathematical model from this 
thesis 
The CPs 
The utility of the CPs is chosen to be their profit from serving the IUs. There are 
two types of CPs, advertising and subscription CPs. Both types of CPs are sensitive 
towards congestion. It is assumed that subscription CPs are more sensitive to 
congestion as the IUs pay for the content and thus should expect to get what they pay 
for. Also many subscription CPs are traffic heavy, such as video games and movie 
streaming services. That is in general     >    . 
Advertising CPs 
The advertising CPs generate revenues that are dependent on the number of 
visitors and their click through rate. There are no internal externalities among the 
advertising CPs, except that more CPs mean more congestion, which lowers the 
revenues for all CPs (as well as the ISPs).The average number of clicks per site per IU, 
κjA is dependent on the quality of the CP. If the congestion sensitivity is hjA, the 
congestion wi, the click through rate (       
 ), the advertising revenues, r, the 
share of customers, xi, fc the unit cost for traffic by connecting to the backbone ISP 
and the cost function, cjA, the profit of a CP in the NN scenario can be modelled as 
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Where the two options are 
1. The CP enters the market 
2. The CP does not enter the market 
In the neutral regime (N) the CPs can only choose to enter the market. However, 
the CPs cannot choose which customers to send its content to. The revenues from 
advertising will never be negative. However, due to costs of operating the service, cjA, 
some CPs will choose not to enter the market. 
The QoS cannot be higher than the weakest link in the chain, which means that 
the QoS experienced by the CPs users is the following 
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In the differentiation scheme (D) the CPs can choose whether to pay for SS or not, 
or whether they want to compete in the market or not. If fi is the price per traffic unit 
on SS charged by the ISPs, and λjA is the traffic per click per IU, the profit functions 
depending on their choices can be described as follows 
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where the four options are 
1. The CP connects to SS from both access ISPs and backbone ISP 
2. The CP connects to SS on access ISP i, and IAS on ISP -i, and both SS and 
IAS from backbone ISP 
3. The CP connects to IAS on both access ISPs and the backbone ISP 
4. The CP does not choose to enter the market 
This is a simplification, as the CP might also choose to go SS on access ISPs and 
IAS on the backbone ISP, provided the general QoS of the backbone is higher than of 
the access ISP. However, to simplify the analysis it is assumed that the CPs either 
connect to SS on both backbone and access ISPs, or none. Because this analysis will be 
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made in the special case of symmetric access ISPs, option 2 will not be considered as 
the CPs will always choose both or neither access ISPs when evaluation SS cs. IAS. 
Immediately it might look as all CPs will favor SS, as the cost of connecting to SS 
is proportional to the amount of traffic generated by the ISP, which is almost the 
same as with revenues. However, the benefit from joining SS depends on the difference 
in click through rate IAS vs. SS. Also, if the sensitivity towards congestion, h jA is 
small, the difference between SS and IAS will not matter much for the CPs revenues, 
and it might not choose to enter SS. 
Again, the QoS cannot be higher than the weakest link in the chain, which means 
that the QoS in the four alternatives are the following 
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Subscription CPs 
To model the subscription CPs we assume Bertrand competition with 
differentiated goods, as there is a limit to how much content the IUs can consume, and 
thus the subscription CPs have to compete on price. In this respect, we see the IUs 
time and ability to consume content as a scarce resource. The IUs obtain the following 
utility from interacting with a subscription CP jS 
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Here, ιJs is the fraction of IUs that are indifferent to the offer, which is multiplied 
with the utility offer made by CP jS. The second term is disutility from the price set 
by the CP jS, the third term is disutility from the opportunity IUs have to connect to 
competing CPs. If we assume that all the CPs have the same utility offer    (  
    
   ): By setting the utility equal to zero we can obtain an expression for the 
fraction of demand that is generated by the selected price and QoS, we obtain 
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Lemma  1: The optimal price under Bertrand competition, when the competing CPs 
are homogeneous in demand functions and marginal costs, but heterogeneous in IUs 
preferences, and the CPs are homogenous, for CP jS is 
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The proof of Lemma  1 can be seen in the Appendix in section 8.1, ( 176 )-( 181 ). 
It should be noted that marginal cost c is equal to (cjs + fcλjs) in the NN regime, and (cjs 
+ fcλjs + fiλjs) is the NNN regime if the CP is active in SS, as the CP then has to pay 
extra for sending packages in the priority lane. 
The formula ( 69 ) implies that price goes up as the QoS gets better, but goes 
down with increasing competition. When the competition is infinite (perfect 
competition), the price is as expected equal to the marginal cost, c. The assumption 
that the CPs are homogenous is obviously only valid for small N, as the continuum de 
facto are defined as heterogeneous. However, we assume in the model that neighboring 
CPs can be modelled as homogenous. This also implies that the price of the competing 
CPs will be equal. 
 
Lemma  2: The fraction of demand for a single CP under Bertrand competition, when 
the competing CPs are homogeneous in demand functions and marginal costs, but 
heterogeneous in IUs preferences, and the CPs are homogenous, for CP jS is 
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The proof of Lemma  2 can be seen in the Appendix in section 8.1, ( 182 ) -( 188 ). 
We see that the QoS will increase both demand and price, and thus should improve 
the revenues of CPs. It is also worth noticing that more competition, a higher N, 
decrease demand and the service price for the single CP, which will decrease its 
revenues, which is not surprising. However, overall demand increases significantly with 
higher levels of competition 
 
Lemma  3: Assuming Bertrand competition, homogeneous CPs in demand functions 
and marginal costs, but heterogeneous in IUs preferences, the total fraction of demand 
covered is equal to 
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Lemma  3 is obtained by multiplying the demand of a single CP, ( 70 ), with N. 
Lemma  1 and Lemma  3 combined implies that more intense competition, a higher N, 
means significantly higher consumer surplus and social welfare from consumers 
interacting with the CPs because the price is lower and total demand covered higher. 
Thus the level of competition is important for the overall consumer surplus in the 
model, as a higher level of competition will move surplus from the CPs to the IUs. 
With the price and fraction of demand served, we can now formulate the profit 
functions of the subscription CPs. The profit in the NN regime is 
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The revenues are thus dependent on the price the CPs set, and the number of IUs 
that connects, which is dependent on price and the QoS. As for the advertising CPs, 
the QoS cannot be higher than the weakest link in the network 
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In an NNN regime, the CPs can choose to connect to SS, or stay in IAS for free. 
The profit depending on the their choices is then 
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where the four options are 
1. The CP connects to SS from both access ISPs and backbone ISP 
2. The CP connects to SS on access ISP i, and IAS on ISP -i, and both SS and 
IAS from backbone ISP 
3. The CP connects to IAS on both access ISPs and the backbone ISP 
4. The CP does not choose to enter the market 
What applies for the scenarios regarding the advertising CPs, also applies for the 
subscriber CPs. That is only option 1, 3 and 4 are possible outcomes in the 
symmetrical analysis. 
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The optimal price formula ( 69 ) will not be valid in scenario 2, SS on one ISP and 
IAS on the other, or in general where the QoS varies on different lanes. However, this 
analysis will be in a special symmetrical case where the ISPs are homogenous, and 
thus a CP will either connect to SS on both or neither of the ISPs, and the QoS will 
be equal on both access lanes. Therefore, the optimal price formula is valid throughout 
the whole analysis. In a non-symmetrical case, the optimal price would have to be 
calculated from maximizing the revenues from IUs at both ISPs simultaneously, where 
IUs through ISP i have SS and IUs through ISP –i only have IAS. 
Again, the QoS is dependent on both the access and backbone ISP, and cannot be 
higher than the weakest link in the chain, which means that the QoS in the four 
alternatives are the following 
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The access ISPs 
There are two ISPs modelled as in a linear city between 0 and 1, where each ISP is 
on one of the extremes. In the NN regime, the ISPs make their income by providing 
connectivity to the IUs. They have to pay to serve the users of their network, which 
can be seen as a variable cost, and invest in broadband capacity to serve the traffic 
demand generated from the CPs and IUs. Under net neutrality the ISP profit is 
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The function CV represents variable operating costs (e.g. customer service, 
electricity and maintenance), while CI are the costs of investing in more capacity. 
In the NNN regime, the ISP can also charge a fee fi, which is a fee per package 
(traffic) the CPs have to pay in order to enter the BE lane. The profit in the NNN 
regime for ISP i is then 
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The function   
    () is dependent on how many CPs that choose SS and their 
need to send content, and is equal to 
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In the NNN scenario, the ISPs have to set the price of connectivity, pi, the basic 
price/package in the priority lane, fi, and the amount to invest, μi, in order to 
maximize their profit function  
 . The ISPs can also set the QoS of SS and IAS 
according to the discussion in the section presenting congestion. It is also assumed 
that the ISPs have a base capacity,   
 , which means that the ISPs does not really 
have to invest in extra capacity to serve demand, especially if the initial capacity is 
high and demand for traffic is low. 
The backbone ISP 
To reduce complexity, and since the focus is on the access ISPs, the backbone ISPs 
are modelled as one player. The CPs only have to connect to one backbone ISP. To 
avoid the effects of monopoly pricing the mark-up is reduced through the competition 
parameter, φ, which simulates competition. Since the model does not differ from traffic 
going up and down the network, and that it obviously has to be in balance between 
the access ISPs and the backbone ISPs within this ecosystem, a settlement free peering 
is assumed. Thus, the ISPs in this model are considered to be Tier 1 ISPs, which 
means that the ISPs do not purchase any transit service, peers with all the other ISPs 
and pay no settlement on their peering agreement [24]. In reality there would also be 
many smaller ISPs that have to pay larger ISPs for access to the Internet through a 
transit agreement. 
The backbone ISP invests in a capacity, μc, to serve the CPs, and obtains income 
from providing connectivity to the CPs, which pay a price, fc, per traffic. The 
backbone ISP also has a variable cost CV dependent on the amount of CPs that 
connect to the backbone ISP, and CI dependent on how much capacity the ISP invest 
in. The profit of the backbone ISP in the NN regime becomes 
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The function CV represents variable operating costs (e.g. customer service, 
electricity and maintenance), while CI are the costs of investing in more capacity. 
The total traffic,   
   
 is equal to all the traffic sent from the CPs to the IUs on 
both access ISPs 
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In the NNN regime, the ISP can also charge a fee fc
DSS
, which is a fee per package 
(traffic) the CPs have to pay in order to enter the SS lane in addition to the fee fc
D
 for 
access to the network. The profit in the NNN regime for ISP i is then 
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Where the traffic on the SS lane equals 
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The regulators 
The regulators are concerned about how SS will affect IAS, and thus might be 
interested in putting restrictions on the QoS of IAS. If Ψ is a constant set by the 
regulators, the restriction posed upon the access ISPs from the regulators can be 
modelled differently based on type of restriction. One alternative is 
 
  
      ( 83 ) 
 
Where Ψ > 0. This type of restriction requires an absolute minimum QoS, and 
therefore poses requirements on the minimum capacity. Also, this restriction does not 
adapt to traffic, which means that in some scenarios the QoS of IAS might be higher 
than SS, which obviously will not be tolerated by the CPs that pay for SS. Also, 
during times of extreme traffic this restriction might be impossible to comply 
altogether. However, this restriction is easy to monitor which makes is a practical, and 
thus realistic, alternative. Another alternative is 
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Where Ψ >1. The type of restriction controls how much better the QoS can be on 
SS relative to IAS. It is important to remember that lower w (higher QoS) is better. 
This type of restriction does not set any restriction on the amount of capacity that is 
built. Also this restriction adapts to different levels of congestion, which makes it 
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possibly to comply regardless of the amount of traffic. Therefore, this type of 
restriction would probably be a better regulation mechanism. However, much more 
complicated to monitor and implement in practice. Another alternative is a 
combination of the two 
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Here M is a number big enough to relax either the first or third line of the 
restriction. This restriction requires a minimum QoS of the IAS. However, when the 
traffic is so high that the QoS of SS will be worse than Ψ1, that is IAS becomes better 
than SS, the alternative restriction is a relative QoS requirement between IAS and SS. 
Thus under normal operation y = 0, and a minimum QoS of IAS is assured. However, 
during periods with peak levels of traffic, the requirement can be relative so that the 
QoS of SS is never lower than the QoS of IAS. However, the QoS of IAS and SS might 
be equal. The benefit of this restriction is the ability to have strict requirements, while 
still being flexible concerning variability in traffic. However, this type of restriction 
does also require a minimum invested capacity. In reality, there is already a built in 
minimum level of invested capacity, which is controlled by the marked. In order to be 
competitive, an ISP always has to provide equal QoS relative to price to its 
competitors. Therefore, the minimum QoS requirement in ( 83 ) and ( 85 ) might be 
considered to be redundant, and the relative QoS restriction ( 84 ) most suitable for 
the regulators and ISPs. 
The IUs 
The IUs get utility from the advertising CPs and by subscribing to CPs. The 
utility from advertising CPs is dependent on the marginal utility from receiving the 
content, mA, and the total content received, λjAκA less a factor determined by the 
congestion, w, and congestion sensitivity, hjA. The utility from content received by 
Advertising CPs can thus be modelled as 
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In the NN regime, and 
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in the NNN regime. The utility is dependent on the amount of content received 
from the CP, and the CP’s congestion sensitivity. This means that very congestion 
sensitive CPs may in certain scenarios provide less utility than CPs that provide little 
content, but are not sensitive to congestion. This will be dependent on the QoS 
provided by the ISP and distribution of CPs. 
The utility from the subscription CPs is the consumer surplus from the demand 
that is served by the subscribing CPs. It is the obtained by taking the integral of the 
demand function ( 68 ), with ( 69 ) substituted as the competitors price, from the 
clearing price to the maximum obtainable price. Then we take the integral over all the 
subscribing CPs. In the NN regime 
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is the consumer surplus. In the NNN regime we have to split SS and IAS 
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The IUs also obtain a numéraire utility from connecting to an ISP, Y. However, 
loose utility pi from the price charged by the CP, and the possible utility offered by 
the other ISP. This is modelled through the Hotelling transfer cost, t. The utility of IU 
x in the NN regime from connecting to ISP i is thus the sum of utility obtained from 
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connecting to the ISP, connecting to advertising and subscribing CPs and the 
disutility of price and opportunity to connect to a competing ISP 
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And in the differentiation, NNN, regime 
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Congestion 
To model the congestion in the system, the M/M/1 model is adopted. This model 
has been widely used in operations research by many scholars to study congestion 
problems and priority pricing [8]. The M/M/1 model is also widely used in previous 
research in the NN debate [2] [8] [1]. The reason for choosing this system is because it 
captures the effect of capacity being a scarce resource, and it fits a system where the 
arrival of customers is so large that the impact of a single customer on the 
performance of the system is very small [8]. 
In the NN regime, all packages are treated equally according to BE. If   
   is the 
total capacity of ISP i in the NN regime and Λi the total traffic, the average 
congestion for ISP i is 
 
  
  
 
  
     
  
( 92 ) 
 
which is equal for all packages, and where the total traffic   
   in both regimes, 
Lϵ{N,D}, is equal to 
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, and 
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For the backbone ISP, the value of x is 1 because all traffic has to go through the 
backbone ISP.  
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In the NNN regime the access ISPs can set a higher standard in the SS lane, which 
can be no higher than 
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Here the βi is the share of total CPs that pay for SS on ISP i, which can be 
modelled as 
 
   
  
   
  
      
( 96 ) 
 
Where   
    can be calculated from equation ( 78 ) or ( 82 ). Equation ( 95 ) says 
that SS is restricted to that it can be no better than if all the packaged in SS are sent 
directly first in line. However, the QoS can be SS if chosen to be so by the ISP. 
Depending on the QoS, wDSi, set by the ISP, the QoS of IAS can be no better than 
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Here wDi is the average congestion in the whole network if ISP i, which equals 
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The formulation implies that the ISPs can degrade the quality of IAS should it 
want to, and if it is allowed by the policy makers. However, it is worth noticing that 
degrading the quality of IAS does not improve the QoS of SS, or at least not above the 
maximum QoS as illustrated by ( 95 ). If the ISP sets the average QoS equal to the 
best possible according to invested capacity, the QoS of the IAS is 
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This is obviously higher than the QoS of SS. The QoS levels have the property 
that wDSS ≤ wD ≤ wDIA as long as the QoS of SS is equal or better than the systems 
total QoS. It would not make sense for the ISP to set the QoS lower (or equal) to the 
system’s total QoS, as no rational CP would be willing to pay for that. 
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5.3 Simplified Mathematical Model that Allows Analytical 
Treatment 
In this section the general model has been simplified in order to make it easier to 
solve analytically, and thus bear much resemblance to the work by Krämer et al. and 
Bourreau et al. However, this model still includes the aspect of E2E by including a 
backbone ISP, and the aspect of regulation on the IAS lane. Both are important 
extensions to better understand the effects of a transition to an NNN regime. First, 
the notation will be presented, followed by the equations of the mathematical model. 
Notation 
y ϵ [0,→)] Continuum of CPs 
i ϵ {a, b, c} Access ISP a and b, and backbone ISP c 
x ϵ [0,1] 
Unit mass of IUs, modelled as residents in a linear city between 0 
and 1 
L ϵ {N,D} 
Superscript to separate between a neutral (N) regime or a non-
neutral, differentiation, regime (D) 
SS 
IA 
Specialized Services (superscript) 
Internet Access Services (superscript) 
r 
λ 
h 
Advertising revenue per advertising traffic unit per IU 
Package traffic unit per IU for CPs 
Sensitivity towards congestion for CPs 
  (  
 ) Variable costs for the access ISPs of providing connectivity to IUs 
  
 ( ̅ 
 ) 
Variable costs for the backbone ISP of providing connectivity to the 
CPs 
  (  
 ) Investments costs of the CPs from investing in capacity 
  
R 
uC 
uw 
t 
ω 
Minimum QoS of IAS set by regulators 
IUs numéraire utility of being provided connectivity 
Utility per CPs for IUs 
QoS utility for IUs 
Standard Hotelling unit cost of transportation 
Market power of backbone ISP 
μi 
w 
βi 
fi
DSS 
fc
DSS 
fc 
pi 
Capacity as measured by package traffic per time unit 
Measurement of congestion as average waiting time per packet 
Share of CPs in SS for ISP i 
Connection fee to SS on access ISP a or b 
Connection fee to SS on the backbone ISP 
Connectivity price for CPs on backbone ISP 
Price for IUs connectivity for IUs at ISP a and b 
Table 13: Indexes, parameters and variables of the simplified mathematical model 
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Decision and timing under NN Decisions and timing under NNN 
0. Exogenous parameters set 
1. Backbone and access ISPs decisions 
a. IUs connectivity price (access 
only)  
b. Investment levels (access only) 
c. Connectivity fee CPs (backbone 
only) 
2. CPs and ISPs decisions 
a. CPs choose which access ISPs 
to connect to 
b. IUs choose which platform, a or 
b, to connect to 
0. Exogenous parameters set, including 
regulators restrictions 
1. Backbone and access ISPs decisions 
a. IUs connectivity price (access 
only)  
b. Investment levels (access only) 
c. Connectivity fee CPs (backbone 
only) 
d. Connectivity fee for SS (both) 
2. CPs and ISPs decisions 
a. CPs choose which access ISPs to 
connect to, and either SS or IAS 
b. IUs choose which platform, a or 
b, to connect to 
Table 14: Timing and decisions in the NN and NNN regime. Decisions under the same 
number are taken simultaneously, and the players have the same information. 
The CPs 
NN regime 
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where the four options are 
1. The CP connects to SS from both access ISPs and backbone ISP 
2. The CP connects to SS on access ISP i, and IAS on ISP -i, and both SS 
and IAS from backbone ISP 
3. The CP connects to IAS on both access ISPs and the backbone ISP 
4. The CP does not choose to enter the market 
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The access ISPs 
NN regime 
  
    
   
    (  
 )    (  
 )         ( 102 ) 
 
NNN regime 
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The backbone ISP 
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Regulators 
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The IUs 
NN regime 
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NNN regime 
   
       ̅ 
  
  
  
    
     
  ( 108 ) 
 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 77 
Congestion 
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Some necessary conditions 
For IUs to value the presence of CPs in the symmetric equilibrium, the following 
must apply 
 
   
   
 
 
( 116 ) 
 
This can be seen by inserting ( 112 ) into ( 107 ) or ( 113 ) into ( 108 ) 
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The value in the bracket must be positive. 
From the solutions of  ̅ and fc 
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This model is allows analytical solutions, and the results are presented in the next 
section. 
5.4 Solutions to the Simplified Mathematical Model 
The following section contains the solutions to the simplified model, as well as 
solutions from a reduced version of the simplified model where the backbone SS-lane 
has been removed. This is to obtain explicit solutions, whereas the model including the 
backbone ISP SS fee can only be solved implicitly. This section only provides the 
solutions, and readers interested in how the solutions were derived from the 
mathematical model can find the process of deriving the solutions, as well as the 
second order conditions for optimality, in the appendix section 0. The next paragraphs 
will briefly summarize the assumptions that were made to derive the solutions, before 
the solutions are presented. 
The model is solved under the assumption of perfect information. This is not 
realistic, as strategic and financial information is usually closely guarded secret by 
most corporations. In a realistic scenario one would expect the large ISPs to have more 
information than the other players, because they directly interact with all players in 
the ecosystem. Not just all the types of players, like the CPs that actually also deal 
with all the types of players, but with literary all the players, as one ISP might do 
business with all CPs, but a CP usually does not do business with many other CPs. It 
might be that ISPs could take advantage of this asymmetry. However, to reduce 
complexity of the analysis this will not be considered in this model. 
Another simplification is that ISP a and b are symmetrical. The analysis is meant 
to analyze the effect between the types of players, and not effects within a type of 
players. E.g. a large Tier 1 ISP could potentially squeeze out the smaller ISPs in one 
of the regimes. Such an analysis would require a much more complicated solution 
process, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. The effect of competing access ISPs is 
still included, which is important when analyzing effects between the types of players 
to avoid unrealistic high margins of the access ISPs. 
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When solving the model we consider its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE), 
where we focus on optimal decisions along the equilibrium paths [2] [31]. To solve the 
game, we used backward induction. The timing in the model as already been set, and 
thus when we start at the last stage, it is assumed that all previous decisions have 
been made and the information is available to all players. 
 
The cost and investment functions were assumed to be the following when deriving 
the solutions 
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 (same as Bourreau et al. [2]) 
NN regime 
Proposition 2: In Net Neutrality, the ISPs investments, the IUs connection fee, the 
CPs connectivity fee, the participation level of the CPs and the average congestion are 
given by 
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Proposition 3: The total profit of CPs, the access and backbone ISPs, consumer 
surplus and social welfare in Net Neutrality is given by 
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The proof of Proposition 2and Proposition 3 can be seen in the appendix in section 
8.2.1, along with the second order optimum conditions in section 8.2.4. 
NNN regime 
Proposition 4: In Non-Net Neutrality, the ISPs investments, the IUs connection fee, 
the CPs connectivity fee, the SS lane connectivity fees, the participation level of the 
CPs and the average congestion levels are given by 
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If regulators set a minimum QoS on IAS, the following restriction is added 
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The proof of these results can be seen in the appendix, in section 8.2.2. 
As one can readily verify by observation, solving the equations numerically 
involves a complex procedure of solving for the implicit solutions given by ( 134 )-( 
136 ). By solving this system of equations, the investment level given by ( 131 ) can be 
calculated, and from that all the other solutions are then obtained. So without these 
solutions, the others cannot be calculated. Numerical experimentation in Matlab 2012a 
using “fsolve” was not able to solve the system of equations. Therefore, a reduced 
version of the model without the backbone SS price, fc
DSS, was used to derive direct 
numerical results. It is possible to provide a logic explanation to why this is a 
reasonable assumption to make. Including the backbone SS price would make more 
sense if the QoS of the backbone also was dependent on the investment levels of the 
backbone. This means that the overall QoS is equal to the weakest link, as explained 
in the general mathematical model. Since this feature is not implemented, it makes 
more sense to analyze the situation where the CPs have to pay for connectivity to the 
backbone provider only, and assume that the QoS provided by the backbone is always 
sufficient. This is not an unrealistic assumption, as the cost of building network for the 
backbone ISPs are much lower than that of the access (eyeball) ISP [24]. By removing 
the backbone SS price, fc
DSS, the following results were obtained: 
 
Proposition 5: In Non-Net Neutrality, the ISPs investments, the IUs connection fee, 
the CPs connectivity fee, the SS connectivity fee, the participation level of the CPs 
and the congestion levels are given by 
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The results from the analytic NNN regime model, along with the results from the 
NN regime, will be used in the following sections in the discussion of analytical results 
and the numerical experiments. In the regulator scenario, the following restriction is 
added 
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This is equal to that the QoS of IAS has to be better or equal to the average QoS 
in NN. 
 
Proposition 6: The total profit of CPs, the backbone and access ISPs, consumer 
surplus and social welfare in Non-Net Neutrality is given by 
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The proof of Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 can be seen in the appendix in 
section 8.2.3, along with the second order optimum conditions in section 8.2.4. 
5.5 Discussion of the Analytical Results 
This section will provide a general discussion of the equilibrium properties of 
Proposition 2, Proposition 3, Proposition 5 and Proposition 6, and a discussion that 
compares the two regimes analytically. By an analytic comparison of the two regimes 
we will derive the following propositions: 
 Proposition 7: The investments levels are always higher in the NNN regime, than 
in the NN regime. That is μ
D
 > μ
N
. 
 Proposition 8: The innovation level is always higher in the NNN regime, than in 
the NN regime. That is  ̅   ̅ . 
 Proposition 9: The average congestion is always lower in the NNN regime than in 
the NN regime. That is w
D
 < w
N
. 
 Proposition 10: The congestion level of SS in the NNN regime is always lower 
than the average congestion in the NN regime. That is w
DSS
 < w
N
. 
 Proposition 11: The backbone ISP always prefers the NNN regime. 
 Proposition 12: The presence of a backbone ISP always reduces the benefit of 
NNN of the other players. 
 Proposition 13: Overall social welfare is always higher in the NNN regime, than in 
the NN regime. 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 86 
 Proposition 14: Some regulation might increase social welfare, however, the 
winners and losers of regulation is ambiguous. 
Proofs of the propositions are provided in the discussion of section 5.5.3. 
5.5.1 NN Equilibrium Properties, a Discussion of Proposition 2 and 
Proposition 3 
In the standard Hotelling setting the equilibrium price would be CV + t [18]. 
However, because of the presence of externalities in the model settings, the equilibrium 
price for the IUs is higher. Increasing the price, p, decreases demand, which can be 
observed directly by the utility function of the IUs. However, reducing demand also 
improve the perceived QoS because of less congestion. This increases utility from QoS 
as well as the number of CPs, which also increases the utility of the IUs and thus 
demand. The total effect on demand from increasing the price is negative, but less 
negative than in the standard setting. This enables the ISPs to claim a price above the 
standard Hotelling setting. The effect increases proportionally with the investment 
levels, because the IUs directly have to finance the access ISPs investments. This 
result was also obtained by Bourreau et al [2]. Bourreau et al. also point out that in 
the degenerate case of no traffic (λ → 0) or investment in capacity (μ → 0), the result 
converges to the standard Hotelling setting (p → CV + t). This implies that there 
would be no active CPs, and thus this result is only valid as long as the numéraire 
utility, R, is high enough so that the IUs would connect. This degenerate case is 
obviously of no interest to analyze as it implies there are no marked for Internet 
services and it follows that the numéraire utility, R, would also be zero, so there are 
no market for Internet access. However, there are two other factors in this model that 
affects the price, the backbone ISP and the congestion sensitivity, h. When the 
congestion sensitivity approaches infinity, (h → ∞), the market converges to the 
degenerate case of no active CPs, and the price converges to the standard Hotelling 
setting. Because this increases the competition for IUs, as there are fewer CPs, the IUs 
are actually better off as the CPs sensitivity to congestion, h, goes up. As the 
backbone’s market power increases, less CPs are able to join the market, which lowers 
the need for investments, and thus the price, p, is also lower. This is also because the 
IUs utility from CPs is lower, so the ISPs cannot claim as much value from the IUs as 
when there are many CPs. 
In contrast to the model by Bourreau et al. the revenues per advertisement, r, also 
affects the access ISPs and IUs. This is because of the E2E effect, where the backbone 
ISP is able to extract much of the surplus from the CPs, and thus affect the number 
of CPs that participates which affects the price and investment levels by the ISP, 
which again affects the IUs. However, as can be seen in the numerical experiment, the 
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effect is still small and mostly affect the backbone ISP and the CPs, which are able to 
claim significantly higher profits when r increases. 
By increasing the demand for traffic, λ, the investment levels starts to increase, 
but then decrease as congestion effects take over and the cost of investing is higher 
than the extra value the ISPs can claim from the IUs.  The IUs are always worse off 
when λ increase, because they have to pay for the extra investments, while the CPs 
and backbone ISP earn from the extra advertising revenues, and the access ISPs are 
able to claim a higher price because of the extra CPs joining the network. This result 
should not be compared to scenario where the demand for traffic increases because the 
packages themselves are bigger. This result would require the model to separate click 
traffic and traffic through the network. The intuition behind this result is that by 
increasing λ we increase the IUs need to interact with the CPs. However, since they 
only gain utility from the number of CPs, they do not obtain extra benefit, but have 
to pay for their extra demand. This obviously makes the IUs worse off. 
Increasing the variable costs for the access ISPs does not affect the performance of 
the CPs and backbone ISP, and neither does it affect the profit of the ISPs. This is 
because the operational costs are linked to the number of IUs served by the ISP only, 
and thus the ISP compensates 1:1 by increasing the price an equal amount to the 
increase in variable costs, CV. The IUs are therefore the only losers when the variable 
costs of the access ISPs go up. However, increasing the variable costs of the backbone 
ISP affects the whole system, because the backbone’s variable cost affects the CPs 
connectivity price, fc, which in turn affects the number of CPs that join the market. 
The number of CPs affects the whole system. The backbone ISP by far lose the most 
on increased costs, because the backbone ISP cannot compensate the full amount from 
the CPs as the access ISP can with the IUs. The CPs also lose, although not as much 
as the backbone ISP, and even less when the market power of the backbone ISP is less 
than monopolistic. If the IUs or access ISP loose or gain in this scenario is ambiguous. 
If the IUs are very dependent on the CPs, e.g. uC and uw are high, they pay more than 
they gain on higher investments, so they gain surplus as the cost of the backbone 
increase, because of less investments, and the ISPs loose. If the IUs does not value the 
CPs that much, the access ISP cannot gain as much value from their investments from 
the IUs, and thus the IUs are worse off when the variable costs of the backbone ISP 
goes up, because there is less need to make as much investments. 
The connectivity price, fc, is only dependent on the exogenous parameters, and is 
not affected by the access ISPs decisions. In contrast, the price set by the backbone 
ISP affects everything the access ISPs do. The intuition is that the backbone cannot 
control the size of the pie, only its share of the pie, which is what it tries to maximize. 
The access ISPs, on the other hand, can control both the size of the pie and their 
share, and therefore tries to maximize the product of their share and size of the total 
profit pool. This product is dependent on the backbone ISP connectivity price, fc. 
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The cost of network investments, CI, is arguably the most important value driver 
in the system, because all the players are dependent on the network capacity to make 
profits. Both ISPs and CPs earn higher profits by decreasing the investment costs. 
Increasing network capacity means more CPs, which again increase the revenues of the 
backbone, which does not have to do anything. However, in equilibrium the total 
investments costs are actually higher when the cost of investing goes down. This can 
be seen by direct substitution of μN in to CI(μN). This extra cost is extracted from the 
IUs, which actually loose surplus by lowering the network investment costs. The effect 
is dampened when the IUs utility for CPs and congestion, uC and uw, go down. 
However, the overall effect is still a loss for the IUs. 
Lastly, the IUs preference for QoS or CPs in general make all players, except the 
IUs, better off. The intuition is that the more highly IUs value CPs and QoS, the more 
they are willing to pay the ISPs to make higher investments. All players, except the 
IUs, take advantage of this. The system is therefore in favor of the platforms and CPs, 
as the IUs are not able to draw benefits from being more dependent on the CPs and 
their services. The congestion levels also decrease as uC and uw go up, while the 
number of CPs goes up. This is because an increase in the IUs utility leads to higher 
investment levels. 
5.5.2 NNN Equilibrium Properties, a Discussion of Proposition 5 and 
Proposition 6 
Generally, the equilibrium properties in the NNN regime follow much of the same 
logic as in the NN regime. However, there are some differences. As in the NN regime, 
the price, p, does not generally equal the standard Hotelling setting, p = CV + t. The 
price might be both higher and lower depending on the parameter values, as the ISPs 
are now able to also extract revenues from the CPs. When r increases, the access ISPs 
are able to extract more revenues from the CPs, which makes the IUs more valuable. 
The access ISPs might even, in extreme scenarios, be willing to pay the IUs in order to 
be attractive for the CPs. This is not an option in the NN regime. Increasing λ always 
make the price increase, as the increase in investment costs are higher than the ISPs 
ability to extract revenues from SS, so the IUs have to pay for the extra capacity. 
The priority fee, fi
DSS, is always positive in the equilibrium solution. The fee 
generally increases with r and λ. The intuition is that as advertising becomes more 
valuable, the access ISPs can extract more revenues from the CPs. 
The CPs connectivity fee, fc, is the same in both regimes. This is because the 
backbone ISP can only maximize its share of the profit pool, and not the size of the 
pool. Thus, the backbone cannot directly gain any extra profits in the NNN regime by 
its own decisions. However, it may earn higher profits indirectly through an increase in 
network capacity investments. 
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The average congestion level, wD, has the same logic as in the NN regime. 
However, the IAS and SS congestion levels, wDIA and wDSS, follows a different logic. 
Generally we see that wD < wDIA, and wDSS < wD. However, in the case where fi
DSS = 0, 
wDSS = wD, while wDIA is always higher than wD. This is because when fi
DSS = 0, all CPs 
connects to the SS lane, so it obviously follows that wDSS = wD, since these would be 
the same. In practice there would be no traffic on the IAS lane, so congestion would be 
zero. However, theoretically the congestion level is higher, as would have been 
experienced if a single package were sent on the IAS lane, as it then would be put at 
the back of the line, behind all the other packages. However, this degenerate case will 
not happen as fi
DSS always is > 0 in the equilibrium solution. 
5.5.3 Net Neutrality vs. Non-Net Neutrality, a General Discussion 
Comparing the Two Regimes 
The main question in this thesis is whether NN or NNN is preferable, which we 
will partly try to answer in this section through an analytical analysis. However, the 
main conclusions will be drawn in the numerical experiments in the next section, as 
the model is too complex to be fully analyzed analytically. First we will discuss the 
investment and innovation levels. Then we will discuss the effect on price levels and 
congestion. Lastly the profits, consumer surplus and social welfare will be briefly 
discussed. 
Effects on investments and innovation  
In this section we compare the investments in capacity by the access ISPs and the 
number of CPs that enter the market. 
 
Proposition 7: The investments levels are always higher in the NNN regime, than in 
the NN regime. That is μD > μN. 
Proof: Since we know that fc
N = fc
D, we can obtain the following result by utilizing 
the results obtained in Proposition 2 equation ( 120 ) and Proposition 5 equation ( 143 
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This result is always positive in equilibrium, even when the backbone ISP has 
monopoly power. This means that the investments will always be higher in the NNN 
regime, than in the NN regime. □ 
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Proposition 8: The innovation level is always higher in the NNN regime, than in the 
NN regime. That is  ̅   ̅ . 
Proof: Since we know that fc
N = fc
D, we can obtain the following result by utilizing 
the results obtained in Proposition 2 equation ( 123 ) and Proposition 5 equation ( 149 
) 
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The proof follows from Proposition 7. □ 
This result coincides with Bourreau et al [2].  
Bourreau et al also find that there might be a scenario where all CPs that were 
active in the NN regime, are in IAS in the NNN regime, and that only a portion of the 
extra CPs enter SS. This is very unlikely in our analysis because of the congestion 
sensitivity, which keeps the number of CPs that enter down. However, it is possible 
when the IUs utility for CPs and QOS, uC and uw, are low. 
Effect on price levels and congestion 
Whether the IUs connectivity price will be higher or lower in the NNN regime is 
ambiguous. We can obtain the following result by utilizing the fact that fc
N = fc
D, and 
the results obtained in Proposition 2 equation ( 121 ) and Proposition 5 equation ( 145 
) 
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It is not clear whether the NNN regime will make the price higher or lower. 
Generally, the effect of extra investments increases the price. However, the ISPs 
ability to extract revenues from the CPs lowers the price. How well the access ISPs 
can extract revenues from the CPs is therefore essential for whether pD is higher or 
lower than pN. 
 
Proposition 9: The average congestion is always lower in the NNN regime than in the 
NN regime. That is wD < wN. 
Proof: Since we know that fc
N = fc
D, we can obtain the following result by utilizing the 
results obtained in Proposition 2 equation ( 124 ) and Proposition 5 equation ( 151 ) 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 91 
 
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
( 163 ) 
It follows from Proposition 7 that the average congestion level in the NN regime is 
always higher than the average congestion in the NNN regime, so wD < wN. □ 
This is also in correspondence with the results by Bourreau et al [2]. 
It follows that the SS lane is always lower than the NN-lane, because of the 
M/M/1 queuing system property wDSS < wD < wIAS. Formally, based on the previous 
discussion and the properties of the M/M/1 queue model, we can write 
 
Proposition 10: The congestion level of SS in the NNN regime is always lower than the 
average congestion in the NN regime. That is wDSS < wN. 
Proof: The proof follows directly from the M/M/1 Property 1, ( 11 ), and 
Proposition 9. □ 
The IAS lane in the NNN regime might be either higher or lower than the average 
congestion in the NN regime, so the results are ambiguous. Since we know that fc
N = 
fc
D, we can obtain the following result by utilizing the results obtained in Proposition 2 
equation ( 124 ) and Proposition 5 equation ( 153 ) 
 
  
    
 
  
  
   (      
 )
(      
     
   )(      
     )
 
 
( 164 ) 
We already know that μD/μN > 1. However, the value of the last fractional varies 
depending on the value of r and λ. As the numerical experiments will reveal, there are 
scenarios with a high r/λ ratio where also the congestion level of IAS is lower than the 
average congestion in NN. Also, when the IUs utility for CPs and congestion is low, 
wDIA is lower than wN because the revenues from the CPs are so important that they 
manage to increase the investments sufficiently in the NNN regime to lower the 
congestion for all CPs. 
Effect on profits, consumer surplus and social welfare 
The access ISPs 
By utilizing the results obtained in Proposition 3 and Proposition 6, subtracting ( 
127 ) from ( 157 ), we obtain 
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( 165 ) 
 
We know that the investments are always higher in the NNN regime, so the ISP 
has higher costs making investments. The first parenthesis, which is equal to the 
externality price effect on the IUs, is equal in both regimes, but since the increase in 
investments costs are quadratic, and the increase in the externality price effect is 
linear, the externality effect is not enough to pay for the extra investments that is 
required in NNN. Whether the NN- or NNN regime is beneficial for the access ISPs is 
dependent on the access ISPs ability to extract extra revenues from the CPs, 
compared to the rebate they offer the IUs. Thus, NNN is not always beneficial for the 
access ISPs, as will be confirmed in the numeric analysis. This result is also proven 
analytically by Bourreau et al [2]. In comparison, Krämer et al. have shown that the 
NNN regime is always beneficial for the ISPs in a monopoly setting [1].  
The backbone ISP 
Proposition 11: The backbone ISP always prefers the NNN regime. 
Proof: By utilizing the results obtained in Proposition 3 and Proposition 6, 
subtracting ( 126 ) from ( 156 ), we obtain 
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It follows from Proposition 7 that the backbone ISPs profits are always higher in 
the NNN regime, than in the NN regime. □ 
The intuition is that this result applies as long as the backbone ISPs already 
provide sufficient QoS, and that it is the QoS of the access ISPs that are holding the 
perceived QoS back. This means that the backbone does not have to make any 
investments, and the profits increase in proportion to the extra investments done by 
the access ISPs. From this we can conclude the following. 
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Proposition 12: The presence of a backbone ISP always reduces the benefit of NNN of 
the other players. 
Proof: Since the backbone does not create any value in the model, and always 
benefits from the NNN regime, the other players must lose benefit relative to a system 
with no backbone ISP effects because some of their benefit is taken by the backbone 
ISP. This proposition does only hold if the backbone ISP is not the bottleneck in the 
system, and can make investments that affects the other players. □ 
It is obvious from a practical standpoint that a real network cannot operate 
without a backbone ISP, and if the backbone ISP can make larger investments from 
adopting the NNN regime, and these investments are crucial for the performance of 
the system, the backbone might increase the benefit for other players. However, this is 
not possible to analyze in this model, as it is assumed that the backbone already has 
sufficient QoS, and thus operates as a free rider when the access ISPs adopts the NNN 
regime. 
The CPs 
By utilizing the results obtained in Proposition 3 and Proposition 6, subtracting ( 125 
) from ( 155 ), we obtain 
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No clear analysis can be drawn from this result. We know that the total number of 
CPs will be greater in the NNN regime. However, the margins of the CPs might be 
lower, so the aggregate profit is less even though there are more active CPs. The 
numerical experiments will later show that, although the CPs are usually better off, 
there are scenarios where the aggregate profit is less in the NNN regime, than in the 
NN regime.  
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The IUs 
By utilizing the results obtained in Proposition 3 and Proposition 6, subtracting ( 
128 ) from ( 158 ), we obtain 
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From Proposition 7 it follows that the IUs will always obtain more utility from 
CPs and congestion in the NNN regime. However, depending on how the payment for 
the extra capacity is split between the IUs and the access ISPs. The numerical 
experiments will reveal that the results on the consumer surplus are ambiguous. 
However, the IUs are usually better off in the NNN regime because of both higher 
utility from CPs and congestion, and a lower price from the access ISPs. 
Total welfare 
Proposition 13: Overall social welfare is always higher in the NNN regime, than in the 
NN regime. 
Proof: By utilizing the results obtained in Proposition 3 and Proposition 6, 
subtracting ( 129 ) from ( 159 ), we obtain 
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By observation, one can establish that both the two first factors are always 
positive in the equilibrium solution. And because the investments are reverse 
proportional to the basic cost unit, CI, the sum of the two terms are higher than the 
difference in investment costs. □ 
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The second factor is interesting, because it shows that even if μD - μN = 0, the 
social welfare is still higher in NNN because of better allocation. This means that the 
short run effects of NNN, that is before any investments are made, should also 
increase the social welfare because of better allocation. The first factor is increasing 
with (μD  – μN), which we know is always positive because of Proposition 7. Even 
though the investments costs are higher in the NNN regime, they always increase less 
than the gross increase in social welfare. This is because the levels of investment, μD, 
that optimizes social welfare is always higher than the levels that optimize the access 
ISPs profits. The intuition is that since the access ISP cannot obtain all the profits by 
increasing the investments, it will always under invest according to the maximizing 
criteria of the social welfare. However, by the definition of the maximum criteria of the 
access ISP, the access ISP will not invest so that the marginal cost of investments is 
higher than the marginal increase in revenues, so an increase in investments will 
increase the revenues for the ISP. However, that increase is always less than the total 
increase in surplus and revenues, so it follows that the social welfare is always higher 
in NNN. Except for the backbone ISP, which always prefers NNN, it is ambiguous 
which players that benefit from NNN. However, the social welfare is always higher 
than in NN. 
 
Proposition 14: Some regulation might increase social welfare, however, the winners 
and losers of regulation is ambiguous. 
Proof: If   
 
 is the access ISPs optimal investment levels in equilibrium, by 
deriving equation ( 159 ) from Proposition 6 with respect to   , we obtain 
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We already know from ( 165 ), ( 167 ) and ( 168 ) that it is ambiguous whether 
the individual players, except the backbone ISP, will benefit from the NNN regime. 
Therefore, higher investments, as might be enforced from regulation, does not 
necessary mean that the individual actors are better off, even though the social welfare 
increases. Equation ( 171 ) does only state that the overall social welfare is improved 
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when the investments are enforced to be higher than the access ISPs optimum levels.  
Too much regulation can force the investment levels out of the social optimum levels, 
so that the social optimum is worse off than with no or little regulation. □ 
Because the individual players benefit from regulation is ambiguous, whether 
regulation is favorable or not depends on the objective of the regulators. If regulators 
want to maximize the IUs consumer surplus, there are scenarios where the IUs market 
power is such that they have to pay for the increase investments. Also, if the 
regulation is too strict, the social welfare might lose on the fact that the total 
investments are higher than the social welfare optimum levels. Last, but not least, this 
discussion has not considered the fact that an access ISP will only operate in the long 
run as long as it is profitable. Thus, if regulating the IAS lane makes the access ISPs 
unprofitable, they might not choose to operate even though it maximizes the social 
welfare. Obviously, the social welfare is not maximized if no access ISPs choose to 
operate, as no investments then would be made. 
Since regulating the IAS lane’s QoS might force the investment levels of the access 
ISPs out from optimum levels, one would expect the access ISPs to always be worse 
off from regulation. However, because of the competition between the access ISPs 
there are scenarios, as we will see in the numerical experiments, where the competition 
makes the ISPs under invest. Thus some regulation might actually increase the profit 
of the ISPs, as it forces the ISPs to reach the optimum monopoly levels of 
investments. This result is ambiguous and might go in either direction depending on 
the effect of competition between the access ISPs. 
Our results coincide with those of Bourreau et al. in their Propositions 3, 4, 5 and 
6 [2] . However, due to the introduction of the backbone ISP, the benefit of the NNN 
regime is less than that of Bourreau et al. Still, our results are in agreement with 
theirs. Also, we have shown that the backbone ISP always prefers the NNN regime, 
and because of this the potential benefit of the other players in the NNN regime is 
reduced, or if the actor is losing from the NNN regime the downside is strengthens. 
Also, we have shown that some regulation might improve social welfare. However, too 
much regulation might reduce the overall social welfare, and even some regulation 
might damage individual players. 
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Figure 12: Investments in network 
capacity is always higher in the NNN 
regime 
Figure 13: The volume of content 
from the CPs is always higher in the 
NNN regime 
  
Figure 14: The average congestion is 
always lower in the NNN regime 
Figure 15: The backbone ISP always 
prefers the NNN regime 
  
Figure 16: Social welfare is always 
higher in the NNN regime 
Figure 17: Some regulation can 
increase social welfare, but risk 
hurting the IUs, CPs or access ISPs 
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5.6 Numerical Experiments 
This section will provide a numerical analysis, where the purpose is to clarify 
under which circumstances the different regimes are preferred for the different actors, 
and how changing parameters affect the results provided in the model. The numerical 
experiments will also confirm all the propositions from the analytic discussion based on 
the analytic solutions. Lastly, we will also do a numerical experiment on the effects of 
regulation. To achieve this, a scenario based sensitivity analysis will be conducted. By 
scenarios we mean analyzing the effects on a transition from the NN regime to the 
NNN regime where all parameters are kept constant, except those analyzed in the 
scenario, and parameters that have to change in order to satisfy the conditions for the 
model, ( 116 ) - ( 119 ). 
The following scenarios will be analyzed and presented in this section: 
1. Varying attractiveness of online advertising 
2. Varying level of interactive and live services 
3. Varying operational performance of ISPs 
4. Varying effectiveness of building infrastructure 
5. IUs becomes more or less dependent on online services 
6. Regional differences in backbone ISPs market power 
7. A regulated network 
a. Base scenario 
b. High and low IU dependence for CPs and QoS 
c. Low and high r/λ ratio 
The scenarios are meant to analyze different regional effects, as well as how the 
use and performance criteria of the Internet might change in the future, will affect a 
possible transition to the NNN regime. The analysis is purely synthetic, and should 
thus not be compared to empirical numbers or results from the real world. However, 
the relations between the numbers are supposed to represent a real scenario, and the 
different scenarios analyses effects that might occur in real life depending on local 
demographics and future development of the Internet. A few highlights from the 
results of the analysis are 
 The attractiveness of advertising is a crucial factor to consider, and in 
extreme scenarios either the IUs and CPs benefit, and the access ISPs lose, 
when the attractiveness of advertising is low, or opposite when the 
attractiveness of advertising is high 
 Regulation might severely reduce, and even revert, the benefit of the NNN 
regime for IUs when they are heavily dependent on the CPs and high QoS 
 Regulating the IAS lane is ineffective when the IUs are less dependent on 
CPs and QoS, or when the attractiveness of advertising is high 
The next section will contain a description on how the model was implemented, 
followed by a section describing the scenarios in more detail. The main results of the 
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numerical analysis will then be presented together with a short discussion of each 
scenario. Lastly, a general discussion on NN vs NNN and regulation will be provided. 
5.6.1 Implementation 
The implementation is based on the explicit results of the analytic mathematical 
model, equations ( 120 ) - ( 124 )  and ( 143 ) - ( 153 ). This model can be solved 
directly, and does not require any algorithms to obtain the solutions. A standard 
computer can easily obtain good results within seconds using either a spreadsheet or a 
mathematical programming language like Matlab. 
The results presented in this thesis was calculated on a standard laptop, ASUS 
UX32VD Ultrabook with a dual core processor (i7-3517U) running at 1.9GHz and 
10GB RAM. The software in use was Microsoft Excel 2010. Excel was chosen because 
of its ability to rapidly perform sensitivity analyses using Data Tables. This is effective 
as long as the results can be calculated directly, which is the case with this model. 
After implementation, results can be calculated immediately, with an instant response 
to parameter changes. 
5.6.2 Description of Scenarios 
This section will present a more detailed description of the scenarios. Each 
scenario will be described with a text providing the context for the analysis, and a 
description of the sensitivity parameter(s) in the analysis. 
Base scenario 
The base scenario is meant to be a realistic representation of today’s situation. The 
parameters for the base scenario are presented in Table 17 together with the results in 
the base scenario. The base scenario is set to provide a realistic split of welfare 
between the players, reduce the volume of CPs so the total volume of content,  ̅ , is 
short of 100% in the NN regime, as well as highlight the fact that in an advertising 
model a lot of traffic must be generated in order to generate a reasonable amount of 
revenues. This is why the r/λ ratio is so low, as seen by the overview in Table 17. 
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Sensitivity scenarios 
The number in the following list states the name of the scenario, the following 
letter, a, describes the parameter that is being changed in the analysis, and the last 
letter, b, explains the relevance and context of the scenario. 
  
1. Varying attractiveness of online advertising 
a. Parameter to be evaluated: The ratio r/λ will vary to test the effects 
of varying performance of the online advertising business model. A 
high ratio means the model creates a lot of welfare relative to the 
investment requirements. The opposite may still generate high 
revenues; however, to achieve this, much higher levels of investments 
are required, as much more traffic is transferred through the network. 
The available revenues with no congestion, r*λ, will be constant 
throughout the analysis. 
b. The wealth of the CPs comes from online advertising. The 
attractiveness of online advertising in comparison to other medias is 
thus very important for the CPs performance and the performance of 
other parties in the ecosystem. As services become more complex, it 
does not necessary mean that the CPs can earn more money. 
However, it does put a higher stress on the network capacity which 
affects the performance of the network, and thus the performance of 
the whole ecosystem. An example of this is by releasing 4k video 
streaming due to competition between video services, which requires a 
high bandwidth, but does not necessary provide more revenues from 
advertising. 
2. Varying level of interactive and live services 
a. Parameter to be evaluated: Increasing and decreasing the congestion 
sensitivity, h 
b. Many services in the future will likely involve more live action and 
interaction with the IUs, and would thus probably be more congestion 
sensitive. This will likely enforce higher demands on network capacity 
3. Varying operational performance of ISPs 
a. Parameter to be evaluated:  Increasing and decreasing variable costs, 
CV and Cc
V 
b. Simple analysis to see the effect of decreasing performance by the 
backbone and access ISPs cost structure. As their operational costs 
increase, some other players are likely to pay much, or most, of the 
extra costs to provide sufficient service 
4. Varying effectiveness of building infrastructure 
a. Parameter to be evaluated:  Increasing and decreasing investment 
costs, CI 
b. This might vary from region to region. Low investment costs means 
that there is likely to be a higher network capacity available, and 
more wealth should be generated for the ecosystem 
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5. IUs becomes more or less dependent on online services 
a. Parameter to be evaluated:  Increasing/decreasing IUs CSP and 
congestion utility, uC and uw 
b. When we become more and more dependent on the Internet, we are 
also likely to be willing to pay more for the services, which is 
illustrated by increasing the utility for the number of CPs and low 
congestion levels 
6. Regional differences in backbone ISPs market power 
a. Parameter to be evaluated: The backbone ISP market power (ω) will 
vary from a high value, which corresponds to a low backbone ISP 
market power, to 1, representing full monopoly power 
b. The market power of the backbone ISP might vary in different 
regions, which means that there might be local differences in the share 
of profit. The backbone can directly harvest the surplus of the CPs, 
and also reap benefits from SS, without paying for the capacity 
expansion. This gives the backbone ISP a unique position where it can 
reap the benefits of the access ISPs investments without having to 
pay for the extra investments 
7. A regulated network: Base scenario, high IU utility levels and low IU utility 
levels, low r/λ and high r/λ 
a. Parameter to be evaluated: The Minimum QoS req. (Ψ) will be set 
very strict, and relaxed until the equilibrium solution investment 
levels are obtained. Regulation is varied from 0 to 100%, where 0% 
means that the access ISPs can do as the like, and 100 % means that 
the investments must be so that wDIA ≤ Ψ = wN.  
b. The analysis is made to see the effects by regulators restricting the 
QoS on IAS, which could be a likely outcome of the NN debate. 
Regulating policies will limit the flexibility of access ISPs to manage 
their network, or make investments, which is the problem being 
analyzed in this scenario. Five scenarios are analyzed under 
regulation: the base scenario, high uC and uw, and low uC and uw, and 
the effects of regulation when r/λ is low and high. Table 15 shows the 
values of the parameters used in the analysis. 
Scenario 
Parameter 
changed 
Low value High value 
Base scenario None - - 
IU dependence uC and uw 5,26 and 6,37*10
-2 41,25 and 0,5 
Advertising 
attractiveness 
r/λ 1,81*10-4 1,81*10-2 
Table 15: Values changed to perform sensitivity analysis of the effects from regulation 
the NNN regime 
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5.6.3 Presentation  and Discussion of the Results 
This section contains graphs showing the main results from the scenario analysis, 
followed by a short discussion of each scenario. Some additional results, used in the 
discussion, are presented in the appendix section 8.3. Since this is a synthetic analysis, 
where the purpose is to see the relative effect of NN vs. NNN, all results have been 
normalized with basis on the NN solutions. The table below illustrates the 
normalization process that was used to present the results and compare the two 
regimes. 
Investments and 
innovation levels. 
Preferably N > 0 
Price and congestion 
levels. Preferably N < 0 or 
as low as possible 
Profits, consumer surplus and 
social welfare. Preferably N > 0 
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Table 16: The normalization process in the numerical experiments to compare the 
results of the NNN regime to the NN regime. See Table 17 for a description of their 
representation in the scenario analysis’ graphs and diagrams 
First the base scenario will be presented, followed by graphs with results from the 
seven scenarios. The results will be presented by graphs showing the relative 
development from NN to NNN of profits and welfare, price and congestion levels, and 
investment and CPs participation levels in the different scenarios. The base scenario 
shows the parameters that are the basis for the whole scenario analysis. Each scenario 
analysis will show how the sensitivity variables are changed in the scenario. 
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Base scenario 
Parameters Value  Variable  Description 
Revenue click (r) 0,2  Investment μ, network investments  
Traffic per IU (λ) 110  y_bar CP volume (innovation) 
Congestion sensitivity (h) 20  y_tilde SS indifference level 
Variable cost access ISP (CV) 0,1  p IUs connectivity price 
Variable cost backbone ISP (Cc
V) 0,1  fiDSS SS lane fee for CPs 
Investment cost coeff. (CI) 0,001  wD Average congestion 
Minimum QoS req. (Ψ) -  wIAS IAS congestion 
Numéraire utility (R) 15  wDSS SS congestion 
Utility CSP (uC) 8,25  fc CPs connectivity fee 
Utility congestion (uw) 0,1    
Hotelling unit cost (t) 1    
Backbone ISP market power (ω) 6    
Table 17: Parameter setting in the base scenario, and explanation of the 
variable names in the scenario analysis representing the relative change 
 
Figure 18: 
Normalized 
results from 
Base 
scenario, 
comparing 
NNN against 
the basic 
values of NN 
The base scenario has an even spread of absolute wealth in the NN regime, and all 
the players benefit from the NNN regime. This means that if there is a downward 
trend of benefit in a sensitivity scenario, an actor that is worse off in the base scenario 
might be tipped over sooner to the side where the NNN regime is not favorable. The 
most dramatic parameter to change the result from the base scenario is presented in 
the first sensitivity analysis, in scenario 1: Varying attractiveness of online advertising, 
which will be presented in the first scenario analysis. 
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Varying attractiveness of online advertising 
 
Figure 19: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation in 
the 
attractiveness 
of online 
advertising 
scenario  
 
Figure 20: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion in 
the 
attractiveness 
of online 
advertising 
scenario 
 
Figure 21: 
Normalized 
values of 
profits and 
welfare in the 
attractiveness 
of online 
advertising 
scenario 
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 In the first scenario, with varying attractiveness of advertising scenario, the r/λ 
goes from very small, to relatively very large. However, the total potential earnings 
from advertising, r*λ, are the same throughout the whole analysis. At a low ratio, the 
benefit of NN is relatively small. This is because there is a tremendous amount of 
traffic that has to be sent in order to generate revenues for the CPs, which makes the 
whole ecosystem inefficient. The CPs and IUs are also worse off with a low r/λ ratio. 
This is because the demand for traffic relative to the ability to generate revenues is so 
high, that almost all CPs have to join the SS line in order to get sufficient QoS. The 
result is that the IAS line becomes severely impaired, and that the SS-line is not good 
enough to compensate for the SS fee the CPs have to pay. Because there is such a 
high requirement to make large investments, but relatively little revenues to be 
extracted from the CPs, the IUs have to pay a higher price to make up for the larger 
investments. Even though the IUs get a 
higher utility from more CPs and better 
average congestion, it is not enough to make 
up for the extra price they have to pay in the 
NNN regime. At a high ratio, all players, 
except the access ISPs, profits from the NNN 
regime. This is because the IUs are now so 
valuable, because their utility for CPs and 
QoS are lower, that the ISPs have to pay 
them to use their platforms, and the revenues 
they generate from the SS-lane is not enough 
to compensate. Concerning impairment of the 
IAS-line it should be noted that, when the 
r/λ-ratio is high, adopting the NNN regime 
actually improves all congestion levels and makes the congestion level of IAS better 
than the average congestion in the NN regime. Lastly, the relative difference between 
the two regimes seems to peak at some point for all the players. This is because in the 
extremes, when there is a very high r/λ-ratio, the access ISPs are under-investing 
because of their inability to extract sufficient revenues from the system. As a result, 
the total investments are smaller, which also makes the relative difference between 
NNN and NN smaller. When the ratio is very small, the CPs simply do not generate 
enough revenues compared to investment requirements so that, even though beneficial, 
the transition from NN to NNN does not make much difference. By observation of the 
absolute values, neither extreme seems likely because the spread of wealth in the NN 
regime is huge in both extremes, favoring the access ISPs when the ratio is low and 
the CPs and IUs when the ratio is high. Thus a middle scenario is probably more 
likely where the spread of wealth between the players is not that large, albeit still in 
the region where there could be a biased spread of wealth favoring one more players. 
 
Figure 22: The attractiveness of 
online advertising is important 
for the individual players’ benefit 
of the NNN regime. 
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Varying level of interactive and live services 
 
Figure 23: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation 
in the 
interactive 
and live 
services 
scenario  
 
Figure 24: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
interactive 
and live 
services 
scenario 
 
Figure 25: 
Normalized 
values of 
profits and 
welfare in 
the 
interactive 
and live 
services 
scenario 
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In the second scenario, where the sensitivity of interactive and live services is 
tested, the congestion level goes from relatively small to relatively large. When the 
congestion levels are small, all players benefit from the NNN regime. However as the 
congestion levels increase, the benefits go down and the access ISP is actually worse 
off as the congestion levels are high. Relatively the benefits for all players decrease. 
The reason for this is because the high congestion level makes the whole system less 
effective, which also makes it relatively harder to benefit from the NNN regime. 
Especially for the ISP that has to make relatively much higher investments compared 
to how many CPs are in the market. Since there are fewer CPs the access ISPs has a 
worse value proposition for the IUs, and can thus not charge as high prices. However, 
they cannot either extract as much revenues from the CPs as they generate less 
revenues per CP, and 
the total number of CPs 
is lower. If the backbone 
CPs market power is 
very low, this effect is 
much smaller, so that 
the NNN regime is still 
profitable under high 
congestion sensitivity. 
However, since the 
backbone ISP is only 
maximizing its own 
share, it is much harder 
for the access ISP to 
extract enough  
revenues from the CPs, 
so that it is worse off in 
the much more competitive NNN regime than in NN. The NNN regime does provide 
one important improvement, an increase in investments and innovation. As the CPs 
become more congestion sensitive, fewer are able to join the market and the overall 
investments are decreasing in the NN regime as the congestion sensitivity goes up. The 
same effect is observed in the NNN regime. However, adopting the NNN regime is a 
good way to actually increase both the investment levels and innovation levels, to 
higher levels than what they would even be when congestion sensitivity is very low in 
the NN regime. This shows how the NNN regime might actually benefit the CPs: Even 
though their conditions for competition are worsened, their ability to fund investments 
makes more CPs able to join the market in an NNN regime! 
  
 
Figure 26: The level of interactive and live services, 
like Skype, reduce the relative benefit of the NNN 
regime. However, as proposed the NNN regime can 
contribute to maintain the overall investment levels 
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Varying operational performance of the access ISP and backbone ISPs 
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the 
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performance 
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scenario 
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Figure 29: 
Normalized 
values of 
profits and 
welfare in 
the 
operational 
performance 
of the 
backbone 
ISP 
scenario 
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In the third scenario, where first the performance level of the access ISPs is tested, 
the variable costs of the access ISP go from relatively low to relatively high. The 
results are trivial. The extra costs are extracted directly from the IUs, because the 
variable costs of the access ISPs are only connected to the number of IUs on the 
platform. Thus the consumer surplus goes down in proportion to the variable costs of 
the access ISPs. However, the absolute benefit of the NNN regime is equal to all 
players throughout the whole scenario. Since the consumer surplus of the IUs is 
relatively smaller when the operational costs of the access ISPs are high, they benefit 
relatively more from the NNN regime. The profits of the CPs, and backbone and 
access ISPs are unchanged in the whole scenario. The result would probably have been 
different if the access ISPs variable costs also were linked to the CPs, as this most 
likely would decrease the number of CPs in the system, which would affect all the 
players. Since the total number of IUs is the same, and not affected by price, the other 
players are not affected in this scenario. 
The results are different when the 
variable cost of the backbone ISP goes from 
relatively small to relatively large. In contrast 
to the previous test, changing the variable 
costs of the backbone ISP affects the whole 
system. This is because the variable costs of 
the backbone ISP is linked to the number of 
CPs, which affects all the players. In absolute 
values, the backbone ISP’s profits are reduced 
the most. However, the relative difference 
between NN and NNN is almost unchanged. 
This is because the relative difference of the 
backbone only depends on the investment 
levels, which relatively does not change much. No players lose relatively much benefits 
of NNN by increasing the variable costs, which illustrates how this effect is spread 
much more evenly among the players than in the previous scenario. So the backbone 
ISP affects the whole system, and not just its own direct business relations. However, 
the access ISPs are clearly the players that benefit relatively much less from the NNN 
regime when the variable costs of the backbone is high, than the others. This is 
because the total effects for all values are small. In the NN regime, the only effect for 
the ISPs is a minor decrease in price and investments. However, in the NNN regime, in 
addition to the decrease in price and investments, the SS connectivity fee and the 
number of CPs also decrease, which makes the total effect larger. Thus the access ISPs 
are less efficient in the NNN regime than when the variable costs of the backbone ISP 
is low, and it follows that the relative benefit of NNN is also smaller. 
  
 
Figure 30: The variable costs of 
the backbone ISP affects the 
whole ecosystem. 
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Varying effectiveness of building infrastructure 
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Figure 32: 
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effectiveness 
of building 
infrastructure 
scenario 
 
Figure 33: 
Normalized 
values of 
profits and 
welfare in the 
effectiveness 
of building 
infrastructure 
scenario. The 
secondary 
axis is for the 
IUs relative 
effect. 
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In the fourth scenario, where the effectiveness of building infrastructure is tested, 
the base unit for investment costs, CI, goes from a reduction by a factor of 10, to an 
increase by a factor of 10. The results show that the absolute benefit of NNN is inverse 
proportional to the base investment cost, CI. This is already known from the analytic 
discussion. It is of more interest that relatively the benefits of NNN only changes for 
the IUs and the ISPs. This is because the connectivity price and SS fee is independent 
of the investment levels, so they are unchanged in the whole scenario. The CPs and 
backbone ISPs profits are thus only dependent on the investment levels. Since all 
other parameters are equal, the relative difference in investment levels are the same, 
and thus the relative profits for the backbone ISP and the CPs are the same. The 
total investment costs are actually much higher when CI is low, because the convexity 
of the investment costs. As can be seen both numerically and by studying the 
formulas, in the optimum solution the product of CI*μ is constant, but the cost is a 
squared function depending on μ, so the total investment costs are 10 times as high 
when CI is one tenth of the original unit. This also makes the relative benefit of 
sharing investment costs with the CPs much higher, which is why the IUs and access 
ISPs are relatively much better off in the NNN regime when CI is low. The reason why 
fi
DSS is relatively much larger when CI is low is because it is unchanged by the 
investment levels, and thus also CI. However, the IUs price is much lower when CI is 
high because of the overall much lower investment costs, as previously discussed. 
  
 
Figure 34: Fiber optic cables have revolutionized the telecommunication 
industry and the way we transfer information, providing better and more 
efficient network infrastructure. 
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IUs becomes more or less dependent on online services 
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Figure 36: 
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Figure 37: 
Normalized 
values of 
profits and 
welfare in 
the IUs 
dependence 
on online 
services 
scenario 
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In the fifth scenario, where the IUs dependence on CPs and QoS is tested, uw is 
varied from 0,01 to 1, and uC from 0,825 – 82,5 (uC is, as in all scenarios, dependent on 
uw and λ). The graphs clearly shows that the relative benefit of NNN is decreasing for 
the CPs and the backbone ISP, as the IUs becomes more and more dependent on CPs 
and low QoS, while the benefit of NNN is increasing for the access ISPs and the IUs. 
The break in the IUs graph is because the utility of the IUs become negative (this can 
be adjusted by increasing R) as they become so dependent that they bear most of the 
investment costs. Thus after the break, the graph shows that NNN makes the IU 
utility relatively less negative in the NNN regime, so the IUs are actually increasingly 
better off in the NNN regime when they are more dependent on CPs and QoS. The 
reason why the backbone ISP and the CPs get relatively less benefits from the NNN 
regime with high IU utility is because when the utility for CPs and QoS is high, the 
IUs are already paying for huge investments in infrastructure in the NNN regime, so 
there is not that much to gain by adopting the NNN regime for the CPs and the 
backbone ISP. In absolute value, they are 
much better off in both regimes when the 
IUs utility is high, as one would expect, 
but the relative difference is low. In 
contrast, when the IUs utility is low, they 
are not willing to pay for as much 
investments. As a result, the CPs can 
obtain a huge benefit by paying the access 
ISPs for higher investments, as the total 
investments then are relatively much 
higher in the NNN regime than NN. The 
IUs always benefit from the NNN regime 
in this scenario. However, the access ISPs 
actually loses by adopting the NNN 
regime when the IUs utility is low. This is 
because the intensified competition in the 
NNN regime forces the access ISPs to over-invest. They cannot reclaim enough value 
from neither the CPs nor the IUs to compensate, in contrast to when the IUs utility is 
high, when the access ISPs can make the IUs pay for the extra investments. The 
relative increase in social welfare is much higher when the IUs utility is low, than 
when their utility is high. The intuition behind this result is straight forward. If there 
is a one-sided market, and the side being charged is much more willing to pay than 
the other side, which is most valuable for the system, the benefit of adopting a two-
sided market is small. However, if the side being charged is the most valuable, and is 
not willing to pay compared to the other side, the benefit of adopting a two-sided 
market is high.  
 
 
Figure 38: Internet is rapidly 
becoming a more important part of 
our lives, and we carry it with us 
almost everywhere with our phones.  
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Regional differences in backbone ISP’s market power 
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Figure 41: 
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ISPs 
market 
power 
scenario 
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In the sixth scenario, the effect of varying the backbone ISP’s market power is 
tested, where the backbone goes from almost perfect competition to full monopoly. 
Since the backbone ISP has a major influence on the CPs profit, and thus their 
participation, which in turn affects all the players, varying the backbone market power 
affects the whole system, as can be seen by the results. In absolute terms, the 
backbone and IUs are actually profiting from the increase in backbone ISP market 
power, while the CPs and access ISPs loses. This is because the price of the IUs 
decrease relatively more than the loss in utility from CPs. The utility from congestion 
is higher because of the relatively lower amount of CPs compared to investments. As 
the market power of the backbone goes up, the margins of the CPs naturally go down, 
so they are obviously worse off. In relative terms, all players gain less benefits of 
adopting the NNN regime when the backbone ISP’s market power is high. This is 
because the backbone decreases the margins of the CPs, so the access ISPs cannot 
extract as much revenues from the CPs. The result is that the relative change in 
investments are very small when the backbone has a monopoly, compared to when 
there is a high level of competition. We already know that the investments in network 
capacity, μ, is the most important value creator, so it follows that when the relative 
increase in investments are small, the relative increase in profits and welfare is also 
smaller. The access ISPs actually end up losing on adopting the NNN regime as the 
backbone ISP becomes more powerful. This is due to the competitiveness of the NNN 
regime. The access ISPs absolute change of p is lower when the backbone ISP has 
monopoly. However, the relative change is extremely high. Thus, the access ISPs lose a 
relatively large amount of revenues from substituting the IUs, more than it manages to 
gain from the SS lane’s connectivity fee. One important aspect of this analysis is that 
the backbone ISP does not generate any value to the ecosystem in this model. The 
foundation for creating value is made by the access ISPs investments, and the ability 
these investments make for the IUs to interact with the CPs. However, in the real 
world the backbone ISP is obviously an important value creator, as the backbone is a 
fundamental part of the Internet and has to make investments on their own. Thus, the 
results should not be interpreted to mean that the backbone ISP is stealing value from 
the ecosystem, but rather that the backbone’s ability to claim value from the system is 
weakening the benefit if the NNN regime for the other players. Also, a model where 
investments by the backbone is included, and vital for the overall performance, might 
even provide a totally different result where it is important that the backbone claims 
enough value to make sufficient investments. Therefore, the key takeaway from this 
analysis is that the NNN regime can still be favorable for all players, even though a 
large share of the value created is captured by the backbone, which might be a 
necessary and real life scenario. 
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A regulated network  – base scenario 
 
Figure 42: 
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values of 
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welfare in 
the 
regulated 
network – 
base 
scenario 
The seventh scenario, where the effects of regulation is tested, consists of three 
tests; one test with the base scenario assumptions, another case where the IUs 
dependence on CPs and QoS is low, and one where it is high. In the basic scenario all 
players, except the access ISP, benefits from regulation. This is not surprising, as we 
already know the investment levels that maximizes social welfare is higher than the 
investment levels that optimize the ISPs investment levels. This result is in 
correspondence with Proposition 14. When the access ISP is forced to over-invest in 
the NNN regime, the relative benefit is naturally smaller. And regulation might 
actually force the access ISPs to lose by adopting the NNN regime. This is because 
regulation only forces the access ISP out of its optimum solution in the NNN regime, 
so the result in the NN regime is not affected. When the regulation is strict enough, 
the effect of regulation might reduce the optimum of the access ISPs sufficiently to 
make the regime unprofitable for the access ISPs. From a social standpoint, regulation 
in this scenario is preferable. 
A regulated network – high and low IU utility on CPs and QoS 
The results are quite different when regulation is tested under high and low IU 
dependence on CPs and QoS. When their dependencies low, the congestion of IAS is 
equal to or better in the NNN regime than the average congestion level in the NN 
regime. This, regulation is redundant. However, when the IUs are very dependent on 
CPs and QoS they take on much higher investment costs, and so the benefits of NNN 
are very high to begin with for the IUs as in accordance with the fifth scenario. Since 
the optimal investment levels are not much higher in NNN than NN, regulation forces 
the investments to be much higher than both the optimum of the access ISPs, and 
even the social optimum. The result is that the IUs have to pay for most of the extra 
investments posed by the regulators, and the price is higher than the benefit of extra 
IUs and lower congestion. Thus the IUs are actually worse off by regulation, as they 
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are forced to pay for most of the extra investments. The effect is so great that 100% 
regulation actually makes the social welfare worse in the NNN regime, than in the NN 
regime. So regulation is not optimal from a social standpoint when the IUs are very 
dependent on CPs and QoS. 
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A regulated network – low and high r/λ 
Because the attractiveness of advertising (the r/λ ratio) is arguably the most 
important parameter to evaluate the benefit of adopting the NNN regime, a numerical 
experiment considering regulation was also performed with a lower and higher ratio 
than the base scenario. When the ratio is high, the congestion level of IAS is already 
better in the NNN regime than in the NN regime, so regulation is redundant. 
However, when the r/λ ratio is low regulation might have positive effects. To begin 
with, the CPs profits are greatly reduced in the NNN regime. However, because the 
price for the SS lane, fi
DSS, is unaffected by investments the larger investments means 
relatively much more profits for the CPs. At about 60% regulation, the CPs are 
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relatively better off in the NNN regime. The access ISPs have a minor increase while 
the IUs are actually slightly worse off, but this is only marginally. The overall social 
welfare does also increase to a certain point. However, as the regulation enforces too 
high investments, the access ISP starts to lose significantly from regulation, until the 
combined effects of the IUs and access ISPs means that the social welfare is reduced. 
The backbone ISP is naturally better off the more regulation, because its profits 
increase proportionally to investments. The implication of this analysis is very 
important, as it implies that some moderate regulation may actually widen the gap of 
the positive range in the r/λ scenario. Meaning that the probability of a real life 
scenario where the NNN regime is favorable, and can be accepted by all players, is 
increased. 
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5.6.4 General Discussion on NNN vs. NN 
The following table summarizes the results from the scenario analyses, showing 
whether the actors benefit or lose by the adoption of the NNN regime under the 
corresponding parameter values. 
 
Player 
surplus\Scenario 
Low 
r/λ 
High 
r/λ 
Low 
h 
High 
h 
Low 
CV 
High 
CV 
Low 
CVc 
High 
CVc 
Low 
CI 
High 
CI 
Low 
uC,uw 
High 
uC,uw 
High 
ω 
Low 
ω 
CPs - + + + + + + + + + + - + - 
Backbone ISP + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Access ISPs + - + - + + + + + + - + + - 
IUs - + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Social welfare + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Table 18: Summary of profits, consumer surplus and social welfare from the numerical 
experiments. See section 5.3 page 74 for an explanation of the different parameters. 
By studying the table is might seem obvious that an overall assessment should 
conclude that adopting the NNN regime is clearly the favorable choice. However, this 
results stems from the fact that all scenarios are based on the base scenario, where all 
players have a positive benefit from the NNN regime. The general development in the 
scenarios should therefore be guiding instead of absolute values. That is, e.g. if the IUs 
are in fact becoming more and more dependent on CPs and QoS, the development 
goes towards a general benefit of an NNN regime, and such a regime could help 
protect the IUs interests. Also, this table illustrates which parameters are important, 
as those parameters that change surplus from positive to negative clearly has a larger 
impact than the ones that do now. By observation, and from this table, the r/λ ratio 
is arguably the most important parameter. However, both congestion sensitivity, h, 
the IUs utilities, uC and uw, and the backbone ISPs market power is also parameters 
that could severely change the outcome of adopting the NNN regime. Actors and 
policy makers should therefore possess some knowledge on which of these scenarios is 
representing their situation, as it might have huge consequences for the final outcome. 
In all scenarios the social welfare increases by adopting an unregulated NNN 
regime. The access ISPs generally argues that the NNN regime will generate higher 
investments, and we have shown this to always be true. Still, there are scenarios where 
one could argue that the practical outcome of NNN is not favorable. Even if the social 
welfare improves, the profit or surplus of the individual players might be worse in 
NNN, and even negative in some extreme scenarios. Obviously, if a player obtains 
negative profit or utility, it will not participate at all, which makes the whole system 
break down. So no scenario with negative profits will prevail in the NNN regime. The 
absolute profit of the CPs, the backbone ISP and the IUs is always positive. However, 
the access ISPs might obtain a negative profit by adopting the NNN regime. In 
general, the increased competitiveness of the NNN regime enforces much higher 
investments. Whenever these investments are higher than the extra revenues obtained 
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by the access ISPs in the NNN regime, they actually risk obtaining a negative profit, 
which would put them out of the market. This is true when the r/λ ratio is high, the 
IUs utility for CPs and QoS, uC and uw, is low, and when the market power of the 
backbone ISP is approaching monopoly power. Bourreau et al. [2] has shown that even 
though the ISPs do not always benefit from adopting the NNN regime, they are locked 
in a prisoner’s dilemma game, and would thus always choose to adopt the regime. 
Therefore, in some extreme scenarios, the NNN regime might make the access ISPs 
compete themselves out of the market. 
However, even in scenarios where the absolute profits and consumer surplus is 
positive, the NNN regime might not be considered favorable if some players are 
suffering to a large extent to the benefit of others. In general, all players, except the 
access ISPs, are better off in the NNN regime. The exception is in the scenario with 
varying r/λ ratio. This scenario is arguably the most important to analyze as it, in 
either extremes, split whom is benefitting by the adoption of the NNN regime in two. 
When the ratio is low the CPs and IUs do not benefit from the NNN regime. As the 
r/λ ratio increase, the IUs quickly benefit from the NNN regime. However, the CPs do 
not benefit, before the ratio is significantly higher. The CPs are also marginally worse 
off when the IUs are heavily dependent on their services and QoS. The last scenario 
where the NNN regime might not be favorable for the CPs is when the backbone ISP’s 
market power is large. Although the range where the CPs benefit from the NNN 
regime is larger than that where the CPs do not benefit, the results show there might 
be some truth to the arguments posed by the CPs, that they would be worse off in the 
NNN regime. 
The benefits of adopting the NNN regime are much more ambiguous for the access 
ISPs than the other players. In general the Access ISPs are relatively worse off in the 
NNN regime when the r/λ is high, the CPs congestion sensitivity, h, is high, the IUs 
utility for CPs and QoS, uC and uw, is low and the backbone ISP’s market power is 
high. There are far more scenarios where the access ISPs are worse off than the other 
players. Since the access ISPs generally argue pro the NNN regime, one must assume 
they consider the real life scenario to be in their favor. One important aspect is the 
assumption of complete information. This is not true in the real world, where one 
would expect the access ISPs to have more information than the other players, because 
the access ISPs directly do business with all the other players and should therefore be 
able to make a better map of the competitive landscape. 
The backbone ISP was included in this analysis to provide an E2E assessment of 
the effects of adopting the NNN regime. The analysis shows that the backbone ISP 
always benefits from the NNN regime. Since the backbone ISP does not create any 
value on this model, it implies that the backbone ISP benefitting on the cost of other 
players. This is quite obvious as all players benefit increases as the backbone ISPs 
market power goes down. Also, the r/λ ratio range where all players benefit increases 
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severely as the market power of the backbone ISP is weakened. This aspect of the 
analysis provides two important insights for potential regulators and key actors. First 
of all the analysis confirms that the NNN regime is still the socially optimal regime in 
the E2E ecosystem. Secondly, this also shows that the presence of a backbone ISP 
severely impairs the performance of the ecosystem, and also the net benefit of adopting 
the NNN regime is impaired and much more ambiguous for individual players. In 
practice this means that where the previous analysis with no E2E assessment provided 
a positive result for the key actors, this analysis shows that the presence of a backbone 
ISP might be enough to make the benefit of the NNN regime negative for certain 
players in some scenarios. 
Concerting the arguments posed by either camp, as presented in the introduction 
to the net neutrality debate chapter, the results shows that there are some truths in 
both of the sides’ arguments. As posed by the proponents of the NNN regime, it does 
lead to higher investments, and lead to relatively much higher investments compared 
to the extra prices forced on the IUs. In many scenarios the IUs are even substituted 
in the NNN regime. The results thus confirm the arguments posed by the NNN regime 
proponents. The NN-proponents, however, have other arguments, which are to a larger 
extent more conceptual than directly result oriented. Most of these principal 
arguments are in agreement with the work already done by the EU-commission, and 
the results from this analysis are not in contradiction to the principle of an open E2E 
Internet. However, the fear of that the NNN regime will stifle innovation is proven not 
to be true; measured in volume, the level if innovation is always higher in the NNN 
regime than in the NN regime. 
Generally, the unregulated NNN regime is preferable to the NN regime. This is 
because it generally increases profits and welfare, is in most scenarios favorable by all 
players, or does not provide any major changes (except in the extreme scenarios). 
Also, as seen by the numerical analysis, the NNN regime can prove to be a major 
benefit for the IUs as they become more dependent on the CPs, and also counter the 
effect of less investments when the CPs becomes more sensitive to congestion, 
maintaining and even increasing the investment levels of today. However, it should be 
emphasized that a clear understanding of where we are on the r/λ scale, and the 
implications of this result, should be provided before a final decision is made. As this 
is, as seen by these numerical experiments, arguably the most important parameter to 
understand who will benefit, and who might possibly not benefit, by the adoption of 
the NNN regime.  
5.6.5 General Discussion on Regulation 
The numerical experiments confirm that regulation might increase the social 
welfare and thus the overall benefits of obtaining the NNN regime. However, when the 
IUs are very dependent on CPs and QoS, too much regulation might reduce the social 
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welfare, and greatly reduce the social surplus of the IUs. When the IUs are not that 
dependent, or the r/λ ratio is high, regulation is redundant. However, some minor 
regulation might be beneficial. As seen by the previous analytic and numerical 
discussion, some regulation should always lead to an increase in social welfare. Also, 
some regulation could lead to a wider r/λ range where the NNN regime is favorable, or 
at least acceptable, for all players. Too much regulation can on the other hand be very 
dangerous. It can lead to a loss of social surplus, and severely damage the surplus of 
individual players. Therefore, based on the previous discussion, too much regulation is 
not recommended as the outcome in uncertain and might severely impair especially 
the IUs that are sensitive to an increase in the access ISPs investments. As seen by 
Proposition 1, neither should the policy makers force the ISPs to separate the 
networks into two separable networks for SS and IAS. This is ineffective, and, 
assuming the M/M/1 assumptions are valid, will increase the average congestion levels 
by a factor of two. This will make investments in network capacity much less effective, 
and should therefore be avoided to maximize the performance of the NN ecosystem. 
5.7 Strengths and Weaknesses Compared to Previous 
Research 
The presented model is based on the research by Krämer et al. and Bourreau et 
al., and have adopted the modifications and strengths posed by Bourreau et al., alas, 
also the weaknesses of no transaction costs or subscription CPs. However, this model 
does provide the E2E perspective by including the backbone ISP, which represents the 
effect of CDN and their agreements with other ISPs to connect the CPs to the 
backbone of the Internet. This has enabled us to prove that there are parts of the 
ecosystem, that has not yet been analyzed, that always benefit on the NNN regime. It 
has also enabled us to show the effect of smaller margins of the other actors in the 
ecosystem when the backbone ISP is introduced. The result was Proposition 11 and 
Proposition 12, which are not similar to any other propositions from previous research. 
Our model does also include variable costs of the ISPs, which have enabled us to show 
how much more sensitive the system is to variable costs involving the CPs. Even 
though this model is more complicated due to the presence of the backbone ISP, it is 
still possible to provide explicit analytical solutions and thus apply a direct analysis 
from which we have derived our propositions. 
Concerning our game theoretical approach, with our two-stage game, the model is 
not as sophisticated as Njorge et al, whom have managed to solve a six stage game. 
Neither does the model consider subscription CPs, as done by Economides and 
Hermalin. Both are valuable contributions to the analysis of the NN debate ecosystem. 
In contrast to their research, however, we were able to provide explicit results and 
analysis. 
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6 Recommendations to the Enterprise, Evaluations 
and Conclusion 
Section 6.1 will summarize our most important findings into recommendations to 
Telenor and how they could maneuver in the NN debate. Section 6.2 will evaluate the 
results compared to the problem statement, and section 6.3 will provide a conclusion 
to this thesis. Section 6.4 will propose recommendations for future research on the NN 
debate. 
6.1 Recommendations to the Enterprise Based on the Analysis 
and Evaluation of the Results 
Based on the results in this thesis, the most important recommendations to 
Telenor are 
 General recommendations towards adopting an NNN regime 
o Analyze the attractiveness of advertising and be sure that it is not 
high enough to make the competitiveness of the NNN regime 
reduce the overall profit of the enterprise from introducing the SS 
lane. 
o Be certain of your competitive position in the value chain, and 
that the backbone ISPs will not eat away the benefits of an NNN 
regime. In general this should not be a problem if the backbone 
ISPs do not have a monopoly.  
o Be sure that the IUs are dependent enough on CPs and QoS so 
that they are still willing to pay when the CPs are charged in the 
SS lane 
 General recommendations to persuade policy makers to allow the NNN 
regime 
o It is very important to show that the attractiveness of advertising 
is sufficient enough for the IUs and CPs to benefit from the NNN 
regime. 
o Focus on the following arguments, as proven in section 5.5.3 and 
5.6.3 
 The overall social welfare always improves in the 
unregulated NNN regime 
 Investments, Innovation and average QoS always 
improves in the NNN regime 
 Assuming sufficient QoS in the backbone of the Internet, 
the access ISPs investments is the value creator of the 
ecosystem. Higher investments means more value to the 
whole ecosystem, and the access ISP will only claim a 
fraction of the extra value by itself 
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 Even though the benefit for individual players is 
ambiguous, all players benefit around the medium ranges 
in the scenarios 
 As the IUs become more and more dependent on the CPs 
and QoS, they increasingly benefit more from the NNN 
regime 
 The analysis confirms the three arguments proposed by 
the NNN-proponents 
 General recommendations to persuade policy makers to allow an 
unregulated and flexible network 
o Focus on the following arguments, as proven in section 5.5.3 and 
5.6.3 
 Splitting the network in two makes the network much less 
effective, doubling the overall congestion levels 
 Regulation might severely impair individual players, and 
especially the IUs are exposed when they are willing to 
pay more for investments than they gain in utility 
 Too much regulation might reduce social welfare, and is 
therefore potentially dangerous 
 Even though some regulation usually increases the social 
welfare, individual actors might be severely impaired. 
Even some regulation can therefore be dangerous if one 
aims to protect the interest of individual actors 
o Bourreau et al. [2] have shown that the access ISPs have no 
incentives to sabotage unless the IAS lane unless the 
attractiveness of advertising is sufficiently high. However, in when 
the attractiveness is sufficiently high, as shown in this thesis, the 
NNN regime is not beneficial to begin with, so given that the 
access ISPs prefer an NNN regime, sabotaging the IAS lane is not 
likely assuming the access ISPs only interests are to maximize 
their own profits 
The results of this thesis are dependent on the assumption that the QoS of the 
backbone is sufficient so that no extra investments by the backbone ISP are needed in 
order to manage the extra traffic in the NNN regime. This is not unlikely, as the 
eyeball network is much more expensive and harder to build than the backbone 
network [24]. However, this is likely to vary from region to region, and where the QoS 
of the backbone is not sufficient they either have to accept a lower QoS than possible, 
or invest which will probably lead to an increase in prices for the CPs that use them. 
The results are also dependent on the assumption of settlement free peering. On 
average this should be true as the access ISPs and backbone ISPs are equally 
dependent on each other. However, the difference between individual players can be 
substantial, meaning that many non-tier 1 ISPs have to pay extra for transit or paid 
peering in order to obtain the necessary increase in QoS in a NNN regime. This 
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analysis is in connection with the different actors, and thus differences within the type 
of actors is not part of this thesis. Intuitively the overall result should be the same. 
However, the smaller ISPs that have to pay extra for transit or peering are likely to 
benefit less from the NNN regime. On the other hand, ISPs that can demand payment 
for transit or peering would likely be better off in a model where this factor is 
included. 
This model assumes that the SS lane is prioritized and that the packages are put 
first in line, while the IAS packages are next in line to the SS lane packages. There are 
other ways to manage the internet, which could alter the result of this analysis. 
However, it is not possible to make the QoS of the SS lane any better than what is 
assumed in this analysis, and thus, unless the ISPs sabotage, the QoS of IAS cannot 
be worse either. Regarding the concerns of the NN proponents, this analysis could be 
seen as a worst case scenario for the IAS lane, as long as the ISPs do not sabotage. 
Bourreau et al. have shown in a similar setting, but without E2E, that sabotaging IAS 
might be preferred in the NNN regime when the advertising rate, r, is sufficiently high 
[2]. Intuitively this is in agreement with our analysis since in this scenario the access 
ISP are worse off in the NNN regime because not enough CPs pay for the huge 
investment requirements. 
Lastly, these results assume complete information, which means that the ISPs can 
set their prices with full knowledge of demand. That all players have complete 
information is most likely not realistic, and incomplete information generally in favor 
of the buyers when the sellers set the price, as is the case in this model [37]. The 
outcome in this setting, however, is not certain. Generally this means that in a real 
setting the IUs and CPs, the buyers, should be even better off than the sellers, as the 
backbone and access ISPs would not be able to extract their full potential margins 
because of the uncertainty. However, we could also expect this effect to be reduced by 
the fact that the ISPs do business with most of actors and individual identities within 
the type of actors and should thus be able to provide fairly good estimates to 
compensate for the lack of full information. Therefore, the results in this thesis should 
not be regarded as unreliable, but rather slightly optimistic on the access ISPs behalf. 
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6.2 Evaluation of the Results Compared to the Problem 
Statement 
The problem statement of this thesis was “What effects does leaving the NN 
regime in favor of the NNN regime involve for key ecosystem actors in an E2E multi 
actor environment, which scenarios lead to a beneficial outcome for the key actors and 
overall social welfare, and how does regulating the QoS of the IAS lane in the NNN 
regime affect the key actors and social welfare?” 
 
This thesis does provide insights on the relative benefit of the NNN regime 
compared to the NN regime in an E2E multi actor environment, and we have also 
shown which scenarios are beneficial for the individual actors. Lastly, we have made 
an assessment of regulating the IAS lane as measured by a minimum QoS requirement 
relative to the average QoS in the NN regime. The analysis also provides general 
recommendations concerning the effects of regulation, and how policy makers could 
use regulation to improve the relative benefit of the NNN regime for all actors and 
maximize social welfare. 
6.3 Conclusion 
We have summarized the current situation and findings in the NN debate. We 
have formulated a general model to analyze the effect of adopting the NNN regime, 
and developed a simplified model, which is possible to solve analytically in order to 
obtain solutions that can be used to analyze the effects of adopting the NNN regime in 
an E2E multi actor environment. The analysis is based on the simplified model.  
We model the following situation: Under the net neutrality regime, the CPs earn 
revenues from advertisers who pay proportionally to the IUs click-through rate. The 
CPs also have to connect to a backbone ISP in order to connect to the Internet. The 
access ISPs connects the backbone of the Internet to the IUs, who pays the access 
ISPs for connectivity. In the NNN regime, the ISPs can offer specialized services (SS), 
similar to a priority lane, which put all the packages in specialized services first in line. 
The CPs can pay a fee to access SS. Those who do not pay have to connect through 
internet access services, which is similar to the neutral best effort internet.  
We have solved the model analytically and done numerical experiments to 
compare the effect of adopting the NNN regime versus the NN regime. 
We show that in the unregulated NNN regime the investments are always higher 
since they are able to be partly compensated for their investments by the additional 
revenues in the SS lane. The consequence is that the innovation levels measured in 
volume is higher and the average congestion levels are lower. We have shown that the 
backbone ISP always prefers the NNN regime, and also reduce the benefit of the NNN 
regime for the other actors in the ecosystem. We also show that the social welfare is 
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always higher in the unregulated NNN regime. However, the individual player’s 
benefits are more ambiguous, with the exception of the backbone ISP that always 
benefits from the NNN regime. Lastly, we have shown that some regulation on the IAS 
lane’s QoS can improve the overall social welfare. 
Our numerical experiments show the importance of understanding how the 
attractiveness of advertising (the r/λ ratio) is in the ecosystem, and that extreme 
values of this ratio severely separated the benefiters and losers of the NNN regime on 
two. When the ratio is low, the CPs and IUs are worse off while the access ISP is 
better off. The opposite is true when the ratio is high. Regulators and policy makers 
should therefore be wary of this ratio. We also show that the NNN regime might 
enforce higher investments as the CPs becomes more congestion sensitive, and that it 
greatly benefits the IUs as they become more dependent of the CPs and QoS. This is 
because the NNN regime provides considerably higher investments and innovation 
levels compared to the price the IUs are willing to pay, when the CPs also pay for 
investments in the NNN regime. We show that a flexible network is favorable, and 
that splitting the network in two will double the average congestion levels. Lastly, we 
show that some regulation on the IAS lane could be positive, and lead to an overall 
higher social welfare as well as a widened r/λ ratio range where all players are better 
off in the NNN regime. However, regulation may also have some unwanted effects 
where especially the IUs can be severely damaged as they are forced to pay for the 
extra investments that might be required by regulation. Too much regulation can also 
lead to a worsened overall social welfare in the NNN regime, in contrast to the 
unregulated NNN regime where it is always positive. 
We do confirm the arguments posed by the NNN regime proponents. In our model 
the conceptual arguments posed by the NN-proponents are already in accordance with 
most of our model settings, as there is no blocking of any content. And, our findings 
conclude that there should not be any fear that the NNN regime will stifle innovation 
as measured in volume of content from the CPs.  
The main contribution to the NN debate from this thesis is the introduction of the 
backbone ISP. We show that the NNN regime is still favorable in the E2E perspective. 
However, we also show that, under our assumptions, the backbone ISP is always 
better off in the NNN regime. This means that the backbone is eating off the other 
player’s benefits, which makes their benefits of the NNN regime more ambiguous. 
However, the overall assessment is still in favor of the NNN regime because of the 
increase in social welfare, investments and innovation, an improved average QoS and 
the ability to greatly benefit the IUs as they become more dependent on the Internet. 
This is because an NNN regime protects the interests of the IUs in such a scenario, as 
the regime prevents the IUs from paying more for investments than they gain from the 
extra utility from more volume of CPs content and a higher QoS. The Internet is 
rapidly becoming a more important part of everybody’s lives, so a scenario where we 
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are sufficiently dependent on CPs and QoS to pay more than our gained utility is not 
unlikely. Maybe, in the future, the NNN regime can protect us, the IUs, from that. 
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
To further gain insights to the effects of the individual players, future researches 
could try to solve the model with a subdivided set of actors, e.g. small and large CPs, 
high and low quality CPs, small and large ISPs and heavy and light IUs. The 
algebraic challenges to do this are substantial, however conceptually it should be 
possible to follow the steps, as in section 0, to solve such a model. 
Lastly, this thesis provides a model to analyze the effect the NNN regime has on 
subscription CPs. These CPs can directly price the IUs from their services, and would 
therefore probably behave differently than the advertising CPs, which most of the 
current research is based on. 
Two major simplifications in this model are the assumption of asymmetric 
information and the lack of transaction costs. Asymmetric information would generally 
lead to better conditions for the buyers, and it would be interesting to see how this 
applies on our setting. Also, one must assume that there will be transaction costs in 
connection with introducing and selling the SS-lane. If these costs are substantial, the 
overall social benefit might not always improve as suggested by this thesis. 
There are no internal externalities among the CPs, which is a simplifying 
assumption. Since the total number of IUs is constant, it is likely that the number of 
clicks per CSP would go down as the number of CPs increase. The effect would 
decrease the effect of extra income from innovation, however, also reduce the re-
congestion effect of innovation. Whether this benefits the CPs or not depends whether 
the increased click-through rate compensates for the decrease in revenues from the IUs 
per volume of CSP content. 
Lastly, the model in this analysis is conceptual, and the numerical experiments use 
synthetic data. Future researchers could try to conduct an analysis based on empirical 
data sets. Also, the analysis in this thesis is based on average numbers. Regulators and 
NN-proponents fear that introducing the SS-lane will impair the IAS lane. On average, 
with the model settings in this thesis, this is shown not to be true. However, the traffic 
levels of IAS and SS may depart far from average levels during specific times of the 
day. Thus, a simulation of specific traffic patterns on the SS-lane and IAS-lane could 
further benefit the insights on the practical effects of the NNN regime. 
The first extension mentioned, separating the different actors into different quality 
and sizes, should not provide significant technical difficulties, but some algebraic 
challenges will be added because of the increased complexity. The other four 
extensions, however, will likely be challenging to implement and obtain good solutions. 
The empirical studies and simulations would require a different methodology, however, 
it should be possible and would provide further insights to the NN debate.  
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Proofs 
Splitting of networks, Proposition 1 
Proposition 1 is only valid for systems where the assumptions of the M/M/1 queue 
are valid. If μT is the total capacity in a network, and λT is the average rate of arrivals, 
the average waiting time per package, wT equals 
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We now split the capacity and arrival of packages into two separate networks, 1 
and 2, with share of capacity and arrivals equal to β and (1-β). The capacity, μ1, of 
network 1 is thus βμT and the rate of arrivals,λ1, equals βλT. The same can be done 
with network 2. The average waiting time per network is therefore 
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The average level of congestion after splitting the two networks, wS, is thus 
 
       (   )   
 
 (     )
 
(   )
(   )(     )
 
 
     
     
( 174 ) 
 
After splitting the networks, the average waiting time per package is twice as high, 
even though the total capacity and average arrival rate is the same. The reason is 
because when the whole network is not separated, the variation from λ1 and λ1 equalize 
each other, and more effectively make use of the capacity in the network. □ 
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Optimal price with Bertrand competition and differentiation in an oligopoly 
The utility of IUs connecting to a CSP jS is modelled as in ( 67 ): 
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We assume that all CPs have the same utility offer,    (      
   ). By setting 
the utility function equal to zero we obtain an expression for the fraction    that is 
indifferent to the offer by CP jS: 
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Next we subtract v from 1 to obtain the fraction that is interested in the offer 
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This is now the fraction of demand for CP jS. If c is the marginal cost of serving 
demand, the profit function if CP jS can be written 
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If we take the derivative and set it equal to zero we can obtain an expression for 
the optimal price 
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Now if we assume that all the CPs are also homogeneous in their cost preferences, 
in addition to their utility offer and demand functions, all the prices will be equal, so 
that vi = vjs 
 
  
 
 
 
     
   
 (   )     
   
   (      
   ) 
 
 
   (      
   )
 
 
 
 
(   )   
   
   (      
   ) 
 
 
   (      
   )
 
( 180 ) 
 
Rearranging for vjs yields 
 
   
   
 
   (      
   )    
   
  
( 181 ) 
 
Demand served by subscribing CPs as a function of competition 
We have equations ( 68 ) and ( 69 ) that show the fraction of demand served by 
CP jS and the price of the CP. 
 
          
 
 
 
   
   
   (      
   )
 
∑   
   
    
   (      
   ) 
 
( 182 ) 
 
   
   
 
   (      
   )    
   
 
( 183 ) 
 
By inserting ( 183 ) into ( 182 ) we can obtain an expression for the demand 
served as a function of the utility,    (      
   ), and the level of competition, N. 
The utility offer will be noted as b for better readability 
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(   )
  
    
   
 
( 184 ) 
 
We have now already made the assumption that the CPs are homogeneous, and 
thus offer equal prices in a Nash equilibrium. The expression ( 184 ) can immediately 
be simplified by separating the fractions 
 
    
 
 
 
 
(   )
 
  
 (   )
 
(   )
 (   )
 
(   )  
  (   )
 ( 185 ) 
 
And by equalizing the denominators of the second and fourth term, and third and 
fifth term 
 
    
 
 
 
(   )   
 (   )
 
(     ) 
 (   )
 
 
 
 
 
 (   )
 
 
 (   )
 ( 186 ) 
 
Then by equalizing all the denominators, we obtain 
 
    
 
 
 
(   )   
 (   )
 
(     ) 
 (   )
 
 (   )      
  (   )
 
     
  (   )
 
 
   
(  
 
 
) 
( 187 ) 
 
By substituting the utility offer back into the equation we obtain 
 
          
 
   
(  
 
   (      
   )
) ( 188 ) 
 
We see that the demand for content for the single CP is decreasing, approaching 
zero with perfect competition. This is from the assumption of consumers’ time being a 
scarce resource, which is the reason why the CPs compete with price. □ 
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8.2 Analytical Solutions 
The following section contains the process of deriving the analytical solutions from 
the analytic model, as well as the modifications and second order optimum conditions 
of the reduced analytic model. 
8.2.1 Analytic Model NN Regime 
Description of information sets 
0. Exogenous parameters set 
a. All players know this the whole game, including the optimal conditions of 
other players 
1. Backbone and access ISPs decisions 
a. IUs connectivity price (access only)  
i. Know the demand for service, but are unfamiliar with the 
connectivity price set by the backbone ISP, and are unable to 
respond to this price once it has been set 
b. Investment levels (access only) 
i. Know all demand functions based on the connectivity prices. 
However, the prices are unknown and the ISP cannot respond to 
the prices once a decision to invest has been made 
c. Connectivity fee CPs (backbone only) 
i. Know the demand for CPs based on investment levels. However, do 
not know how large the investments from the access ISPs will be. 
2. CPs and ISPs decisions 
a. CPs choose which access ISPs to connect to 
i. Know the price for connectivity from the backbone ISP and the 
investment levels by the access CPs. However, they are unfamiliar 
with the distribution of IUs on the ISPs and the final congestion 
levels 
b. IUs choose which platform, a or b, to connect to 
i. Know the price and investment levels of the ISPs, they also know 
their position within the city, biasing them towards either of the 
platforms. However, they do not yet know the distribution of CPs 
and the final congestion levels, but will favor ISPs with more 
content and low congestion 
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Stage 0: Exogenous parameters set 
   (  
 )      
  
   
 ( ̅ 
 )    
   
  
   (  
 )  
  
 
  
   
 Other parameters to be set for numerical analysis 
Congestion 
  
  ∫    
    
 ̅ 
 
 
    
  ̅ 
  
( 189 ) 
 
This can be inserted into the congestion formula 
 
  
  
 
  
     
  ̅ 
  
 
( 190 ) 
From stage 2: By substituting for the value of  ̅ 
  and imposing the symmetric 
solution we obtain 
 
   
      
     
   
   
 
 
( 191 ) 
Stage 2: The CPs and IUs decisions 
CPs 
The CP yN will join as long as 
 
∑ [    
 (     
   
 )    
 ]
       
   ( 192 ) 
 
The last CP  ̅ 
  that connects to ISP i ϵ {a,b} can then be formulated as 
 
    
 (    ̅ 
   
 )    
    ( 193 ) 
 
The last CP interested in connecting is thus 
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 ̅ 
  
    
    
 
     
 
 
  
  
( 194 ) 
 
By substituting for  
 , this can be rearranged into 
 
 ̅ 
  
  
 (    
    
 )
   
 (    
    
    )
 
 
( 195 ) 
By imposing the symmetrical solution we get 
 
 ̅  
   (      
 )
 (      
     )
 ( 196 ) 
 
Equation ( 194 ) and ( 195 ) provides us with a relation we need later 
 
  
   
    
    
    
 
 
  
  
( 197 ) 
 
IUs 
We assume there is enough numéraire utility, r, so that all IUs connect. If   
   ̃  
and   
  (   ̃ ) we get 
 
   
     
       ̅ 
  
  
  
    
    ̃  
      ̅ 
  
  
  
    
   (   ̃ ) 
( 198 ) 
 
This can be restructured into a function  ( ̃   ̅ 
   ̅ 
    
    
    
    
 ) 
 
 ( )     ( ̅ 
   ̅ 
 )    (
 
  
  
 
  
 )  (  
    
 )   (    ̃ )    ( 199 ) 
 
By substituting ( 195 ) and ( 197 ) into we ( 199 ) we obtain 
 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 140 
 ( )   (
  (  (   ̃
 )    
 )
 (   ̃ )
     )
  
 
  (   ̃ )    
    
 (
  (   ̃
    
 )
  ̃ 
     )
  
 
   ̃    
    
 (  
    
 )   (    ̃ )    
( 200 ) 
 
This function implicitly gives  ̃  as a function  ̃ (  
    
    
    
     
  ) 
Stage 1: ISPs set the IUs price and SS price 
Access ISPs 
The first order optimal condition for the access ISPs are 
 
   
 
   
    
  (  
    )
   
 
   
    
( 201 ) 
 
   
 
   
  (  
    )
   
 
   
   
   
    ( 202 ) 
IUs price for connectivity on Access ISPs 
To find the derivatives we use the implicit theorem 
 
   
 
   
   
      
 
      
  
 
( 203 ) 
Where 
 
  
   
    
 
( 204 ) 
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  ̃ 
   
 (
    
 (  (    
     
 )      
    )      
 (  
    )
   
  (    
    
    ) 
)
   
 (
    
 (  (    
     
 )      
    )      
 (  
    )
   
  (    
    
    ) 
)    
      
( 205 ) 
 
So we get 
 
   
 
   
   
 
  
   ( 206 ) 
 
By imposing the symmetrical solution we get 
 
      (
  (  (      
 )       )       
 (  
    )
 (      
     ) 
)     ( 207 ) 
 
Further, we have 
 
   
  
 
    
( 208 ) 
 
By substituting for KD and the y derivatives we get 
 
      (
  (  (      
 )       )       
 (  
    )
 (      
     ) 
)       ( 209 ) 
 
Investment levels 
   
 
   
  (  
    )
   
 
   
   
   
    ( 210 ) 
 
To find  
   
 
   
  we use the implicit derivation theorem 
   
 
   
   
      
 
      
   
  
   
 
 
  
, 
where we already have KN. Further we have 
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   (
  (   ̃
    
 )      ̃
   
  ̃ (   ̃    
    )
) ( 211 ) 
 
So we get 
 
   
 
   
  
  (   ̃
    
 )      ̃
   
  ̃ (   ̃    
    )  
 ( 212 ) 
 
By substituting ( 208 ) and ( 212 ) into the first order optimum condition for 
investment levels, and imposing the symmetrical solution, we obtain 
 
  (      
 )       
 (      
     )
     
    ( 213 ) 
 
This can be rearranged into an expression for the investment level,    
 
   
 
  
  (      
 )       
 (      
     )
 
( 214 ) 
 
Backbone ISP 
The backbone cannot offer different prices based on which ISPs the CPs connect 
to. We know that the ISPs are symmetric, so by imposing symmetry we get 
 
  
     
  ̅ 
     
  ̅ 
  ( 215 ) 
 
Since  ̅ 
  is a function of both   
 , and   
 , which is dependent on   
 , we have from 
the product and chain rule 
 
  ̅ 
 
   
  
  ̅ 
 
   
  
  ̅ 
 
   
 
   
 
   
  
 
( 216 ) 
This results in the following first order optimum condition for the backbone ISP 
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   ̅ 
  (  
    
 ) (
  ̅ 
 
   
  
  ̅ 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 )    
( 217 ) 
 
Connectivity price 
  ̅ 
 
   
   
    
 
   
 ((    
    
    ))
    ( 218 ) 
 
Further, because of symmetry, we have 
 
  
   
    
   
 
   
   
  
   
 
 
  
   ( 219 ) 
 
If we impose the symmetric solution, we obtain 
 
  ̅ 
   
   
     
 (      
     ) 
   ( 220 ) 
 
 
So we can now write the first order optimum condition as 
 
   
 
   
   ̅ 
  (  
    
 )
  ̅ 
 
   
    
( 221 ) 
 
By substituting for the derivative and  ̅ , and equalizing the denominators, we 
obtain 
 
   
 
   
  
   (      
 )(      
     )
 (      
     ) 
 
     (  
    
 )
 (      
     ) 
   ( 222 ) 
 
This can be rearranged into an implicit expression for   
  
 
   
   (       )  
  (  )             
    ( 223 ) 
 
This expression can be solved with the quadratic formula   
   √      
  
, which 
yields 
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(       )  √(       )    ((  )             
 )
 
 
(      )  √  (           
 )
 
 
 
( 224 ) 
 
This can be simplified into 
 
  
  
       √  (           
 )
 
 
( 225 ) 
 
Welfare 
The CPs 
The profit of the CPs in equilibrium equals 
 
  
  {
∑ [
  
 
(       )    
 ]
       
 
  
       ̅ 
    ̅ 
 ( 226 ) 
 
Thus, the total profit of all CPs in equilibrium is 
 
     
  ∫    (       )     
     
 ̅ 
 
 
( 227 ) 
 
Since all values except yN is constant the total surplus equals 
 
     
     ̅  
    ̅ 
 
  
 
    
  ̅  
( 228 ) 
 
By substituting for the values of  ̅        we obtain 
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   (      
 )
 (      
     )
(   
      (      
 )
  (      
     )
      
     
     
    
 ) 
( 229 ) 
 
     
  
  (      
 ) 
 (      
     )
 
( 230 ) 
 
The IUs 
The IUs surplus, or consumer surplus, can be modelled as 
 
    
   ∫ (     ̅ 
  
  
  
    
    ̃ )  ̃ 
   
 
 
( 231 ) 
 
Since  ̅           are constant with respect to  ̃ , we get 
 
    
       ̅
  
  
  
     
 
 
 
( 232 ) 
 
Substituting for  ̅           we obtain 
 
    
       (
  (      
 
)       
 (      
     )
)
    (
  (  (      
 
)       )       
 
(  
    )
 (      
     )
 
)
     
 
 
 
( 233 ) 
 
The access ISPs 
There are two access ISPs, so the total surplus equals in equilibrium 
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  ∑ (    
      
    (  ))
       
          (  ) ( 234 ) 
 
This equals 
 
           
     (
  (  (      
 
)       )       
 
(  
    )
 (      
     )
 
)   
    (  ) 
( 235 ) 
 
The backbone ISPs 
There is only one backbone ISP, and by substituting the equilibrium solutions to 
the profit function we obtain 
 
         
  ∑ [  
  ̅    
  ̅ ]
       
 
   (  
    
 
) (      
 
)
 (      
     )
 ( 236 ) 
 
Total welfare 
The total welfare is defined as the sum of the access and backbone ISPs profits, 
the CPs profits and the IUs consumer surplus 
 
        
      
             
           
 
   (      
 ) ̅  
    ̅ 
 
  
 
    ̅
  
  
  
  
 
 
       (  ) 
( 237 ) 
 
By inserting for the profits and consumer surplus we obtain 
  
        
(      
 )(     
 
 )
 (     
 
     )
   
(     
 
 )
 
 (     
 
     )
    
  (      
 )       
 (     
 
     )
  
 
 
       (  ) 
 
( 238 ) 
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8.2.2 Analytic Model NNN Regime 
Description of information sets 
0. Exogenous parameters set 
a. All players know this the whole game, including the optimal conditions of 
other players 
1. Backbone and access ISPs decisions 
a. IUs connectivity price (access only)  
i. Know the demand for service, but are unfamiliar with the 
connectivity price set by the backbone ISP, and are unable to 
respond to this price once it has been set 
b. Investment levels (access only) 
i. Know all demand functions based on the connectivity prices. 
However, the prices are unknown and the ISP cannot respond to 
the prices once a decision to invest has been made 
c. Connectivity fee CPs (backbone only) 
i. Know the demand for CPs based on investment levels. However, do 
not know how large the investments from the access ISPs will be. 
d. Connectivity fee for SS (both) 
i. Both access and backbone ISPs know the demand for SS. However, 
they do not know what price the other players will set, and thus 
participate in a double marginalization game, where the total 
demand is a result of their combined prices. They set prices 
simultaneously without the opportunity to change the price at a 
later stage 
2. CPs and ISPs decisions 
a. CPs choose which access ISPs to connect to, and either SS or IAS 
i. Know the price for connectivity and SS, and the investment levels 
by the CPs. However, they are unfamiliar with the distribution of 
IUs on the ISPs and the final congestion levels 
b. IUs choose which platform, a or b, to connect to 
i. Know the price and investment levels of the ISPs, they also know 
their position within the city, biasing them towards either of the 
platforms. However, they do not yet know the distribution of CPs 
and the final congestion levels, but will favor ISPs with more 
content and low congestion 
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Stage 0: Exogenous parameters set 
   (  
 )      
  
   
 ( ̅ 
 )    
   
  
   (  
 )  
  
 
  
   
 Other parameters to be set for numerical analysis 
Congestion 
  
  ∫    
    
 ̅ 
 
 
    
  ̅ 
  
( 239 ) 
 
  
    ∫    
    
 ̅ 
 
 ̃ 
 
    
 ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 ) ( 240 ) 
 
  
    ∫    
    
 ̃ 
 
 
    
  ̅ 
  
( 241 ) 
 
   
  
   
  
  
   
 ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
  ̅ 
    
 ̃ 
 
 ̅ 
   
( 242 ) 
 
This can be inserted into the congestion formulas 
 
  
  
 
  
     
  ̅ 
  
 
( 243 ) 
 
  
      
    (    )  
    ( 244 ) 
 
  
    
 
  
     
 ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
 ( 245 ) 
 
  
    
  
 
  
     
  ̅ 
   
    
  
 
  
     
  ̅ 
 
 
  
     
 ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
 ( 246 ) 
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From stage 2: By substituting for the values of  ̅ 
  and  ̃ 
  and imposing the 
symmetric solution we obtain 
 
   
(      
     )
     
 
 
( 247 ) 
 
     
(      
     
       
   )(      
     )
     (      
 )
 
( 248 ) 
 
     
(      
     )
(      
     )  (      
 )
    
 
(      
     
       
   )(      
     ) 
 (  )   (      
 )
 
( 249 ) 
 
We can also formulate the relations 
 
     
(      
     
       
   )  
(       )
    
(      
     )
     
     
 
(      
     
       
   )(      
     )  
   (       )
 
( 250 ) 
 
The relations can be ordered accordingly 
 
(      
     
       
   )
(       )
     
 
(      
     
       
   )(      
     )
   (       )
   
( 251 ) 
 
Which is a necessary result for the SS scheme to be efficient. This always holds in 
equilibrium as long as 
 
  
    
      
      ( 252 ) 
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Stage 2: The CPs and IUs decisions 
CPs 
The CP   
  will join as long as 
 
∑ [    
 (     
   
   )    
    
      
   ]
       
   ( 253 ) 
 
The last CP  ̅ 
  that connects to ISP iϵ{a,b} can then be formulated as 
 
    
 (    ̅ 
   
   )    
    
      
      ( 254 ) 
 
The CP in platform iϵ{a,b} that is indifferent to SS can be formulated as 
 
    
 (    ̃ 
   
   )    
      
        
 (    ̃ 
   
   ) ( 255 ) 
 
Equation ( 255 )  implies 
 
  
      
        
   ̃ (  
      
   ) ( 256 ) 
 
This can be inserted into ( 193 ) 
 
    
 (    ̅ 
   
   )    
      
   ̃ (  
      
   )    ( 257 ) 
 
This can be simplified into 
 
   (( ̅ 
   ̃ )  
     ̃   
   )  
  
 
    
  
( 258 ) 
 
If we divide ( 257 ) by  ̅ 
  and apply relation ( 244 ) we obtain 
 
 ̅ 
  
    
    
 
    
  
 
  
  
( 259 ) 
 
By substituting for  
 , this can be rearranged into 
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 ̅ 
  
  
 (    
    
 )
   
 (    
    
    )
 ( 260 ) 
 
By imposing the symmetrical solution we get 
 
 ̅  
   (      
 )
 (      
     )
 ( 261 ) 
 
Equation ( 259 ) and ( 195 ) provides us with a relation we need later 
 
    
 
    
    
    
 
 
  
  
 
( 262 ) 
By rearranging ( 193 ), and substituting with ( 245 ), we get 
 
 ̃ 
  
  
   (  
      
   )
   
 (    
    
    
      
   )(    
    
    )
 
  (  
      
   )
(    
    
 )(    
    
    
      
   )
 ̅ 
  
( 263 ) 
 
By imposing the symmetrical solution we get 
 
 ̃  
   (  
      
   )
(      
 )(      
     
       
   )
 ̅  ( 264 ) 
 
IUs 
We assume there is enough numéraire utility, R, so that all IUs connect. If 
  
   ̃  and   
  (   ̃ ) we get 
 
   
     
       ̅ 
  
  
  
    
    ̃  
      ̅ 
  
  
  
    
   (   ̃ ) 
( 265 ) 
 
This can be restructured into a function  ( ̃   ̅ 
   ̅ 
    
    
    
    
 ) 
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 ( )     ( ̅ 
   ̅ 
 )    (
 
  
  
 
  
 )  (  
    
 )   (    ̃ )    ( 266 ) 
 
By substituting ( 195 ) and ( 197 ) into we ( 199 ) we obtain 
 
 ( )   (
  (  (   ̃
 )    
 )
 (   ̃ )
     )
  
 
  (   ̃ )    
    
 (
  (   ̃
    
 )
  ̃ 
     )
  
 
   ̃    
    
 (  
    
 )   (    ̃ )    
( 267 ) 
 
This function implicitly gives  ̃  as a function  ̃ (  
    
    
    
     
  ) 
 
Stage 1: ISPs set the IUs price and SS price 
Access ISPs 
The first order optimal condition for the access ISPs are 
 
   
 
   
    
  (  
  
 (  
   ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 ))
   
   
 )
   
 
   
    
( 268 ) 
 
   
 
   
    ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )    
    ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
      
( 269 ) 
 
   
 
   
  (  
     
  
    ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
 )
   
 
   
  
  
    ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
   
   
 
   
( 270 ) 
IUs price for connectivity on Access ISPs 
To find the derivatives we use the implicit theorem 
 
   
 
   
   
      
 
      
  
( 271 ) 
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Where 
  
   
    
 
( 272 ) 
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 (  (    
     
 )      
    )      
 (  
    )
  ̃ 
  (   ̃ 
    
    ) 
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 (  (    
     
 )      
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    )
   
  (    
    
    ) 
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So we get 
 
   
 
   
   
 
  
   ( 274 ) 
 
Further we have 
 
 (  
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   ̃ 
 ))
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 ) 
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  (    
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    ))
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 )
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    ))
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       )
 (  
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   )(    
    
    ))
 ) 
 
( 277 ) 
 
For easier notation, we write ( 
 
     
 
   )   . By imposing the symmetrical 
solution we get 
 
  ̅ 
 
   
   
 
      
  (       
 ) 
 (      
     ) 
 
 
( 278 ) 
 
  ̃ 
 
   
      
    
 (  
   )(     
 )    (       
        )
 ((      
    )(      
     ))
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  ̅ 
 
   
  
  ̃ 
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(      
  (       
 ) )(      
    ) 
 ((      
    )(      
     ))
 
 
     ( (  
   )(     
 )    (       
        ))
 ((      
    )(      
     ))
 )   
  
( 280 ) 
 
 
      (
  (  (      
 )       )       
 (  
    )
 (      
     ) 
)     
 
( 281 ) 
 
This gives 
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    ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
   
  ( 282 ) 
 
By substituting for KD and the y derivatives we get 
 
      (
  (  (      
 )       )       
 (  
    )
 (      
     ) 
)    
     
      
( 283 ) 
Price for SS access ISPs 
 ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
     
  ̃ 
 
   
     
   ̅ 
 
(    
    
    
      
   )
  
( 284 ) 
 
   
 
   
    ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )  
  
      ̅ 
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   )
    
( 285 ) 
 
This can be simplified by substituting for  ̃ 
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   )
     
   (    
    
 )    
( 286 ) 
 
By imposing the symmetrical solution we get 
 
  
    (      
 )(      
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   )(       
     
       
   )
     
   (       
 )    
( 287 ) 
 
This expression can implicitly be solved for   
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Investment levels 
We already have  
  
    ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
  from ( 280 ). 
To find  
   
 
   
  we use the implicit derivation theorem 
   
 
   
   
      
 
      
   
  
   
 
 
  
, 
where we already have KD. Further we have 
 
  
   
   (
  (   ̃
    
 )      ̃
   
  ̃ (   ̃    
    )
) ( 288 ) 
 
So we get 
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 )      ̃
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    )  
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    )
 ( 290 ) 
 
  ̃ 
 
   
  
  (  
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By imposing the symmetrical solution we get 
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 (      
     )
 ( 292 ) 
 
  ̃ 
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 (      
     
       
   )(      
     )
 ( 293 ) 
 
Now 
 ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )
   
  can be formulated by combining the two terms 
 ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
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( 294 ) 
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By substituting ( 208 ) and ( 212 ) into the first order optimum condition for 
investment levels, and imposing the symmetrical solution, we obtain 
 
  (      
 )       
 (      
     )
   
   
(       
 )(      
     
       
   )     (  
      
   )
 (      
     
       
   )(      
     )
     
    
( 295 ) 
 
This can be rearranged into an expression for the investment level,    
 
  
 
 
  
(
  (      
 )       
 (      
     )
   
   
(       
 )(      
     
       
   )     (  
      
   )
 (      
     
       
   )(      
     )
) 
( 296 ) 
 
In addition to the first order optimum condition, the optimal investment levels are 
bound by the regulators restriction 
 
  
      ( 297 ) 
 
By imposing the symmetrical solution, this can be rewritten as 
 
    
 
 
(      
     
       
   )(      
     ) 
 (  ) (      
 )
 
( 298 ) 
 
Backbone ISP 
The backbone cannot offer different prices based on which ISPs the CPs connect 
to. We know that the ISPs are symmetric, so by imposing symmetry we get 
 
  
     
  ̅ 
     
   ( ̅ 
   ̃ 
 )     
  ̅ 
  ( 299 ) 
 
Since  ̅ 
  and  ̃ 
  are functions of both   
 , and   
 , which is dependent on   
 , we 
have from the product and chain rule 
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( 300 ) 
This results in the following first order optimum conditions for the backbone ISP 
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We can rewrite the first condition as 
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Connectivity price 
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Because of the symmetry, we have 
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This makes it possible to simplify the first order optimal condition significantly. 
We can now write the first order optimum condition as 
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Further we can impose the symmetrical solution on ( 218 ) and ( 305 ) to obtain 
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( 309 ) 
 
By substituting for the derivatives and  ̅  we obtain 
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This can be rearranged into an implicit expression for   
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Backbone SS price 
We have 
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By substituting for  ̃ 
  and its derivative, and dividing by  ̅ 
 , we get 
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This can be rearranged into 
 
  
    (    
    
 )(    
    
    
      
   )
 
   (  
      
   )(    
    
    
      
   )
   
     (    
    
 )    
( 314 ) 
 
This function can implicitly be solved for   
   . By imposing the symmetrical 
solution we get 
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8.2.3 Analytical Results Modifications in the Reduced Simplified Model 
To conduct a numerical analysis of the mathematical model, the backbone SS 
price, fc
DSS had to be removed from the model. This only affected the NNN regime. 
Without the backbone ISP’s opportunity to claim extra profits from SS, the whole last 
term disappears, and the implicit function   
  consists of two products, where either 
has to be zero. 
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( 316 ) 
 
The last product consists of two products inside the bracket, which gives two 
opportunities. 
(      
 )      
  
  
 
 
( 317 ) 
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And 
(      
     
   )      
  
  
 
   
    
( 318 ) 
 
The first term is obviously too high, as it implies that no profit would be left for 
the CPs, even if none of them were congestion sensitive. The last term implies that the 
access ISP could force the backbone to pay for providing connectivity. So these 
solutions are either not feasible, or not maxima, as the Hessian analysis will show. The 
optimal solution is then then derived from the first bracket. 
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This yields 
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( 320 ) 
This shows that the solution is independent of regime, and will be the same in either 
NN or NNN. As in the NN regime, the other solution, with a positive square root, is a 
local minimum rather than maximum. The solution is neither feasible for the system of 
equations to have a solution. The price for SS is more complex. 
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However, from maple a similar solution to that of the backbone connectivity price, 
based on the quadratic formula, can be obtained 
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Welfare from the solutions by the reduced analytical model 
The CPs 
The profit of the CPs in equilibrium equals 
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Thus, the total profit of all CPs in equilibrium is 
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Since all values except yD is constant the total surplus equals 
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This can be simplified into 
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By substituting the solution from the reduced simplified model, we obtain 
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Results are provided by numerical experimentation. 
 
The IUs 
The IUs surplus, or consumer surplus, can be modelled as 
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Since  ̅           are constant with respect to  ̃ , we get 
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By substituting the reduced simplified solution we obtain 
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Results calculated by numerical experiments. 
The access ISPs 
There are two access ISPs, so the total surplus equals in equilibrium 
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This by substituting the values for     ̅       ̃  we obtain 
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Results calculated by numerical experiments. 
The backbone ISPs 
There is only one backbone ISP, and by substituting the equilibrium solutions to 
the profit function we obtain 
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In the reduced simplified model, we obtain 
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Total welfare 
The total welfare, or social welfare, is defined as the sum of the access and 
backbone ISPs profits, the CPs profits and the IUs consumer surplus 
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By substituting the analytic results we obtain 
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8.2.4 Second Order Conditions Reduced Simplified Model 
For the equilibrium results in the analytical solution and numerical analysis to be 
valid, the second order conditions for local optimum must also be valid. The previous 
discussion, based on feasible solutions, also shows that this is the global maxima to the 
optimization problem of the players in the game. The results are listed with the 
imposed symmetrical solution. This simplifies many of the expression after the 
derivatives have been derived, so the expressions are easier to analyze. 
Net neutrality 
The solutions in equilibrium are a maximum of the profit functions if the 
corresponding Hessian Matrix is negative definite. For the access ISP that is if 
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is negative definite. And for the backbone ISP that is if 
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The Hessian is negative definite, and thus the problem concave, if  
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This is always true as long as the cost for making investments,   , and 
transporting cost, t, are sufficiently high. 
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Backbone ISP 
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This is < 0 when 
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This is also a necessary condition, as seen by observation, of the solution formulas. 
Results also verified from numerical analysis. 
Non-net neutrality 
The solutions in equilibrium are a maximum of the profit functions if the 
corresponding Hessian Matrix is negative definite. For the access ISP that is if 
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is negative definite. And for the backbone ISP that is if 
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This is the same as in NN. 
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Access ISP 
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The Hessian is negative definite, and thus the problem concave, if  
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This is true in the symmetric equilibrium solutions as long as CI and t are 
sufficiently high. 
Backbone ISP 
On order to find the second derivative, we include all possible solutions. That is, 
both brackets as discussed from deriving the solution. We then obtain 
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Since we know that (      
     ) (      
     
   )     (      
 ) is 
positive in the feasible solution, we can obtain 
 
(      
 )(      
     )(       
     
   )
    (  
    
 )(      
    
   ) 
( 368 ) 
 
This is true in the equilibrium solutions. 
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8.3 Additional Numerical Results 
Additional results from Scenario 1: Attractiveness of online advertising 
 
Figure 47: 
Share of IAS 
and wDIA/wD 
in the 
attractivenes
s of online 
advertising 
scenario’s 
NNN regime 
 
Figure 48: 
Average 
margin of 
CPs in the 
attractivenes
s of online 
advertising 
scenario. One 
should 
consider this 
as margin 
per volume 
of content 
and not per 
CSP. 
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Additional results from Scenario 3: Varying performance of the ISPs 
 
Figure 49: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation 
in the 
operational 
performance 
of the 
access ISPs 
scenario 
 
Figure 50: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
operational 
performance 
of the 
access ISPs 
scenario 
 
Figure 51: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
operational 
performance 
of the 
backbone 
ISP scenario 
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A regulated network – basic scenario 
 
Figure 52: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation 
in the 
regulated 
network – 
basic 
scenario 
 
Figure 53: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
regulated 
network – 
basic 
scenario 
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A regulated network – high IU utility on CPs and QoS 
 
Figure 54: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation 
in the 
regulated 
network – 
high IU 
utility on 
CPs and 
QoS 
scenario 
 
Figure 55: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
regulated 
network – 
high IU 
utility on 
CPs and 
QoS 
scenario 
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A regulated network– low IU utility on CPs and QoS 
 
Figure 56: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation 
in the 
regulated 
network– 
low IU 
utility on 
CPs and 
QoS 
scenario 
 
Figure 57: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
regulated 
network– 
low IU 
utility on 
CPs and 
QoS 
scenario 
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A regulated network– low r/λ 
 
Figure 58: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation 
in the 
regulated 
network– 
low r/λ 
scenario 
 
Figure 59: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
regulated 
network– 
low r/λ 
scenario 
The Net Neutrality Debate  IØT - NTNU 
 183 
A regulated network– low IU utility on CPs and QoS 
 
Figure 60: 
Normalized 
values of 
investments 
and 
innovation 
in the 
regulated 
network– 
high r/λ 
scenario 
 
Figure 61: 
Normalized 
values of 
price and 
congestion 
in the 
regulated 
network– 
high r/λ 
scenario 
 
 
